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Abstract 
Safety-critical systems, those whose failure could end up in loss or injuries to people or 
the environment, are required to go through laborious and expensive certification 
processes. These systems have also increased their complexity and as it has already been 
done in other domains, they have applied component-based system developments to 
deal with complexity. However, components are difficult to assess as certification is done 
at system level and not at component level. Compositional certification approach 
proposes to get incremental credit by accepting that a specific component complies with 
specific standard’s requirements and it is correctly integrated. The objective is to support 
integration of new components while the previously integrated components do not need 
to work for re-acceptance.  
We propose (1) the use of assurance modelling techniques to provide us the mechanism 
to understand the common basis of standards shared by different domains such as the 
avionics, automotive and the medical devices design.  
We propose (2) an assurance decomposition methodology offering guidance and 
modelling mechanisms to decompose the responsibilities associated with the life-cycle of 
safety-critical components. This methodology ensures a hierarchy of assurance and 
certification projects where the responsibilities and project tasks can be specified and its 
accomplishment can be assessed to determine the compliance of functional safety 
standards.  
Assurance decomposition supports the reuse of components as it guides us not just for 
standards compliance but specifically on the understanding and tailoring of those 
standards for component assurance and support when those components are integrated 
into the final system.  
We propose (3) a contract-based approach to support the integration of reused 
components and at the same time, the proposal supports the identification of 
assumptions, a very laborious and time consuming task. Assurance Contracts are defined 
to ensure incremental compliance once the components are integrated. The objective of 
this assurance contracts is to ensure the overall compliance of the system with the 
selected standards and reference documents such as guidelines or advisory circulars.  
The defined approach to assurance contracts specification attempts to balance the need 
for unambiguity on the composition while maintaining the heterogeneity of the 
information managed. The claims classification offers an easy method to support the 
assessment of contract completeness and the structured expressions provide a semi-
formal language to specify the assumptions and guarantees of a component. 
This work has been mainly framed in a European collaborative research projects such as 
OPENCOSS a Large-scale integrating project (IP) with 17 partners from 9 countries to 
develop a platform for safety assurance and certification of safety-critical systems 
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(compliance with standards, robust argumentation, evidence management, process 
transparency), SAFEADAPT an FP7 project with 9 partners and RECOMP an ARTEMIS 
project..  
The results of this work have been presented to the standardization group of the Object 
Management Group responsible for the SACM (Structured Assurance Case Metamodel) 
standard specification, which currently discusses its inclusion in future versions.  
The (4) tools presented and used in this work have been included in the results of an 
open tool platform developed within the OPENCOSS project that is being released in 
PolarSys. PolarSys is an Eclipse Industry Working Group created by large industry players 
and by tools providers to collaborate on the creation and support of Open Source tools 
for the development of embedded systems. 
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Resumen 
Los sistemas de seguridad críticos, aquellos que en caso de fallo pueden inducir la pérdida 
o el daño de personas o el entorno, están obligados a cumplir con minuciosos y costosos 
procesos de certificación. Los sistemas críticos al igual que se ha hecho en otros dominios, 
han aplicado diseños de sistemas basados en componentes para hacer frente a la 
complejidad. Sin embargo, el cumplimiento de requisitos de una certificación dada es 
difícil de evaluar en los componentes. Esta evaluación se realiza a nivel del sistema y no a 
nivel de componente. El enfoque de certificación composicional propone obtener 
créditos intermedios al aceptar que un componente específico cumple con los requisitos 
de un estándar seleccionado. El objetivo es apoyar la integración de nuevos componentes 
a la vez que se mantiene a los componentes existentes ya integrados sin la necesidad de 
re-aceptación. 
Se propone (1) el uso de técnicas de modelado de aseguramiento que nos proporcione 
el modo de comprender sin ambigüedad de manera común por diferentes dominios tales 
las de aviónica, automoción y el diseño de dispositivos médicos, la base de normas de 
seguridad. 
Se propone (2) una metodología de descomposición del aseguramiento del sistema que 
ofrece guías y mecanismos de modelización para descomponer las responsabilidades 
asociadas con el ciclo de vida de los componentes críticos para la seguridad. Esta 
metodología garantiza una jerarquía de proyectos de aseguramiento y certificación, 
donde las responsabilidades y tareas del proyecto se pueden especificar y su realización 
se puede evaluar para determinar el nivel de cumplimiento de las normas de seguridad 
funcional. 
La descomposición de aseguramiento soporta la reutilización de componentes, ya que 
ofrece una guía no sólo para el cumplimiento de las normas, sino también 
específicamente para la comprensión y la adaptación de los criterios de garantía de los 
componentes y apoyo cuando esos componentes se integran en el sistema final. 
El (3) enfoque basado en contratos propuesto apoya la integración de componentes 
reutilizados y, al mismo tiempo apoya la identificación de asunciones, una tarea muy 
laboriosa y que consume mucho tiempo. Los contratos de aseguramiento se definen para 
asegurar el cumplimiento gradual en el momento de integración de los componentes. El 
objetivo de estos contratos de aseguramiento es garantizar la conformidad global del 
sistema con los estándares seleccionados y documentos de referencia tales como 
directrices o circulares de asesoramiento. 
El enfoque definido con la especificación contratos de aseguramiento intenta equilibrar la 
necesidad de reducir ambigüedad sobre la composición mientras se mantiene la 
heterogeneidad de la información gestionada. La clasificación de las afirmaciones ofrece 
un método sencillo para apoyar la evaluación de la integridad del contrato y las 
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expresiones estructuradas proporcionar un lenguaje semi-formal para especificar las 
asunciones y garantías del contrato. 
Este trabajo se ha enmarcado dentro de proyectos europeos de investigación en 
colaboración, principalmente OPENCOSS, un proyecto de gran escala (IP) con 17 socios de 
9 países para desarrollar una plataforma para la garantía de la seguridad y la certificación 
de los sistemas críticos de seguridad (cumplimiento de las normas, argumentación 
robusta, gestión evidencias, proceso transparentes), SAFEADAPT un Proyecto del 7º 
programa marco con 9 socios y RECOMP, un Proyecto ARTEMIS. 
Los resultados de este trabajo se han presentado al grupo de estandarización de la Object 
Management Group responsable de la especificación del estándar SACM (Structured 
Assurance Case Metamodel) y se está en trámites de discusión para su inclusión en 
futuras versiones. 
Las (4) herramientas presentadas y utilizadas en este trabajo se han incluido en los 
resultados de una plataforma de herramientas abierta desarrollada dentro del proyecto 
OPENCOSS que se ha liberado en PolarSys. PolarSys es un grupo industrial de trabajo de 
Eclipse creado por representantes de grandes industrias de sistemas embebidos y 
proveedores de herramientas para colaborar en la creación y el apoyo para el desarrollo 
de herramientas de código abierto. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Safety-critical systems are defined as computer-based systems that in case of an incident 
or misbehaviour can lead to an accident that will put people or the environment in 
danger, resulting in injuries and or casualties [Knight 2002]. To deal with this issue even 
further, different standards and guidelines for the design of safety-critical systems have 
been created, such as the IEC 61508 standard for Functional Safety1 of 
Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related Systems [IEC 61508]. One of 
the main challenges for those standards is that they should not avoid technological 
innovation but at the same time, the systems resulting from those innovations should 
remain safe. In order to cope with that, those standards and guidelines tend to be 
sometimes ambiguous and open to different interpretations. While those interpretations 
leave the door open to new ideas, technologies and methods, they also make it difficult 
for standard compliance assessors and companies to share the same views. New 
technologies need to prove safety prior to their inclusion in safety-critical systems.  
Safety-critical systems have increased in technical complexity towards open, upgradeable 
and interconnected systems, exacerbating the problem of ensuring safety in the presence 
of human, environmental and technological risks. These systems also need to handle with 
a shorter and shorter time to market. This situation is pulling companies to invest in 
reusing parts or whole systems from one project to another, sometimes even from 
completely different domains. Although this solution seams very reasonably at first it is 
not so easy to implement and put into practice on safety-critical domains and new 
problems emerge. Safety is a system property and it is not easy to define its boundaries 
while trying to decompose it among the constituent parts and components that interact 
for its operation. Assurance2 of safety-critical systems is done at high level, not at 
                                                          
1 Functional Safety is the part of the overall safety of a system or piece of equipment that depends 
on the system or equipment operating correctly in response to its inputs, including the safe 
management of likely operator errors, hardware failures and environmental changes. [IEC 61508]. 
2 System Assurance is the planned and systematic activities that assure systems engineering 
processes and products conform with its requirements for safety, reliability, availability, 
maintainability, standards, procedures, and regulations. 
"Concern for man himself and 
his safety must always for the 
chief interest of all technical 
endeavours." -Albert Einstein 
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component level. So when dealing with activities such as its certification3, their 
correctness assessment is done by composing small parts into the whole system. This 
assessment must assure that the system integration is done correctly and that new 
properties or behaviours will not emerge unnoticed on the integration. 
This thesis work focuses on three industrial domains: avionics, automotive and medical 
devices as an exemplary subset. All these domains share two aspects that makes them 
relevant for this work; they are all involve safety-critical areas and their systems 
catalogue are getting more and more complex and dependent on software. We will 
specifically analyse how components reuse is being handled in relation to assuring 
compliance with safety standards. This thesis deals with the management of certification 
assets in order to support the reuse of parts of the system or the whole system within 
new projects. The underlying work also deals with modelling requirements from the 
safety standards in relation with reuse, and how the assurance information for a 
component is managed along the lifecycle and used during composition. When the 
component is reused and integrated into the system, assurance of safety standards 
compliance is addressed by composing assurance assets from each of the components 
that form the whole systems. This compositional approach could support the assurance 
of complex systems in very regulated and standardized areas such as the avionics domain 
and be flexible to incorporate new technological trends.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 explains the purpose of this 
work. Section 1.3 details the problem that the present thesis resolves. Section 1.4 
introduces the goals defined for this work. Section 1.5 describes the approach followed in 
this thesis to fulfil the identified goals. Section 1.6 introduces the research methodology 
that has been followed in this work. Section 1.7 explains the context in which the work of 
this thesis has been performed. Finally, Section 1.8 gives an overview of the structure of 
this document. 
1.2 Motivation 
The society is requesting more complex systems and with shorter lead development 
times to bring those systems into the market. In order to reduce the time requested to 
put a new system into the market, reuse of software improve productivity, reliability and 
lower overall cost in software development projects. This improvement could increase up 
to 50% with high level of reuse [Gill 2003]. 
Component-based development increases the potential for reuse and it is being used in 
safety-critical systems as a response to the increasing complexity in its design and as a 
reusability mechanism. Modern engineering and business practices use massive 
                                                          
3 Certification is a (legal) recognition that a system complies with standards, rules and regulations 
designed to ensure it can be depended upon to deliver its intended service safely. 
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subcontracting supply chains and Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS)4 component-based 
development. 
However, current safety certification schemes are often criticised for being process-
centric, focusing on the development process and less on the resulting product. This has a 
negative impact on component-based (or systems of systems5) environments where there 
can be little and/or poor visibility into the internal subsystems design process. 
In the avionics domain, experience shows that despite the difficulties and costs incurred 
over the certification of COTS components, these components pose relatively few 
problems, and in most cases, with only minor negative impact. This observation suggests 
that the required levels of safety can be met by adopting broadly-used COTS products, 
thus laying the groundwork for a reuse strategy in aerospace system design [Espinoza et 
al. 2011]. 
Functional safety standards such as DO-297 [DO-297] in the avionics domain are 
introducing concepts for components reuse and moving from federated systems towards 
a component-based and modular systems architecture. Safety assurance demands a 
systems perspective where software and/or hardware components can be integrated 
providing the desired effect.  
In the automotive domain, the ISO 26262 standard for functional safety [ISO 26262] has 
introduced the concept of SEooC (Safety Element out of Context) where a component is 
evaluated against a “presumed” operational context and operating conditions. Once the 
component becomes part of a specific system in an actual operational context, the 
evaluation is completed by comparing assumed context conditions against actual context 
conditions.  
In the medical domain, devices shall also follow functional safety standards such as the 
IEC 62304 [IEC 62304] for software developments. The concept of SOUP (Software of 
software of unknown provenance) is introduced as a concept to apply when dealing with 
COTS. One of the main differences with other domains is that the evidence to provide is 
not so clearly specified and it is the manufacturer the responsible to specify them. 
However, the functional safety standards lack details regarding the adoption of a 
compositional approach. This absence of guidelines is noticed in all safety-critical related 
systems. There is a need to tackle the composable/modular system view of the 
certification problem. This would imply that (a) certification approaches should be 
extended to detail certification data in terms of the component/system and, (b) they 
must address technology, policy and personnel involved in a component-based system. 
                                                          
4 Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software – Commercially available applications sold by vendors 
through public catalogue listings. COTS software is not intended to be customized or enhanced. 
Contract-negotiated software developed for a specific application is not COTS software.[DO-178c] 
5 Systems of systems are large scale concurrent and distributed systems that 
are comprised of complex systems.[Kotov 1997] 
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The responsibilities for certification should be properly understood and accepted by the 
different stakeholders involved in the system development and assessment. When the 
system development is decomposed across different suppliers these suppliers also inherit 
some of these responsibilities and should be aware of the implications on the whole 
system assurance. 
The main prerequisite for achieving the level of transparency expected for safety-critical 
systems is therefore to answer the following questions: (1) what information is required 
by each stakeholder to achieve the required level of transparency and trust?, (2) what is 
the best way to represent such information contained in existing standards, practices, 
and technologies? 
1.3 Problem statement 
Different projects have conducted different surveys in order to capture the challenges 
and state of the art on these areas. We will particularly highlight the outcomes of the 
OPENCOSS project. 
Partners from the OPENCOSS project [OPENCOSS D1.1] have claimed that the expected 
benefits that can be achieved by reusing components, may lead to development 
efficiency by time saving of and cost reduction, due to reduction of the effort of creating 
the software, testing, debugging and fine-tuning. Such reuse of components can make 
certification more systematic and manageable, due to better analysis of system 
integration issues (emergent issues6). In some domains such as IT systems, composition of 
systems from existing certified generic products results in reduction of the re-certification 
costs and efforts for reused parts.  
However, in order to achieve such benefits as described above, a set of challenges should 
be tackled. Certification and safety assurance can be error prone. It is difficult to justify 
the safety of a reused component without providing a full certification dossier. There is 
the risk of different contexts jeopardising implicit assumptions made about compatibility 
which compromise system safety. In the automotive sector a new concept SEooC has 
been introduced. The SEooC shall be evaluated against “presumed” operational context 
conditions. When reused components are not integrated in the overall system 
development lifecycle, the gap at the boundary between system requirements and 
generic product features may lead to risks of discovering system integration constraints. 
In case of the SEooC, it shall be evaluated by comparing assumed context conditions 
against actual context condition. Moreover, a component certification data should be 
complete and consistent, containing consistent evidence management, component 
models and specifications, and data in order to assess the possibilities for reuse in 
another context. Component-level arguments should be encapsulated effectively.   
                                                          
6 Emergent behaviour is that which cannot be predicted through analysis at any level simpler than 
that of the system as a whole [Dyson George 1997]. 
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1.3.1 State of the practice 
Compositional assurance deals with component-based development. The reason for 
decomposing the system into components is in order to benefit from the possible reuse 
of the components. In a similar way, compositional assurance search to benefit from 
reuse of already assurance component and reduce the overall effort for system 
assurance. We face a reuse challenge related to how reuse is managed, what is the scope 
of reuse and what reuse methodology we must apply. For a better clarification of the 
problem please refer to Fig. 1, a reuse taxonomy created to support the reader. 
Each of the branches in the diagram shows a different type of reuse. There are scenarios 
that combine different reuse types depending on the perspective. In Fig. 1 some boxes 
are highlighted in green; this has been done in order to define the scope of this research.  
 
Fig. 1 Taxonomy reuse 
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Engineering aspect 
This aspect focuses on the idea of reuse on the engineering practices. This facet is based 
on the idea of engineering reuse, where the reuse is at technical level (design and 
implementation). In this situation the safety aspects or mechanism associated with the 
engineering decisions are reused. However, the reuse of work products related with 
demonstration compliance with standards which are done together with the component 
(HW and/or SW) development are usually impacted and need some rework. The reuse 
scenarios are the following:  
• Upgrade – new feature. A component which is associated with a particular 
hardware and/or software will include new features that previous component did 
not have. We have a basic component that will include a new feature in the next 
version. 
• Upgrade – Enhance performance. A component which is associated with a 
particular hardware and/or software will be modified as part of its maintenance 
and will keep the same functionalities as the previous version but the 
performance will be enhanced. 
• Similar project. A component is reused and integrated into a system with the 
same context and domain as the previous used. The functionalities needed in 
both projects are the same and so the component is reused. 
• Similar Project - Product Lines. According to the Software Engineering Institute 
(SEI) description, a software product line is a set of software-intensive systems 
that share a common, managed set of features satisfying the specific needs of a 
particular market segment or mission and that are developed from a common set 
of assets in a prescribed way [Clements Northrop 2001]. 
• Different project - same domain. A component developed for a specific project in 
a certain domain is reused in another project with a different context but both 
projects are from the same domain. The operational environments and/or 
systems in which the component is integrated might differ. 
• Different project –different domain. General use components may be reused not 
only in projects from the same domain but also in/from project from different 
domains.  
• COTS. In this case, the reuse is of a component described as “Commercial off the 
Shelf”. These components are usually general purpose components that can 
apply to different domains and purposes. 
In this work we will focus specifically on reuse of similar and different projects in the 
same domain and the reuse of COTS. The other aspects, although relevant, are outside 
the scope of this research. 
Stakeholders aspect 
This aspect focuses on the different interests depending on the stakeholders. The 
objective here is not so much led by the engineering decisions but on the standard 
compliance requisites and the best practices and methodology for a systematic reuse. 
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• Regulatory jurisdiction. Critical systems may operate in places where different 
jurisdictions apply, for example a plane landing on different countries. In this case 
different jurisdictions apply to the same product/ component and the 
certification artefacts generated for one jurisdiction can be applied in order to 
achieve other jurisdiction. When components are used on different countries, the 
different jurisdiction of each of the countries shall be taken into account in their 
design 
• Communities of practice. Reuse of the methodologies and practices of one or 
more activities mentioned on the standard between different communities who 
share the same objectives 
• Across boundaries of engineering organizations. Different groups within the 
same organization or across different organization reuse the components 
(designs, implementation and/or certification artefacts) from one group to 
another. 
In this work the reuse between communities of practice and across boundaries of 
engineering organizations are in the scope of this research.  
Certification data aspect 
This aspect is focused on the reuse of certification related data and work products. The 
objective here is to reuse the data generated on previous projects or phases and 
minimise the rework of certification related activities. 
• Evidence. Reuse of the results from conducting a safety related activity, 
procedure or applying a certain method or tool. The evidence of having 
conducted such activities is sufficient and there is no need to repeat them when 
reusing the component. 
• Design. Reuse of the results from the design phase into different projects. 
• Argumentation – Patterns. Safety case patterns are considered to be one of the 
main approaches for managing reuse of safety assurance. A safety case pattern 
provides a means of explicitly and clearly documenting common elements found 
in safety cases, and it also promotes the reuse of best practices for safety 
assurance [Hawkins Kelly 2013]. 
• Module - Safety Case. Safety cases modules are parts of an overall safety case 
containing part of an argument and relevant citations of evidence. A safety case 
module may correspond, among other things, to an interrelated set of safety 
engineering activities, scope of responsibilities of a particular engineering 
organisation, well-defined sub-system or equipment used within the overall 
safety-critical platform [OPENCOSS D5.2]. 
• Argumentation Architecture. Safety case architecture is defined by Kelly as “the 
high organisation of the safety case into components of arguments and evidence, 
the externally visible properties of these components, and the interdependencies 
that exit between them” [Kelly 2003]. Argumentation architecture supports the 
reuse of argument modules which can be associated to system component. 
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The focus of this work is all the above scenarios. 
1.3.2 Problem synthesis 
Compositional assurance is considered a system property and previous works have been 
focused on safety property decomposition across the system elements but not on the 
work required to reuse the certification-related data when the elements of the system 
are reused. The challenge developers and practitioners face is the lack of guidelines and 
support for component-based development and how to take advantage of reuse 
mechanism while ensuring compliance with standards. In particular, the challenges that 
this thesis addresses can be stated by the following three research questions in the 
assurance and certification of safety-critical systems: 
Research question 1 (RQ1). How can we express standards compliance needs in relation 
to component development and component integration? 
Research question 2 (RQ2). How can we express the distribution of responsibility across 
the system stakeholders in relation to safety standards compliance? 
Research question 3 (RQ3). How can we best support stakeholders while ensuring 
compliance across the system development lifecycle? 
These research questions are analysed and answered in the following sections. 
1.4 Thesis goals 
At section 1.3 of this thesis we have described the main problems safety-critical systems 
assessors face when assuring safety standards compliance for a component-based 
system. In chapter 1 we defined the scope of this thesis on three perspectives to improve: 
• Perspective 1: Guidance. It consists of providing guides, formalisation of 
certification knowledge, and methodology. It is a way to structure the knowledge 
base and explore that knowledge to be used by different stakeholders. 
• Perspective 2: Reuse parts/components. This perspective is focused on managing 
the decomposition of responsibilities of the work at component level and 
integration at system level.  
• Perspective 3: Automation. The objective here is the automation time consuming 
aspects of compositional assurance. We aim in providing support to the impact 
analysis thought the right identification of use context and parameters at system, 
hardware and software level. A methodology and tools to support integration of 
components into a system from the assurance perspective is provided. 
The aim of this work is to provide an answer to the research questions presented above 
at the different levels of abstraction. Next, the main contributions of this research work 
are summarized. 
Thesis answer to RQ1 is to elaborate some guidelines and a mechanism to express in a 
clear way which information is requested by the standards for components to be reused 
in safety-critical. The aim is to provide a methodology that will serve both developers and 
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practitioners on the understanding on the requirements for the components safety 
compliance and reuse.  
Thesis answer to RQ2 is the decomposition of responsibilities and work developed by 
each of elements in which the system is decomposed. When decomposing a system into 
components and reusing components, the responsibilities for assurance can be 
ambiguous and the responsibilities of each of the stakeholders may be unclear.  
Thesis answer to RQ3 is based on supporting the stakeholders on the assurance process, 
providing the status information regarding the component and system assurance.  
1.5 Thesis approach 
This work is based on the Common Certification Language (CCL) developed in the 
OPENCOSS project [OPENCOSS D4.4]. This is a model-based approach for the specification 
of safety compliance needs for critical systems. The approach is based on a holistic and 
generic metamodel that abstracts common concepts for demonstrating safety 
compliance from different standards and application domains. Its application results in 
the specification of "Reference Assurance Frameworks" for safety-critical systems, which 
correspond to a model of the safety criteria of a given standard. The metamodels have 
been validated versus safety standards and with practitioners. The metamodels support 
the specification of safety compliance needs for most critical computer-based and 
software-intensive systems.  
Associated with component-based development, contract-based approaches have been 
developed in order to help address component integration. However, contract-based 
approaches differ when we see them from the development perspective and from the 
safety assurance perspective. This thesis is focused on assurance contracts which are 
defined as a set of claims that need to be made concerning a component to support its 
certification against a particular safety assurance standard. 
Specifically, our approach provides the following contributions: 
The Assurance modelling contribution. The common certification language (CCL) is 
applied in the scope of component-based system assurance. The interpretation of the CCL 
metamodels proposed in this work provides the mechanism to understand objectives of 
standards with a common basis. This is the first step to generate guidelines and formalize 
the compliance with standards for a company and a project. Modifications proposed to 
the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM)7, are included along with the CCL for 
the component development and reuse. This contribution is described in detail in chapter 
4. 
The Compositional assurance decomposition contribution can be described as a 
contribution for perspectives 1 and 2. It provides us with a guideline and the mechanism 
to decompose the responsibilities associated with component with the objectives of 
                                                          
7 The Structured Assurance Case Metamodel is an OMG (Object Management Group) standard 
developed by the SysA (System Assurance) group. 
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standards based assurance. We are able to identify a hierarchy of assurance projects 
where the responsibilities and tasks can be specified and there is a mechanism to indicate 
compliance of those tasks. This contribution is described in detail in chapter 5. 
The Contract-based approach for assurance integration contribution tries to address 
perspective 2 and perspective 3. A contract-based approach is defined to support the 
integration of reused components. The proposal supports the identification of 
assumptions currently a very laborious and time consuming task. This contribution is 
described in detail in chapter 6. 
In order to fulfil perspective 3 of the scope and support the previous contributions a tool 
support contribution has been developed and applied on the different case studies. The 
tool implements the metamodels shown on the assurance modelling chapter and 
provides editors for each of them. The tool support is not explained in a specific chapter 
but has been shown on the different chapters and been used on the case studies. Tool 
support contribution is described in chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
1.6 Research methodology 
In order to perform the work of this thesis, we have carried out a research project 
following the case study research methodology defined by Yin [Yin 2013]. According to 
[Yin 2013] a case study is the preferred method when ‘(a) “how” or “why” questions are 
being posed, (b) the investigator has little control over events, and (c) the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context. This is the case of this study and 
the research questions identified previously can be categorized as “how” questions.  
We have adapted the iterative case study design process proposed by Yin and conducted 
three case studies using the following phases (See Fig. 2):  
• Phase 1: it focuses on defining the research questions, validating the rationale 
behind choosing a case study as the preferred method; develop a theory by a 
deep analysis of the state of the art. 
• Phase 2 works in parallel executing the three case studies. The case study 
development cycle consists of 5 process steps: (1) design the case study by 
preparing the procedures, (2) prepare to conduct the case study pilot, (3) collect 
the evidences for the case study, (4) analyse the case study evidence in contrast 
with the proposed theory , (5) share the case study report 
• Phase 3: collects the results for each of the case studies for common analysis and 
produce common conclusions. 
In order to produce the case study procedures and reports the guidelines from Runeson 
and Höst [Runeson Höst 2009] have been followed. They proposed some checklists to 
ensure the quality of the case study design and reports. We have been using those 
checklists in order to verify the quality of the case studies proposed in this work. 
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Fig. 2 Case Study research process based upon[Yin 2013] 
1.7 Thesis context 
This thesis has been developed in the context of the research center Fundación TECNALIA 
Research & Innovation [TECNALIA]. The work that has made the development of this 
thesis possible is in the context of the following research funded projects: 
• RECOMP: "RECOMP" stands for Reduced Certification Costs Using Trusted Multi-
core Platforms and is a European funded project from ARTEMIS JOINT 
UNDERTAKING (JU). The project started April 1th of 2010 and has duration of 36 
months. 
• OPENCOSS: OPENCOSS is a European large scale integrating FP7 project dedicated 
to produce the first European-wide open safety certification platform: an Open 
Platform for EvolutioNary Certification Of Safety-critical Systems for the railway, 
avionics and automotive markets. 
• SAFEADAPT: Safe Adaptive Software for Fully Electric Vehicles a European FP7 
project, is analyzing adaptation to address the needs of full electric vehicles 
regarding safety, reliability and cost-efficiency. This project is planned to finish in 
March 2016. 
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1.8 Thesis outline 
This thesis is presented in nine chapters including this one, and one appendix. The 
remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 introduces the main fields that are related to the work that is presented in this 
thesis in order to provide the reader with the background knowledge and research 
context for the thesis work. 
Chapter 3 presents an explanation on the assurance standard ecosystems and its 
application in the three domains under study: avionics, automotive and medical devices. 
The analysis focuses on the composition problem and how component reuse is handled in 
assurance standards. 
Chapter 4 introduces model driven compliance engineering by the appliance of the 
Common Certification Language to the composition problem. 
Chapter 5 proposes a hierarchical decomposition of the assurance problem aligned to the 
system decomposition into components. 
Chapter 6 introduces a contract-based approach to assurance and structured expressions 
as a mean of formalize those contracts. 
Chapter 7 presents how the designed case studies for three different domains were 
planned to evaluate the proposed methodology. 
Chapter 8 details how the proposed approach has been validated by means of several 
experiments throughout case studies. 
Chapter 9 summarizes the main contributions and publications of this work. In addition, 
this chapter provides some insights about further work. 
Annex A shows further details about the analysis done on the standards 
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2 State Of The Art 
2.1 Introduction 
This work deals with the design and development of a common approach for 
compositional assurance on safety-critical systems.  
As Fig. 3 shows, this work is placed joining three different research areas: Safety 
Standards Compliance, Assurance Cases and Components-based Approaches. 
 
Fig. 3 Research areas related to this work 
This work relies on different concepts from these areas. In order to clarify the context and 
the foundations in which this approach is based and to provide a basic background for 
understanding the overall thesis work, different concepts are introduced in this chapter.  
Specifically, the rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides the main 
characteristics of the safety standards compliance for the safety-critical systems area. 
Section 2.3 provides an overview of the Assurance cases area and its principles. Section 
2.4 presents the foundations of the component-based development for safety-critical 
systems. 
Compositional 
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"Safety is 25% Common 
Sense, 80% Compliance and the 
rest is good luck" – Barry Spud 
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2.2. Safety standards compliance for critical systems 
Safety-critical systems can be defined as those whose failure could result in damaging 
either people or the environment. According to Knight [Knight 2002] “there are plenty of 
definitions of the term safety-critical system but the intuitive notion actually works quite 
well. The concern both intuitively and formally is with the consequences of failure. If the 
failure of a system could lead to consequences that are determined to be unacceptable, 
then the system is safety-critical”. In the previous chapter the actual situation of safety-
critical systems and how industries deal with standard compliance on a regular basis have 
been introduced.  
Knight speculates that one of the challenges safety-critical systems will have to deal is 
“comprehensive approaches to total system modelling be developed so that properties of 
entire systems can be analyzed. Such approaches must accommodate software properly 
and provide high fidelity models of critical software characteristics. They must also deal 
with the issue of assured non-interference”. Safety-critical systems need to ensure the 
functions are isolated and there is enough separation and independence between the 
involved elements so the functions do not interfere between themselves for an adequate 
performance.  
Safety-critical systems are identified once an initial hazard and risk analysis has been 
performed, if safety concerns are discovered then it is requested to be certified [Storey 
1996]. Rushby in [Rushby 2007] expressed that current certification practice is “standard-
based” which implies that standards are responsible for prescribing the requirements and 
objectives the system should comply with. These “standard-based” certification is very 
costly and its objective it to provide stakeholders and society in general the confidence 
that the system will not suffer any unacceptable risk that could end in harm of any type. 
Certification requires that applicants shall follow prescribed processes and develop 
specific evidences.  
On the Civil Aviation certification is defined as a legal recognition that a product, service, 
organization, or person complies with the requirements states in a certain standard. This 
implies technically checking the object of certification to very formally that complies with 
the applicable requirements. For certifying a product the authority should assess the 
design process of the product to ensure an acceptable level of safety, check whether the 
product actually conforms to the expected design and issuance a certificate required by 
the national laws to show the product has gone through the assessments process [DO-
178c]. We can assume than when complying with a standard we are actually looking for a 
legal recognition.  
Certification is applied to complete systems, while analysing down into subsystems. As 
Rushby mentioned in [Rushby 2007] the Federal Agency of Aviation (FAA), the USA 
authority responsible for certification avionics systems, only certifies complete aircrafts, 
engines and propellers. The FAA does not certify components such as operative systems, 
or air cruise control application outside the target airplane where they are used. It is only 
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considered the system as a whole and not the components or parts in which it can be 
decomposed. The analysis should be done considering the complete target system. 
Safety-critical systems however, find it difficult to introduce new technologies, methods 
or tools in their design and developments as they have to go through the certification 
liaison process. Applicants should provide to the authorities the compilation of evidences 
from their result of their system safety assessment [Papadopoulos McDermid 1999]. 
While this might be easy and practical on those systems with long and extensive 
experience to the efficacy of the prescribed process and methods, this actually becomes a 
barrier for systems innovation where systems differ from previous ones or where new 
design, implementation or assurance techniques are applied [Rushby 2007]. 
Advisory circulars in the avionics domain are documents issued by the authorities like the 
FAA (Federal Avionics Agency) which works in United States or the EASA (European 
Aviation Safety Agency) in Europe, which are not standards, but are intended to provide 
guidance on accepted compliance means for specific challenging topics. For instance, the 
AC 20-148 [AC 20-148] provides recommendations concerning reusable software 
components. This advisory circular indicates that in order to reuse components, 
stakeholders must identify any installation, safety, operational, functional and 
performance possible concerns. Developers need to state clearly the DO- 178C [DO-178c] 
objectives that are fully and partially addressed, and how compliance has been achieved. 
They need to state clearly the failure conditions, safety features, protection mechanism, 
architecture limitations, software levels, interface specification and the process for 
certification. The AC 20-170 [AC 20-170] intends to lead the applicants into the idea of 
incremental certification. The incremental certification is linked to the incremental 
acceptance. This is the process for obtaining intermediate credit towards the final 
approval and certification. In each stage of the acceptance, the credit is obtained in a 
form of recognition so as to show for future use in a certification process. The mayor 
benefit of this incremental acceptance process is the ability to integrate and accept new 
components in the system without the need for re-acceptance of the previous integrated 
components. However, as stated before, certification is only issued at complete system 
level, instead that at component level. 
Although in the automotive domain there is not a legal obligation to obtain the 
certification from the public authorities, the ISO 26262 functional safety standard is 
considered the state of the art8. In fact, the ISO 26262 standard for the automotive 
industry does not include the word “certification” in the whole document. One of the 
differences between the avionics and the automotive domain is that in the ISO 26262 
standard the certification liaison process is not included. In Europe, the General Product 
Safety Directive (GPSD) 2001/95/EC applies in the absence of specific European 
regulations for safety of certain product categories and complements the provisions of 
                                                          
8 The Draft International Standard (DIS) of ISO 26262 was published in June 2009. Since the 
publication of the draft, ISO 26262 has gained traction in the automotive industry. Because a 
public draft standard is available, lawyers treat ISO 26262 as the technical state of the art 
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sector legislation, which do not cover certain matters, for instance in relation to 
producers’ obligations and the authorities’ powers and tasks. As stated by lawyers [Klindt 
2012] [Reuter 2012], ISO 26262 should be treated as published state of the art and so it 
should be complied in order to reduce the risk of liability. 
In the automotive domain the concept of assuring the complete systems also applies. In 
ISO 26262, the functions at vehicle level are mapped to the “item” concept.  
In ISO 26262 [ISO 26262] Development Interface Agreements (DIA) are described as a way 
to specify both procedures and responsibilities allocated to distributed developments for 
items and elements. The DIA includes information beyond technical safety by addressing 
procedural and confidence related issues. The use of DIAs is intended to help address 
risks such as: a supplier with inadequate capability, improper understanding or definition 
of the boundary of component and its interactions with its environment, or failing to fulfil 
requirements. 
In ISO 26262, the term Development Interface Agreement (DIA) is used to define the 
procedures and responsibilities allocated within distributed developments for items and 
elements. In the DIA the supplier should exchange with the customer information such as: 
feedback about conflicts, completeness, consistency, etc.; technological limitations, 
behaviour models, incl. fault models, feedback about boundary between the Component 
and its environment. Those are the kind of properties that can be classified as in the 
scope of the safety contracts. However, the DIA includes more information that is not 
classifies as safety but also procedural and confidence related argumentation. The 
objective of the DIA is to intend to avoid as much as possible the risk from: 
• a supplier with inadequate capability, 
• improper understanding or definition of the boundary of Component C and its 
interactions with its environment, 
• not fulfilment requirements of 5.4.4, as applied to hardware Component C. 
In the medical domain, the manufacturer is the responsible of the final device which 
should go through the certification liaison process. Although the manufacturer may 
consider integrating developments done by suppliers, (s)he is still fully responsible for 
ensuring the product safety and the risk management activities have been executed and 
appropriate risk control measures have been applies event to the outsourced 
developments [ISO 14971]. 
In the medical domain reused is accepted by the use of SOUP components. In this case 
the manufacturer is expected to ensure: 
• The product development methodologies used are appropriate. The FDA 
recooments to include an audit of the design and development methodologies 
used to thoroughly assess the development and qualification documentation 
generated . 
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• The procedures and results of the verification and validation activities performed 
to the component are appropriate and sufficient for the safety and effectiveness 
requirements of the medical device. 
• There are appropriate mechanisms for assuring the continued maintenance and 
support of the components [OTS Guidance 1999]. 
One of the main differences between the avionics, automotive and the medical domain in 
relation with functional safety is how this concept is covered. 
The automotive domain has integrated all functional safety concerns into one standard, 
ISO 26262. In this standard it is covered the product lifecycle from the concept level to 
the release, maintenance and operation of the product along with the management and 
supporting processes, as it is represented in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4 ISO 26262 Overview [ISO 26262]. 
Avionics domain on the contrary has standardised the different phases of the 
development in different domain specific standards. In Fig. 5 the relations between the 
different avionics standards in the design and operational phase are identified. 
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Fig. 5 Guidelines documents covering development and in-service/operational phases [ARP 4754A]. 
In [OPENCOSS D1.1] a good description is given for the avionics, automotive and railway 
certification framework. 
[Zeller et al. 2014] analysed different safety standards regarding software safety 
assurance highlighting the following similarities: 
• Common notion of safety and certification 
• Linear progressing safety process with dedicated phases 
• Combined hazard assessment and risk analysis to derive safety requirements 
• Criticality levels as means to allocation safety (integrity) requirements to system 
elements 
• Verification activities are driven by the safety requirements 
• Safety case provides evidence that safety requirements are fulfilled which is 
needed for certification. 
And they also identify the following divergences: 
• Varying definition of criticality levels 
• Different approaches for the allocation of safety requirements 
• Specific verification & validation processes. 
Regarding the medical industry, in Europe it is only requested for certification to be 
compliance with EC directives while the application of ISO standards are not mandatory 
just recommended, however, they provide strong bases while requesting certification and 
in some cases a mandatory requirement expressed by customers.  
In Fig. 6 a collection of the standard related to functional safety for medical devices are 
described as described by Hobbs in [Hobbs 2011]. 
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In the avionics domain when a critical hazard occurs, the safe state will be to land as soon 
as possible and finish with the aircraft operation. In a road vehicle there is no need for 
landing so the system tends to shut down when a hazard occurs. However, in medical 
regulation, safety is defined as “the probable benefits to health for its intended use when 
accompanied by adequate directions and warnings against unsafe use, outweigh any 
probable risks” [OTS Guidance 1999]. In this sense the safe state has a different concept 
behind and also the way in which the requirements are derived. The safety requirements 
derived for the safe state are not related to the normal behaviour and expected 
functionality but to the abnormal behaviour and performance in presence of a fault. 
 
Fig. 6 Some of the standards contributing to functional safety in medical devices [Hobbs 2011]. 
[Dodd Habli 2012] describes the audits known as Stage of Involvement (SOI) done at 
strategic point in the software lifecycle with the aim of reducing the risk of failing the final 
certification audit. The earliest a potential certification failure is identified the better. A 
failure will normally consists of reworking an artefact requested by the authority before 
the audit is repeated and directly affecting the final cost. That is the reason SOIs are 
planned frequently with a typical time duration between audits is four to six months. In 
fact, the idea of periodic SOI is similar to the idea of early validation and verification in 
order to reduce the possible project deviations. 
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Dodd and Habli distinguish two types of certification: prescriptive certification and goal-
based certification. In the first one, applicants show that system is acceptably safe based 
on the process objectives prescribed by the standards. Goal-based standards, on the 
contrary, request the existence of a clear argumentation relating how evidences 
generated as an output from testing, analysis and review, support claims concerning the 
safety of the function. Avionics certification follows the prescriptive certification 
approach while the automotive and medical safety standards fit better on the goal-based 
approach. 
[Kelly et al. 2005] analysed the goal-based certification approaches where challenges are 
identified as follows. It is hard to find skilled and experienced people to enable the 
potential benefits of the goal-based standards. Kelly says that in the defence context it is 
possible to find this technically qualified people but it is necessary not only in this context 
but also a similar level of qualification in the customer community. It is a challenge not 
only in finding but also in preserving the skills and ensuring consistent decision making in 
long running projects. 
Prescriptive-based certification is not free from criticisms, [McDermid 2001] [Redmill 
2000] the use of qualified tools, techniques and methods as the ones mentioned in the 
standards do not necessary mean that the system will achieve the desired level of 
integrity. 
Standards-based approaches are defined as those which follow the prescribed process 
and released prescribed documentation. “These approaches work well in fields that are 
stable or change slowly” [Rushby 2010-1]. In order to cope with this, Argument-Based 
Approach to Certification is proposed. This is the one where applicant develops a safety 
case, whose outline form may be specified by standards or regulation. It makes an explicit 
set of goals or claims and provides supporting evidence for the claims and arguments that 
link the evidence to the claims. 
With the idea of inheriting the better of the two approaches, a hybrid approach is 
presented in [Stensrud el at 2011] by integrating prescriptive elements from the 
standards into a goal-based safety case. Their approach is based on transformation, from 
tables presented on the standards into claims. Prescriptive standards requested that 
certain analysis, methods, techniques or activities to be perform during the development. 
These analysis, methods or activities are recommended or highly recommended based on 
the critical level for the function and grouped on tables. Stensrud proposed to transform 
these tables into claims, then, the assessment and ratings of the requirements in the 
standard should be explicitly stated with more detailed arguments. 
There have been different attempts to model the standards. In eDIANA project 
(Embedded Systems for Energy Efficient Buildings) [Arana et al. 2011] a Software 
Engineering Process for Certification Metamodel is proposed. They created a general 
certification “language” by means of a structured semi-formal meta-model, which acts 
like a template for certification requirements specification. Fig. 7 describes the inputs for 
the meta-model creation and how it was used. 
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Fig. 7 Derivation of the Certification Meta-model by Arana [Arana et al. 2011]. 
Another project, ModelMe! (Model-Driven Software Engineering for the Maritime and 
Energy Sectors) also proposed another approach. Some of their conclusions were in three 
main aspects: Safety Evidence Management, Safety Assessment (Modus) and Traceability 
and Slicing.  
• The Safety Evidence Management aspect described in [Panesar-Walawege et al. 
2010] focused in improving system assessment and development practices 
through the application of Model-Driven Engineering. In Fig. 8 we can see and 
except of the IEC 61508 standard meta-model. The complete model includes 124 
concepts, and 32 association types. Specifying safety standards requirements 
through modelling seems worthwhile and brings many practical benefits.  
• They developed Safety Assessment methodology called Modus [Sabetzadeh et al. 
2011] aims for quantitative assessment of dependability cases. Many safety 
decisions are based on expert judgment and assurance cases9 could be a solution 
for showing these decisions. The concept of assurance case will be developed 
further in section 2.3. Assurance cases 
• Regarding the Traceability and Slicing aspect, requirements-Design traceability is 
specially challenging as is a major observed issue in certification. For that reason 
improving traceability and using traceability for automated analysis (slicing, 
                                                          
9 Assurance Case is a set of auditable claims, arguments, and evidence created to support the claim 
that a defined system/service will satisfy the particular requirements [SACM 1.1]. 
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impact analysis, etc) are some important concerns for suppliers and certifiers 
alike. In [Falessi et al. 2011] they proposed the use of a tool SafeSlice for creating 
traceability links and checking consistency. Their approach is based on SysML 
system models where by Slicing of design models they are able to manage safety 
inspections and report generation. This is important in order to check 
components properties.  
 
Fig. 8 Excerpt of the Conceptual Model of IEC 61508 resulting from ModelMe! project 
In the automotive industry there has been an interest on developing a domain specific 
language called EAST- ADL [EAST-ADL V2.1.12] which purpose is to model with enough 
detail the automotive electrical and electronic systems so as to be able to generate 
documentation, design, analysis, and synthesis. For doing so it is requested to have 
system description at different layers of abstraction and detail. These activities also 
involve specifying non-structural aspects of the electrical/electronic system under 
development, such as requirements, behaviour, and verification and validation.  
In EAST-ADL they include the dependability package in order to provide support for safety 
information organization according to ISO 26262. The Dependability package (see Fig. 9) 
includes support for defining and classifying safety requirements through preliminary 
Hazard Analysis Risk Assessment, tracing and categorizing safety requirements according 
to their role in the safety life-cycle, formalizing safety requirements using safety 
constraints, formalizing and assessing fault propagation through error models, and 
organizing evidence of safety in a Safety Case.  
This package tries to provide some support for ISO 26262 requirements, specifically for 
part 3.  
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Fig. 9 Diagram for organization of dependability related information [EAST-ADL V2.1.12]. 
2.3. Assurance cases 
Assurance cases and safety cases appear sometimes indistinctly in the literature. Safety 
cases are defined as “A structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that 
provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given 
application in a given environment” [Def Stan 00-56]. However, these cases are not just 
limited to the safety area; we can find the previous concept applicable to IT 
trustworthiness [Gorsky 2004], security [Bloomfield et al. 2006] or compliance, conceiving 
assurance cases with a much broader scope.  Assurance Case is defined as “a collection of 
auditable claims, arguments, and evidence created to support the contention that a 
defined system/service will satisfy the particular requirements” [SACM 1.1]. 
Wagner [Wagner et al. 2010] structured safety cases into three parts “(1) the safety goal 
that has to be achieved, (2) the available evidence for achieving this goal, and (3) the 
structured argument, which establishes the systematic relationship between the evidence 
and the goals"  
Bloomfiel [Bloomfield 2012] talks about three argumentation approaches:  
1. The goal-based approach where the safety properties which are satisfied are 
argued. 
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2. The rule-based approach where the argumentation is focused on standards 
compliance and  
3. The risk informed approach where the argumentation is centred in 
vulnerabilities and hazards mitigated. 
Flood and Habli [Flood Habli 2011] also make an argument categorization defining: 
• risk (or “primary”) arguments – that aim to establish that the system is acceptably 
safe to be deployed. 
• confidence (or “backing”) arguments – that are used to justify that sufficient 
confidence can be placed in evidence and inferences of the risk arguments 
• compliance arguments – that show that requirements of the applicable standards 
have been satisfied. 
In relation with the previous section where we described the safety standards compliance 
the work of Holloway [Holloway 2013] is relevant as he creates the assurance case 
implicit for the DO-178C. He categorizes the objectives into: (i) The objective is likely to 
appear in some form as a claim or evidence in the primary argument. (ii) The objective is 
likely to appear in some form as a claim or evidence in a confidence argument.(iii) The 
objective is likely to appear as context, assumption, or justification in an argument rather 
than as a claim or evidence. 
However, safety cases are seen with criticism due to several reasons [Johnson Robins 
2011], [Johnson Derek 2011]. One of the main complaints against safety cases is that it is 
always possible to find or produce evidence that something is safe. It is the confidence 
level that is put into that evidence what gives strength to the argumentation. 
Unfortunately, for safety analysis there is no complete mathematical theory to base 
arguments and guarantee completeness. Bloomfield [Bloomfield 2012] and Rasche 
[Rasche 2001] also highlighted following main issues while applying safety cases:  
1. The tendency for practitioners is to use extended expansions for claims that 
cover many issues which are often very hard to justify even informally. 
2. Architecting assurance cases is a specialised activity and some of the current 
assurance cases should be review it and will need significant rewriting to 
apply an architecture structure.  
3. There is a large gap between the practice and the best practices; there is a 
lack of guidance on claims-argument-evidences. 
4. The amount of work required to construct a safety case including the 
specialized and costly (outside) resources required. 
5. Problems associated with obtaining and validating data to justify a 
probabilistic risk analysis. 
6. Too much focus on technical risk and not enough on meeting the needs of 
workers. 
The Nimrod report [Haddon-Cave 2009] also includes some criticisms to safety cases 
indicating that just by doing a safety case, it will not imply that the safety case is correct 
and too complicated safety cases will induce to produce incorrect safety assessment. 
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Unfortunately, there is not a method from preventing in given inappropriate 
argumentation. The ideal scenario for creating strong, complete safety cases is to provide 
an independent, non-subjective argumentation. This could be reached by demonstrating 
that major hazards of installation and the risks to personnel therein have been identified 
and appropriate controls provided.  
It is not rare, while doing safety assessment, to be presented long reports referencing to 
evidence, but those reports lack in clarity on how that evidence relate to the safety 
requirements and how it is understood to comply with the standard. In fact one of the 
complaints Haddon Cave made on the Nimrod report is that “Safety Cases and Reports 
are too long, bureaucratic, repetitive and comprise impenetrable detail and 
documentation”. 
When creating a safety case, the argumentation defined as a connected series of claims 
intended to establish an overall claim is required to be shown. In attempting to persuade 
others of the truth of an overall claim, we make supporting claims which also need to be 
supported; giving us a hierarchy of claims. Ultimately these claims should be supported 
by evidence.  
In Fig. 10 we show how the top claim is decomposed into two sub claims (claim 1 and 
claim 2). Claims should be stated as true/false evaluated proposition. 
 
Fig. 10 Argument decomposition logic 
To inference that proposition stated in Claim is truth the following logic should be 
applied: 
IF Evidence 1 THEN Claim 1 
IF Evidence 2 THEN Claim 2.1; IF Evidence 3 then Claim 2.2 
IF Claim 2.1 AND Claim 2.2 THEN Claim 2 
IF Claim 1 AND Claim 2 THEN Claim 
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Kelly [Kelly 1998] proposes to use argumentation to justify the rationale behind the 
design decision that a system is safe for a specific environment and under certain 
circumstances. He defines six steps in the top-down development of a safety case: 
1. Identify the goals to be supported; 
2. Define the basis on which the goals are stated; 
3. Identify the strategy used to support the goals; 
4. Define the basis on which the strategy is stated; 
5. Elaborate the strategy (and proceed to identify new goals–back to step 1), or step 
6; 
6. Identify the basic solution. 
This methodology has been accepted by the GSN community [GSN Standard] and it has 
been even adapted for developing from the bottom up: 
1. Identify evidence to present  
2. Infer “evidence assertion” claims to be directly supported by these pieces of 
evidence, and present these as claims; 
3. Derive higher-level sub-goals that are supported by the evidence assertions; 
4. Describe how each layer of sub-goals satisfies the parent goal (i.e. strategy); 
5. Check that any necessary contextual information is included; 
6. Check back down the structure for completeness; 
7. Join the resulting goal structure to a known top goal or a set of sub-goals. 
Wagner [Wagner et al. 2010] proposes to structure the product-related safety case into 
arguments about the system itself in different abstraction levels and arguments about the 
environment and the user of the system. He states that by identifying generic safety case 
modules and several reoccurring patterns, this can be reused supporting the 
development of future automotive safety cases. 
Similarly, [Papadopoulos McDermid 1999] also worked on specifying a process for safety 
assessment but their particularity is that they proposed a common process for system 
development and assessment which could be acceptable in the framework of each safety 
standard in consideration. Their model consists of three integrated processes: a 
development process, a safety assessment process and a safety case process. 
Denney and Pai even go further and proposed a lightweight methodology [Denney Pai 
2012] to give systems engineers a capability to (i) continue to maintain the existing set of 
artefacts, as per current practice, (ii) automatically generate (fragments of) a safety case, 
to the extent possible, rather than creating and maintaining an additional artefact from 
scratch, and (iii) provide different views on the relations between the requirements and 
the safety case. They implement a tool to support this methodology and where they can 
assist in a semi-automated safety case generation where they make the following 
transformation from the design model to the safety case: 
• hazard, requirement, causes → goal, sub-goal 
• allocated requirements →sub-goals 
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• mitigation, verification method → strategy 
• verification allocation → evidence 
• requirement source, allocated artefact → goal context 
In relation to this semi-automatic generation of the safety case, another important idea is 
introduced in [Stensrud et al. 2011]. They presented a hybrid approach between 
prescriptive standards and safety cases. The idea is the appliance of safety argument 
patterns by transforming a SIL (Safety Integrity Level) table into a GSN safety pattern. SIL 
tables appear on the IEC 61508 standard in order to show the mechanism, activities 
applicable depending on the criticality of the function. Stensrud proposes a different 
approach to safety case patterns, where patterns are related to certification objectives 
and how they help introducing conformance items for the IEC 61508 standard on safety 
cases and improving transparency in certification processes. Their main interest is to take 
advantage of the goal-based structure of the safety cases and integrate the prescriptive 
elements of the standard so as improve the transparency and consistency of the safety 
certification.  
 
Fig. 11 Schematic illustration of a safety case [Stensrud et al. 2011]. 
Stensrud work is based on the presented a safety case framework  defined by Weaver 
[Weaver et al. 2002] that includes the top level software safety argument where the top 
level goal is that the system is acceptably safe. The top level goal is further broken down 
into sub goals including that the safety requirements are valid. Fig. 11 describes this 
safety case framework. Stensrud address the middle level of the safety case (the grey 
triangles in the figure). They propose a collection of safety case patterns derived from the 
IEC 61508. However, the link between their patterns with the upper pyramid patterns and 
still is just being used on one standard, the IEC 61508. 
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Kelly and McDermid [Kelly McDermid 1997] introduced the idea of safety case patterns a 
mechanism used to reuse some parts of the safety case that support its construction. 
They can be used to apply the best practices of argumentation. Concerning this [Sutcliffe 
Carroll 1999] mentions "Claims as a means of reuse will have to face the problems 
encountered in software component reuse, such as obtaining a critical mass of claims to 
persuade designers to buy into the process of design by reuse, the not-invented-here 
syndrome, need for management incentives and legal and copyright issues".  
There are some argumentation patterns catalogues published in [Stensrud et al. 2011] 
[Matsuno et al. 2010]. 
In order to achieve the challenge of complexity and length of the safety cases, the idea of 
modular safety cases appears. By adopting a modular, compositional, approach to safety 
case construction it may be possible to: 
• Justifiably limit the extend of safety case modification and revalidation required 
following anticipates system changes 
• Support (and justify) extensions and modifications to a ‘baseline’ safety case 
• Establish a family of safety case variants to justify the safety of a system in 
different configurations. 
This approach establishes a modular and compositional construction for safety cases that 
has a correspondence with modular structure of the underlying architecture. As with 
system architecture it would need to be possible to establish interfaces between the 
modular elements of the safety justification such that safety case elements may be safely 
composed, removed and replaced. Similarly, it will be necessary to establish the safety 
argument infrastructure required in order to support modular reasoning. 
Kelly in [Kelly 2001] affirms that “By adopting a modular, compositional, approach to 
safety case construction it may be possible to: 
• Justifiably limit the extend of safety case modification and revalidation required 
following anticipates system changes 
• Support (and justify) extensions and modifications to a ‘baseline’ safety case 
• Establish a family of safety case variants to justify the safety of a system in 
different configurations.” 
Once a modular safety case is created, a module can be reference in other parts of the 
safety case or be reused along with the system associated.  
Despotou highlighted the following advantages of using modular safety cases approach 
[Despotou Kelly 2008]: 
• Reuse of arguments 
• Containment of impact of change 
• Contracts between argument modules provide additional barrier to propagation 
of change if the public (cross-referenced) goals from a supporting argument have 
changed.   
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• Limiting the cost of (re)generating evidence 
• Integration of process and product arguments 
• Standardisation of processes 
He also addressed two challenges: (1) Complexity, in relation that reference between 
modules could increase complexity and reduce clarity. In this sense, coupling between 
arguments should be maintained at reasonable levels. (2) Loss of uniformity, and over-
specification, in relation to the level of abstraction of the modules. Argument contracts 
should make clear the relationship of the referenced arguments. 
The GSN Standard has created an extension in order to cope with the new concepts that 
modular safety cases have to deal with [GSN Standard] such as: 
• Away Goal: This repeat a claim presented in another module which is used to 
support the argument in the local module.  
• Module reference: Presents a reference to a module containing an argument 
• Contract module reference: Presents a reference to a contract module containing 
definition of the relationships between two modules, defining how a claim in one 
supports the argument in the other. 
• Away Solution: It repeats a reference to evidence items presented in another 
argument module. 
• Away Context: It repeats a contextual artefact. 
[Palin Habli 2010] proposes the use of modular safety cases on its use for automotive 
domain. Palin’s approach starts by specifying top level safety claims for automotive 
systems, proposes argument strategies and evidence that can substantiate the safety 
claims (using ISO 26262 as context, where appropriate); and finally, he proposes an 
argumentation framework based on the reuse of argumentation patterns. Palin created a 
pattern catalogue of automotive safety arguments (Fig. 12) The argument patterns are 
identified, some of which are designed to be connected together to produce integrated 
product and process arguments. The patterns address aspects of safety related to safety 
requirements, hazard/risk analysis and through-life safety  
Another challenge identified in [Sutcliffe Carroll 1999] is the misinterpretation due to the 
use of natural language: "claims have an advantage in being a structured natural language 
description which facilitates communication between users and designers from different 
communities. The penalty in natural language is the potential for misinterpretation". They 
also propose some recommendations to support the reuse: claims should be indexed and 
formatted so retrieval mechanism can be used when reusing in new design context. The 
use of faceted classification schemes for the indexation and retrieval has already been 
applied for indexing reusable software components, but with limited effectiveness. 
Sutcliffe suggests that task-artefact cycle as a more powerful approach. In this approach 
claims are associated to context scenarios where they have been used. These scenarios 
are as well associated with identified cases and classes of users, usage tasks and product 
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features. Sutcliffe affirms that this approach provides a richer classification scheme for 
interpreting how claims may be reused.  
 
Fig. 12 Architecture for the Argument Pattern [Palin Habli 2010]. 
Rushby [Rushby 2010-2] also proposes to formalise the content of the claims in safety 
cases: “formalization of some elements may allow the context for human reviewers (e.g., 
assumptions) to be more precisely articulated and checked.” In order to deal with the 
possibility of ambiguity arguments or arguments that tends to possible misinterpretation, 
he indicates that safety argumentation can be logical deduction, probabilistic, expert 
judgement or historical experience. Just by formalizing some elements of the safety case 
it will support precision and checking methods could be applied. He proposes to formalise 
of the content of the claims in safety cases.  
Holloway [Holloway 2013] worked on the creation of the assurance case implicit on the 
DO-178c. He categorized the objectives into:  
• The objective is likely to appear in some form as a claim or evidence in the 
primary argument.  
• The objective is likely to appear in some form as a claim or evidence in a 
confidence argument.  
• The objective is likely to appear as context, assumption, or justification in an 
argument (rather than as a claim or evidence). 
There are coordinated efforts are currently underway in the International Standards 
Organization (ISO) and the Object Management Group (OMG). At the OMG we can 
identify the System Assurance Task Force (SysA) which goals are: 
• Facilitate the development of a specification for a Software Assurance Framework 
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• Enable industry to improve visibility into the current status of software assurance 
during development of its software 
• Enable industry to develop automated tools that support the common framework 
The SysA group is behind the development of OMG SACM standard (Structured Assurance 
Case Metamodel) [SACM 1.1] which combines previous OMG specifications 
• ARM (Argument Metamodel) 
• SAEM (Software Assurance Evidence Metamodel)  
The object management group (OMG) is working on standardizing the Structured 
Assurance Case Metamodel [SACM 1.1]. Standardization will ensure that end users are 
investing not just in individual tools but also rather into a coordinated strategy. 
The objective of SACM is to provide a modelling framework which will allow users to 
exchange their argument structure. This is important from the tooling perspective as 
tools could interoperate so as to exchange information on the same concepts and be 
understandable by all. It reduces ambiguity. However, the representation of an argument 
in SACM does not imply that the argument is complete, valid, or correct. Similarly, the 
evaluation or acceptance of an argument by a separate party is not covered by the SACM. 
An argument is usually defined as a series of linked premises (propositions), leading to a 
conclusion. From this we can derive a set of practical modelling approaches that allow 
users to link propositions (claims) together and to communicate how they consider that 
higher level claims are supported or derived from the lower level claims. In the SACM 
model, structured arguments are derived from that principle where argument elements 
(primarily claims) that are being asserted by the author of the argument, together with 
relationships that are asserted to hold between those nodes. 
Another attempt related to the OMG is the Machine-checkable Assurance Case Language 
proposal, to get assurance cases that are machine checkable which implies to have a 
grammar for the assurance cases and reduce the ambiguity. However, this proposal is still 
under revision [MACL 2013]. 
2.4. Component-based development for critical systems 
The first concept to be explained here is the composability. Maybe one of the most 
adequate definitions for this that applies to our context is the one done by Rushby 
"Composability means that properties of subsystems are preserved under composition" 
[Rushby 2007]. 
Component-Based Development (CBD) is becoming an increasing trend on complex 
system development. Some of the benefits associated with this practice are: reusability, 
maintainability, accuracy, clarity, replaceable, interoperability, scalability, performance, 
flexibility, adaptability, and reliability [Woodman et al. 2001]. 
The appliance of CBD also implies new capabilities that developers should fulfil. According 
to [Brown 1998] developers of large-scale and mission-oriented applications require 
many additional capabilities including: 
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• Re-engineer legacy applications to harvest existing components reusable in other 
applications or replaceable by newer technologies.  
• Find suitable components both locally and externally.  
• Integrate components implemented in a variety of different technologies.  
• Validate a component’s behaviour before using it.  
• Manage multiple implementations of the same component in different 
technologies, and as it evolves over time. 
When the CBD is applied to safety-critical systems then issues arise. As it is mentioned in 
[Rushby 2010-1] components are certified only as part of an airplane or engine. That is 
because the interactions is what matters and it is not known how to certify these 
composabilities. At the same time modern engineering and business practices use 
massive subcontracting and component-based development that provide little visibility 
into subsystem design. 
When analysing accidents involving critical systems such as the Mars Polar accident [Mars 
Polar Loss 2000], we discovered that it is not a problem for component failure but for 
component interactions. Component failure accidents have received the most attention 
in engineering, but component interaction accidents are becoming more common as the 
complexity of system designs increases. Levenson [Leveson 2012] defines a component 
interaction accident as those ones which arise due to interactions among systems 
components (electromechanical, digital, human, and social) rather than in the failure of 
individual components. It is important to provide enough information about a component 
that it is possible to perform an analysis on component interactions. 
When applying CBD to system engineering the following lesson learned should be 
considered: 
• It is important to document the dependencies and effects making assumptions 
made by component designers and developers explicit [Sutcliffe Carroll 1999]. 
• It is recommended to have tool support for the Certification Process, especially 
when reusing software components [Illarramendi et al. 2014]. 
Regarding safety-critical systems, lately different projects have proposed different 
structures in order to support the component base development. 
 
Fig. 13 Match between design-contracts proposed by ASSERT project 
The European ASSERT project proposed to model the assumptions of a component as 
provided interfaces and required services as guarantees [Cancila et al. 2010.]. 
Components will interact only when their respective contracts are valid and the transitive 
closure over assumption is met. Fig. 13 illustrates this interaction. If we just consider 
Component A and component B , Component A guarantees some services (PI_1) with 
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attributes declared in the contract if its assumption, RI_1, is satisfied. This required 
interface RI_1 is satisfied by the guarantee PI_2 provided by Component B, (assuming the 
two contracts locally match). 
However, we still need Component C to ensure that the overall system guarantees PI_1. 
This is because PI_2 requires RI_2 to be satisfied. We now have a chain from PI_1 to PI_3 
where the last element (PI_3) is not dependent on any further required interfaces. 
Consequently, the system guarantees P1_1.  
The CHESS project evolves from the ASSERT concepts. [Vardanega 2009] extending the 
application from the initial spatial domain proposed in ASSERT to aero-spatial, 
telecommunication and railway application domains strengthening results on both 
contract-based approach and mathematical structure.  
SPEEDS was a European project which main objectives were: 
• Modular (component-based) system design with multi-domains in a distributed 
partner environment 
• Integration of domain/tool-specific design models into one tool-independent 
“Complete Virtual System Model” 
• System analysis and simulation across domains, based on a “Complete Virtual 
System Model”   
SPEEDS developed and implemented a formal meta-modelling language and the syntax of 
component. This language provides the format for a Complete Virtual System Model that 
integrates all domain-specific and tool-specific system models. As a result of the project 
not only the complete system model comes out but also the component’s contract. These 
contracts identify the premises and promises of the component in order to behave in a 
specific way and an attribute designating its view-point. A viewpoint has no formal 
semantics but is used as a means of sorting contracts across a complete system 
specification. The specification of the assumption and promise assertions is actually the 
core of the contract; it presents a required capability of the component (associated with 
the viewpoint) [SPEEDS D.2.5.4]. These contracts define the premises and promises of the 
component regarding its behaviour in a specific way as well as an attribute designating its 
viewpoint.  
CESAR [CESAR D_SP1_R3.3_a_M3] was another European project which came out with a 
meta-model (CMM: Cesar Meta-Model) as a result that offers a domain and tooling 
independent modelling capacity which can be used as extension points for domain and 
tool-specific extensions. The CMM includes the concept for Rich components, which can 
be connected and integrated on hierarchies. There can be different kinds of rich 
components such as operational actors, functions, logical components or technical 
components depending on the respective perspective. The CMM is based on an 
integration of component-based design with contracts based on input from SPEEDS 
project, EAST-ADL2 (traceability, verification and validation) from ATESST project and the 
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own CESAR Requirements Management Meta-Model (RMM). All these propose a 
metamodeling language for components dealing with safety-critical systems. 
Another relevant work is the VerSaI concept introduced by Zimmer [Zimmer 2014]. 
Zimmer introduced a model based language used for contracts with its focus on vertical 
and horizontal interferences. The concept of Vertical and Horizontal Interfaces was first 
introduced by [Zimmer et al. 2010]. The authors distinguish between two types of 
interfaces; the Vertical Interface, which happens between the application and the 
underlying platform, and the Horizontal Interface that takes place between applications 
(whether they run in the same platform or not).  
It is important that components do not include only functional specification but also 
include the behaviour when a malfunction appears. Related to this idea and the modular 
safety cases mentioned on previous section, the idea of safety case contract appears.  
The IAWG (Industrial Avionics Working Group) consortium has been researching how to 
evaluate safety on a modular approach. Modular and incremental certification is seen as 
a strategy to deal with the cost of re-certification of change in relation with size and 
complexity of the system. According to Fenn [Fenn et al. 2007-1] there are two concepts 
we need to deal on modular software safety contracts: 
- Dependency – Guarantee Relationships (DGRs): They capture guaranteed 
properties of a software component and define the properties on which that 
component is dependent  in order to uphold its guarantee 
- Dependency – Guarantee Contracts (DGC): The relationship that captures the 
dependencies from one software element that may be satisfied by the 
guarantees provided by other element. 
A safety case contract is seen as the mechanism to record the interdependencies existing 
between the argumentation modules that form the safety case. These contracts are used 
to shown how the claims from one module are supported by arguments from another 
module. Kelly in [Kelly 2001] proposed a tabular form in order to match successful link 
between two or more modules of the safety cases. However, the Industrial Avionics 
Working Group (IAWG) found some problems: 
• It was unclear without more explicit examples, what exactly the safety case 
contract table was meant to cover, and how it was to be applied. In practice it 
was found to be difficult to capture all the necessary information in such a tabular 
form.  
• There is no mechanism for capturing the strategy used in addressing one goal 
with another. This strategy could in many cases be fairly complex. In the same 
way that strategy (potentially with its own context and assumptions) may be 
needed to show how a goal within a module solves another, this may also be 
required where the solution is made across modules via the contract.  
• The tables exist as completely separate entities from the GSN argument itself. 
This means that here is no visibility with in the GSN structure of contractual links 
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Fenn [Fenn et al. 2007-2] proposed to take advantage of the GSN graphical notation and 
safety cases argumentation within the safety case contract as it provides more 
expressiveness and clarity than the tabular approach and also be integrated with the 
safety case argument. The GSN argumentation notation enables to capture the rationale 
behind the safety contracts relationship, where an "away goal" requiring support in one 
module, cannot be directly mapped to a "public goal" elsewhere. This way strategies, 
justifications, and context are also included on the contract and the rationale is made 
explicit. Fenn also proposes a generic pattern for safety case contract modules (See Fig. 
14). They indicate that dealing with context can be complex in the practices as contexts 
inherited from components that have been developed independently are unlikely to be 
equal and the differences are even greater if they have been developed in different 
domains. They also proposed an argument pattern to be used for the safety contracts 
that was used on their case studies. 
 
Fig. 14 Generic pattern for safety case contract modules [Fenn et al. 2007-2] 
Safety case contract-based approaches have been proposed for certification of COTS-
based systems [Ye Kelly 2004]. Ye and Kelly propose the use of a contract that “must 
record an account of the match achieved between the objectives required by the 
application argument module and addressed by the COTS component argument module. 
In addition the contract must also record the collective context agreed as consistent 
between the participant modules”. 
Conmy proposed a method [Conmy et al. 2003] that can be seen in Fig. 15 an Integrated 
Modular Avionics system which is a component-based architecture used in avionics. The 
process is based on the analysis of each component in the context of the overall system 
design and then finding derived safety requirements. Each IMA component (hardware, 
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software or both) is then examined to determine how these safety requirements are met, 
and a contract is formed which captures the rely/guarantee conditions between that 
component and any component which relies on it. 
 
Fig. 15 Summary of the safety process proposed in [Conmy et al. 2003] 
From another perspective, the FRESCOR project (Framework for Real-time Embedded 
Systems based on COntRACTS) [FRESCOR] proposed contract-based resource 
management in distributed systems. It uses service contracts as a mechanism for 
dynamically specifying execution requirements. To accept a set of contracts, the system 
has to check as part of the negotiation whether it has enough resources to guarantee all 
the minimum requirements specified, while upholding guarantees on all previously 
accepted contracts negotiated by other application components. If successful, the system 
reserves enough capacity to guarantee the requested resources and will adapt any spare 
capacity available to share it among the different contracts that have specified their 
desire or ability to use additional capacity.  
The SAFECER project also made some work in relation to composition. They proposed the 
use of composition contract, “a composition contract can be formulated to establish 
relations between their respective contracts and properties” [SAFECER D2.2.1]. In this 
context Sljivo [Sljivo et al. 2013] introduced the concept of weak/strong 
assumptions/guarantees when formalizing for addressing a broader component context 
and specification of properties for specific alternative contexts. They propose contracts in 
which all properties that an environment shall satisfy are defined separately from those 
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required only in some contexts. This allows their contracts to be used for components 
and in different contexts. Their proposal includes the specification for all the properties 
that an environment must satisfy separately from the guarantees and assumptions that 
are required to hold only in some contexts. The latter is specified as a set of weak A=G 
pairs to preserve the connection between assumptions and guarantees, and to enable 
specification of additional properties for specific alternative contexts. 
When a component is integrated in a new context the formal specification proposed by 
Sljivo can be used to check consistency of component integration contracts and the 
contracts of the subcomponents that are part of the system in two separate steps: (1) by 
checking that all strong assumptions in a subcomponent that are not satisfied by the 
composition with other subcomponents are ensured by the strong assumption in the 
composite component contract, and (2) by checking that the composite component 
contract follows from the subcomponent contracts and the interconnections. 
Sljivo [Sljivo et al. 2014] also propose a safety contracts for a component from the 
appliance of FLAR2SAF method. The behaviour of the individual component is expressed 
by a set of logical expressions (FPTC rules) that relate output failures (occurring on output 
ports) to combinations of input failures (occurring on input ports). 
FLAR2SAF method can be performed by the following steps: 
• Model the component architecture in a formal specification, 
• Formally specify failure behaviour of a component in isolation, 
• Translate the formal rules into corresponding safety contracts and attach system 
behaviour analysis based on individual component behaviour results as initial 
evidence, 
• Support the contracts with additional V&V evidence and enrich the contract 
assumptions accordingly. 
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3 Standards Analysis 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the context of the functional safety standards for critical systems 
in the avionics, automotive and health domain from a composition perspective. We will 
analyse the different standards to find the similarities and differences when dealing with 
components assurance. The objective is to gather a good understanding to the level of 
complexity of the problem we are facing. We will focus on how compositional assurance 
is managed in the different domains. 
Safety assurance and certification are amongst the most expensive and time-consuming 
tasks in the development of safety-critical embedded systems as it is evidenced in 
[Hawkins et al. 2013][Dodd Habli 2012]. Further, market trends strongly suggest that 
many future embedded systems will comprise heterogeneous, dynamic systems. As such, 
they will have to be built and assessed according to numerous standards and regulations. 
Current certification practices will be prohibitively costly to apply to this kind of 
embedded system. The certification process is carried out at the whole system level and 
components cannot be separately certified. In [RTI 2014], it is mentioned that for DO-
178C, the standard which applies to software development in avionics domain, costs can 
range from $50 to $100 per executable line of code (ELOC), depending on the certification 
level. These are only the costs for creating the certification evidence and do not include 
the costs for designing and writing the code. 
Rushby [Rushby 2007] defines certification objective as the intention to provide the 
stakeholders assurance that the system is sufficiently safe to operate avoiding 
unacceptable risk of adverse consequences. This assurance is based in three elements 
goals, evidences and argument that might appear explicitly or implicitly in the material 
provide for the assessment. The goals identify the hazardous event to be considered for 
avoidance or mitigation and the degree of risk considered acceptable. The evidence 
includes the results of activities such as analysis, reviews, validation and verification. 
Finally the arguments makes the connection on how the evidence support the goals 
already identified.  
Standards in each of the domains analysed focus mainly on new developments. The 
system decomposition into parts that can be reused from previous projects is not clear in 
the standards proposed procedures. The engineer needs to interpret the requirements 
"A prudent man foresees the 
difficulties ahead and prepares 
for them; the simpleton goes 
blindly on and suffers the 
consequences." Proverbs 22:3 
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and objectives of the standards which will apply to the specific situation and sometimes 
this is open to interpretations. In order to deal with this problem different guidelines and 
complements have been published. 
Reusing a project is difficult and even more when the context changes for example 
reusing across domain. Very few attempts have been made. Zeller [Zeller et al. 2014] 
proposed cross-domain assurance process in conjunction with a development 
methodology for safety-relevant software. The objective was to reduce the effort 
required to perform a safety assessment by reusing safety analysis techniques and tools 
as well as artefacts produced during the safety assurance process. SAFECER project 
proposed a use case where the focus of the reuse across domain was the tool 
qualification [SAFECER D5.4.1]. Their tool qualification proposal across domains is based 
on three pillars: (1) Cross-Domain Requirements spanning different standards, (2) Cross-
domain development process according to the associated standards and their integrity 
levels, (3) Cross-domain tools, instantiated according to the associated standard. 
When trying to analyse the commonalities of the different standards it will be beneficial 
to create a common framework so the particularities and commonalities of the standard 
get highlighted. In this chapter a common framework has been created in order to 
compare standards from the avionics, automotive and medical devices development 
functional safety standards. 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, the different domains are described. The 
objective is to show the different composition and reuse approaches in each of the 
domains. In the next section a comparison framework is defined, this framework in then 
used to compare the commonalities and differences of each of the domains for assurance 
when dealing with component-based systems. 
3.2 Fundamental concept of component 
The different standards identified concepts for reuse which can be mapped to reusable 
components and need to fulfil some compliance requirements for a successful 
composition. 
The first concept identified for the IEC 61508 is the compliant item. This standard, used 
on automation industries, is considered the “mother” of the functional safety standards 
analysed in chapter 3. The compliant item can be software or hardware but in both cases 
what the standard prescribes is the creation of a safety manual by the developers per 
compliant item. According to IEC 61508: “The safety manual shall specify the functions of 
the compliant item. These may be used to support a safety function of a safety-related 
system or functions in a subsystem or element. The specification should clearly describe 
both the functions and the input and output interfaces.” From this statement we can 
extract some requirements for the developers such as new artefacts that should be 
created, i.e., the safety manual, that should be released by the developers and these are 
pre-condition for the integrators to perform the integration phase.  
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One of the first problems encountered whenever we analyse standards from different 
domains is the definition of what composition means for each of them. Component, part 
or module, are concepts that might be used as synonyms, however, they have different 
meanings and connotation in each of the domains. Fig. 16 depicts a schematic on the 
decomposition of the concepts.  
Standards do provide definitions related to components and composition, however, they 
do not agree on the naming or the description. Each domain has its own approach to 
system modularity and reuse. Component has become an overweight concept that could 
induce misunderstanding when different stakeholders discuss.  
 
Fig. 16 Concepts decomposition 
3.2.1 Avionics  
The avionics domain is known for being a very standardized domain. In Fig. 17 the 
different actors involved on the aircraft manufacturing are shown [Chevrel 2011]. First 
the aircraft manufacturer agrees with the avionics authority of the country the type 
certificate. This certificate will include the first definition of the product with documents 
defining the aircraft characteristics. This is done at the very beginning of the design 
phase. The manufacturer then will make a contract with the different avionics system 
developers to contract the development of one or more systems of the aircraft and 
requires them their contribution for the airworthiness certification process. System 
development suppliers should also contact with the authority in order to get a Technical 
Standard Order (TSO) authorization to ensure their system is compliant with the avionics 
standards. Getting this authorization does not mean that the system will be certified. In 
fact, to install the system on the aircraft, the aircraft manufacturer has to discuss with the 
authority to get the installation authorisation. After the installation the complete aircraft 
goes through a safety assessment and it is after all the evaluation process that the aircraft 
is ready to get the airworthiness certification. 
Vehicle / Aircraft / Medical device 
Functional Unit 
System 
Platform 
Component 
Application 
HW SW Component 
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Fig. 17 Certification actors involved in avionics 
In the avionics domain the DO-297 [DO-297] standard and the advisory circular AC 20-148 
[AC 20-148] deal with reuse, each of the documents for a different scope. The AC 20-148 
is the results of creating guidelines for the software component reuse while the DO-297 
standard appears as a consequence of the move from federated architectures in avionics 
to IMA architecture (Integrated Modular Avionics). IMA is the term used for a distributed 
computing network aboard aircraft, which supports avionics applications of many 
different assurance levels, and it is designed for flexibility in configurations and 
modularity. It supports assurance evidence reuse to reduce effort required when reusing 
components in different systems. IMA technology has introduced the possibility to 
fragment the certification process into several tasks: (a) module and/or platform 
acceptance, (b) application acceptance (software and hardware), (c) IMA system 
acceptance (integration of multiple applications), (d) aircraft integration (e) change of 
modules or applications and (f) reuse of modules or applications.[DO-297] 
The IMA platform architect role establishes a certification baseline about sizing 
hypothesis (memory, processor throughput), applicable (certification standards DO-254, 
DO-178), and functionality expected (e.g. API A653). The IMA platform architect also fixes 
the execution platform perimeter for the module supplier, including hardware (e.g., 
processing unit, IO units, and memory units) and software (OS, drivers, platform system 
functions, etc.). The module supplier provides what DO-297 calls the usage domain 
(characteristics and usage constraints). The module supplier provides qualification 
material for certification demonstrations as well. Finally, the IMA platform architect 
validates the module supplier’s data and provides formal acceptation. Acceptance of a 
module can only be performed in the context of the aircraft or engine certification 
program or modification project. 
In the avionics domain, federated systems are moving forward to more integrated 
modular avionics (IMA) architectures. IMA is the term used for a distributed computing 
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network aboard aircraft, which supports avionics applications of many different 
assurance levels, and is designed for flexibility in configurations and modularity. It 
supports assurance evidence re-use to reduce effort required when re-using components 
in different systems. The DO-297 standard [DO-297] proposes two concepts for 
compositions, applications and IMA platform modules. 
In Fig. 18, extracted from the DO-297 standard, the IMA architecture is structured in 
reference to the different elements in which it is decomposed. On the one hand there are 
the avionics specific functionalities which are called the IMA applications and might be 
reused from one platform to another. On the other hand, the platform, the hardware and 
basic software in which the functions run are part of the architecture as well. Fig. 18 
describes the incremental aspects that are related to the IMA concept. The IMA platform 
(certification domain #2) that is built from modules (certification domain #1) and 
associated configuration tools is in correlation with the IMA platform Usage Domain. The 
usage domain defines the set of rules and constraints that allow the customization of the 
IMA platform for a specific use while keeping the certification credits obtained for the 
platform.  
 
Fig. 18 Relationship of IMA elements and the incremental certification concept [Ruiz et al. 2012] 
The objective of deploying an IMA architecture is to reduce the space, weight and power 
requirements by reducing the need of hardware. By complying with DO-297 the idea is to 
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reduce the cost of maintenance and certification as it allows the certification of the 
following building blocks: the IMA modules and the IMA application. It allows 
decomposing the certification process into the following activities: 
• module and/or platform acceptance,  
• application acceptance (software and hardware),  
• IMA system acceptance (integration of multiple applications),  
• aircraft integration (e) change of modules or applications,  
• reuse of modules or applications. 
IMA platform references a distributed computing network on-board aircraft, which allows 
us having support for avionics applications of many different assurance levels. This way, 
mixed-criticality applications can be running on the same platform without the need of 
certifying each of them to the highest assurance level. It is designed for flexibility in 
configurations and modularity but, at the same time, it ensures the isolation of the 
applications and the safety of the platform. It is thought for reusing applications from 
different target systems without increasing the certification costs. 
However, applying DO-297 is not an easy task. Eveleens [Eveleens 2006] indicates as one 
of the challenges of reusing an IMA from a previous project the lack of sufficient support 
for dealing with changes made in existing IMA systems or when reusing design elements 
of an IMA. There is a need of justification in order to reuse pre-qualification documents 
due to the number of acceptance criteria, safety arguments and evidence that need to be 
considered in a new integration project.  
Another hot topic for compositional certification is the incremental certification issue. In 
the AC 20-170 [AC 20-170] defines it as: “A process for obtaining credit toward approval 
and certification by accepting or finding that an IMA module, and/or off-aircraft IMA 
system complies with specific requirements. This incremental acceptance is divided into 
tasks. Credit granted for individual tasks contributes to the overall certification goal”. The 
tasks which conforms the incremental acceptance are: 
• Module acceptance; 
• Application Acceptance; 
• IMA system acceptance; 
• Aircraft Integration of IMA System (including Validation and Verification); 
• Change; 
• Reuse of modules or applications. 
In Fig. 18 the elements for reuse on IMA architecture as Component (either software or 
application specific hardware), complete application, a module, a set of module or the 
complete platform are illustrated. 
An IMA module, which is a module for the IMA platform, can work standalone or in a 
combination of more modules including core software, which manages resources in a 
sufficient manner to support at least one application. These applications running on the 
IMA platform are also eligible for reuse. For both, DO-297 prescribes a set of data that 
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should be available before the reuse takes place and some objectives that should be 
achieved. For example one of the objectives to fulfil is to ensure that life cycle data 
remains unchanged from what was previously accepted. Related to this, documents and 
data such as the MAP (module acceptance plan), PSAC (Plan for Software Aspects of 
Certification), PHAC (Plan for Hardware Aspects of Certification) should be available 
before the reuse is effectively done. 
Fig. 19 based on the IMA certification process included in DO-297 standard includes the 
activities that should be done in each of the phases: (S) Specification, (D) Development, (I) 
Integration, (V)  Validation and Verification, (Q)  Compliance with standards and (C) 
Certification. Following the incremental certification guidelines the objective is to reduce 
the time required in task 3, the IMA system integration (off the aircraft) by reducing the 
effort needed in integration, Validation and Verification. 
 
Fig. 19 IMA certification process 
The advisory circular AC 20-148 is not a standard and consequently is not prescriptive; 
however, it is highly recommended applying it when using Reusable Software 
Components (RSC) in your system. According to the circular, a RSC “is the software, its 
supporting RTCA/DO-178B software life cycle data, and other supporting documentation 
being considered for reuse. The component designated for reuse may be any collection of 
software, such as libraries, operating systems, or specific system software functions”. AC 
20-148 distinguishes between what is the component from the developer view and from 
the integrator point of view.  
The RSC needs to be developed having in mind that it is not going to be used in just once 
specific project but with reuse as an objective. This means that from the planning phase 
there should be some activities that should be performed and release a set of data to 
make reuse feasible. Some of these activities are referenced from the developer and from 
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the integrator perspective. For example, some of the activities suggested for the RSC 
developer to perform include: 
• Prescribe activities to gain full credit for the installation 
• Identify verification activities that integrator must repeat 
Related to these the RSC integrator is required to perform the following activities: 
• Activities prescribe by developer to gain full credit for the installation 
• Repeat verification activities define by developer 
These activities resemble pre conditions and post conditions that should be accomplished 
in order to make a satisfied reuse. 
RSC is not the only concept in the avionics domain that takes reuse and composition into 
play. The DO-297 standard is based on the idea of reference architecture, the IMA 
architecture. The platform implementing this IMA architecture will be composed by 
modules and applications will run on top of this platform. The standard designates 
platform modules and applications to be reused on different projects.  
Software development aspects are covered in DO-178 standard while hardware aspects 
are in DO-254 [DO-254]. These two standards describe development procedures and are 
referenced by the others. 
Table 1 Scope of the avionics standards 
Reference document Scope 
ARP 4754a Assurance 
ARP 4761 System 
DO-297 Platform / Application 
DO-178 Software 
DO-254 Hardware 
AC 20-148 Software components 
AC 20-170 Incremental certification 
In Table 2 some of the definitions used in the avionics standards regarding the 
compositional concepts are shown. 
Table 2 Definition of compositional concepts according to avionic standards 
Concept Reference Definition 
Component DO-297 A self-contained hardware or software part , 
database  or combination thereof  that maybe 
configuration controlled  
DO-178C 
DO-254 
A self-contained part, combination of parts, 
subassemblies, or units that performs a distinct 
function of a system. 
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Concept Reference Definition 
Item ARP 4761 One or more hardware and/or software 
elements treated as a unit 
Module DO-297 A component or collection of components that 
may be accepted by themselves or in context of 
an IMA system 
Application DO-297 Software and/or application-specific hardware 
with a defined set of interfaces that when 
integrated with a platform(s) performs a 
function 
Platform DO-297 A module or group of modules, including core 
software, that manages resources in a manner 
sufficient to support at least one application 
System DO-297 
DO-254 
A collection of hardware and software 
components organized to accomplish a specific 
function or set of functions 
COTS DO-178 Commercially available applications sold by 
vendors through public catalogue listings. COTS 
software is not intended to be customized or 
enhanced- Contract-negotiated software 
developed for a specific application is not COTS 
software. 
DO-254 Component, integrated circuit or subsystem 
developed by a supplier for multiple customers, 
whose design and configuration is controlled by 
the supplier’s or an industry specification. 
Incremental 
certification 
AC 20-170 A process for obtaining credit toward approval 
and certification by accepting or finding that an 
IMA module, and/or off-aircraft IMA system 
complies with specific requirements. This 
incremental acceptance is divided into tasks. 
Credit granted for individual tasks contributes to 
the overall certification goal 
In avionics there are some properties that need to be checked for making reuse feasible. 
Some of these properties, that have their own section in the standards, include the robust 
partitioning and resource management. These properties should be reported to be 
ensured and results should appear on the validation and verification results report. 
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3.2.2 Automotive 
The automotive domain is much less regulated. The standard ISO 26262 [ISO 26262] was 
published in November 2011 and is the reference for the functional safety in this domain. 
However, in the automotive industry, component driven development is a well-known 
strategy. Different concepts for compositional systems arise which differ on how they 
should be treated later on. Many suppliers take part on the development of a vehicle 
where different components and systems are integrated. There are three main concepts 
that cover the composition from different perspectives and are included on the standard: 
• Hardware & Software qualified component; 
• Safety Element out of Context (SEooC); 
• Proven in use argument. 
The three concepts share the aim of reusing the component together with the evidences 
which the show the compliance with the standard requirements.  
In Fig. 20 and Fig. 21 taken from part 10 of the ISO 26262 standard we have a clear view 
of the parts in which an automotive system is decomposed, and the terms used in the 
standard to identify the scope of each of the elements. An item is always associated with 
a vehicle function and it item can be either a system or an element. Fig. 20 focuses on the 
relationship between the elements of a system. It clarifies the information from the 
standard perspective using the naming structure which appears in the standard.   
 
Fig. 20 Relationship of automotive concepts [ISO 26262-part 10] 
Table 3 provides excerpts of definitions extracted from different standards that support 
the previous proposition. The definitions have been extracted from the part 1 of the 
standard which focuses on vocabulary. 
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Table 3 Definition of compositional concepts according to automotive standard ISO 26262 
Concept Reference Definition 
Component ISO 26262 Non-system level element that is logically and 
technically separable and is comprised of more 
than one hardware part or more software units  
Part/Unit ISO 26262 Atomic level software component of the 
software architecture that can be subjected to 
standalone testing. When referring to 
hardware, then hardware which cannot be 
subdivided. 
Element ISO 26262 System or part of a system including 
components, hardware, software, hardware 
parts and software units 
Item ISO 26262 System or array of systems to implement a 
function at the vehicle level 
System ISO 26262 Set of elements that relates at least a sensor, a 
controller and an actuator with one another  
SEooC ISO 26262 A SEooC is a safety-related element which is not 
developed for a specific item. 
Qualified Software/ 
Hardware component 
ISO 26262 Pre-existing elements for an item which is not 
necessarily designed for reusability nor 
developed under ISO 26262 
Fig. 21 is focused on the decomposition issue, i.e., how the electronics embedded 
systems in a vehicle are decomposed. In some situations it might be complex to clearly 
categorize a component as an item or as an element, the reason why is the overlapping; 
there are cases in which the element is an item, the boundaries are not fixed. That is the 
case of the SEooC which is not an item but an element and can be a system by itself. 
Hardware and software qualified components appear on part 8 of the standard. The 
objective of these components is their reuse in items developed in compliance with ISO 
26262 and with similar functionality and context.  
A qualified hardware component is a piece of hardware which has not been developed 
according to ISO 26262. Some examples could be resistors, transistors, grey code 
decoder, sensors such as fuel pressure sensors. There is some discussion among suppliers 
whether sensors should follow ISO 26262.  
A qualified software component is a piece of software to be reused on items with 
identical functionality. These components need to include source code, models, pre-
compiled code, or compiled and linked software. Examples of these are the COTS 
software, or in-house components already in use. 
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Proven in use acceptance is only feasible when field data is available. The item or element 
for reuse which justifies the adequacy based on the data from previous produced vehicles 
which have incorporated the item. They shall have identical conditions of use as the 
previous one which should already be released and in operation. As the standard has only 
been released in November 2011, there are not many chances that elements are already 
in operation and with enough historic data to be shown as evidence when reused. The 
requirement for reuse about the conditions of use it is difficult to fulfil on different 
projects.  
 
Fig. 21 Example of item dissolution taken from part 10 of the standard ISO 26262-10 
Much more different is the SEooC concept which is described on the part 10 of the ISO 
26262 standard. This concept is the one which share more commonalities with the IMA 
modules. The SEooC is developed from the beginning at the concept phase considering 
reuse. The reuse could be in different contexts where the final use could diverge. The 
possible contexts and system in which the component might end up being reused are 
assumed. The component might end be used for different purposes than the ones 
thought at development time, the possible contexts and end uses are assumed, in fact 
the assumptions that need to be define are of two types: 
• External: related to the reference target (E/E architecture, system(s), 
environment, etc.) 
• Internal: requirements and safety requirements, related to the application that 
are placed on the element by higher levels of design  
In [Ruiz el at. 2013-1] we describe the activities for the SEooC compliance assessment 
(Fig. 22). SEooC does assumptions at the development phase on how it is going to be used 
and the environment in which it is going to be integrated. Once it is integrated with the 
item, these assumptions need to be validated. If assumptions are not compatible you 
should either change the item or the SEooC. 
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Fig. 22 An interpretation of being compliant with SEooC topics within a view of the progressing steps in a 
typical ISO 26262 workflow [Ruiz et al. 2013-1] 
A SEooC is a safety-related element which is not developed for a specific item. The SEooC 
is a generic element that can be developed by an organization independently from the 
one that will be reusing the element in a specific context. It is developed under ISO 26262 
and intended to be reusable. Examples of a SEooC can be: 
1. A Hardware SEooC such as an ECU performing the inverter function that can be 
reused on: (a) the braking subsystem, (b) the clutch subsystem, (c) the 
accelerator subsystem  
2. A Software SEooC like a communication software library that can easily be reused 
on: (a) Communication from the control system to the different systems, (b) 
Communication between two ECUS that are part of the same system. 
3. A Software SEooC can also be an AUTOSAR [AUTOSAR]software module for 
controlling an electric motor which is meant to be integrated easily in a variety of 
potential car systems such as: (a) Electric power steering, (b) Dynamic steering, 
(c) Steer by wire, (d) Brake by wire, (e) Power sliding windows (f) Actuators for 
mirror adjustment 
A system SEooC for example, the electronic parking system that is in charge of the 
management of the park pawl (mechanical engagement/disengagement) actuation. The 
parking system provides mechanical locking or unlocking of the transmission when the 
parking mode is selected (by the driver or automatically), avoiding unwanted movement 
of the vehicle when stopped. It can be reused on different vehicles. 
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Fig. 23 SEooC System development 
Fig. 24 depicts the process for SEooC development in accordance with ISO 26262 
recommendations which appears in part 10. On the right side of the figure the specific 
activities that should be done at development time in a SEooC can be seen while on the 
left side the SEooC impacting on the item development is shown.  
 
Fig. 24 SEooC development process 
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3.3.3 Medical devices 
In the health domain where medical devices development is categorized, there is a 
standard ecosystem. Functional safety is split into three standards. The standard IEC 
60601-1 is the generic standard. From this the 60601-1-XX are considered the collateral 
or horizontal standard. Part 2 standards, those following the naming series 60601-2-XX 
are defined for specific product types, such as the 60601-2-4 is specific for cardiac 
defibrillators. The horizontal standards, those names as 60601-1-XX to ensure certain 
aspect of the device (EMC; usability, alarms, environment…). Software related functional 
safety is handled in the IEC 62304 standard while risk management is done in the ISO 
14971 standard. 
 
Fig. 25 Medical devices standards ecosystem 
Regarding compositional assurance, a concept for SOUP (Software Of Unknown 
Precedence) is defined. It referrers to a software item that is already developed for which 
adequate records of the development processes are not available. Similar to automotive 
domain, the manufacturer of the medical device should tailor some of the activities in 
order to use a SOUP. From the planning phase, SOUP components should be identified. 
Manufacturer should also specify system hardware and software necessary to support 
the proper operation of the SOUP item. Hardware components are not so easy to identify 
as they are not mentioned on the generic standard, 60601-1. Hardware elements should 
be IEC 61508 compliant.  
Table 4 Definitions of compositional concepts according to standard related to medical devices 
Concept Reference Definition 
Software item IEC 62304 
IEC 90003 
Any identifiable part of a computer program 
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Concept Reference Definition 
Software product IEC 62304 
IEC 12207 
Set of computer programs, procedures, and 
possibly associated documentation and data 
Software system IEC 62304 Integrated collection of software items 
organized to accomplish a specific function or set 
of functions 
Software unit IEC 62304 Software item that is not subdivided into other 
items 
SOUP IEC 62304 Software of unknown provenance (SOUP). 
Software item that is already developed and 
generally available and that has not been 
developed for the purpose of being incorporated 
into the medical device (also known as “off-the-
shelf” software”) or software previously 
developed for which adequate records of the 
development processes are not available. 
System IEC 62304 
IEC 12207 
Integrated composite consisting of one or more 
of the processes, hardware, software, facilities, 
and people, that provides a capability to satisfy a 
stated need or objective. 
3.3 Analysis on the guidelines 
There have been a number of attempts to make a comparison between different 
standards from the different safety-critical-domains; however, there were not specifically 
focused on component compositions. 
Ledinot in [Ledinot et al. 2012] made an analysis to different software safety standards: ( 
DO-178/ED-12 for aeronautics, IEC 61508 for industry automation, ISO 26262 for 
automotive, IEC 60880 for nuclear, EN 50128 for railway and ECSS-Q-ST-80C for space) 
comparing how the Development Assurance Levels impact on the prescribed objectives, 
activities, methods or safety mechanisms to be implemented. They compare the 
probabilistic system safety levels to which the highest software development assurance 
levels are supposed to be compatible with. All the standards dismissed the notion of 
probabilistic software failure, as well as any probabilistic quantification of DAL 
(Development Assurance Level)-dependent likelihood of residual software fault. 
However, all the standards implicitly state that the various software development 
assurance levels are compatible, or consistent, with corresponding quantified system 
safety levels. 
Blanquart [Blanquart et al. 2012] makes an analysis from the critical categories (Safety 
Integrity levels, Development Assurance levels, etc.) and highlights that all standard share 
the same fundamental concepts where critical categories are linked to the risk and effects 
of potential failures. The main divergence comes from acceptance barrier. Some domains 
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consider different categories for a few and many deaths, or consider damaging the 
environments or public or private property in same categories as injuries. 
Safety standard guidelines on how to manage safety design in order to mitigate the 
possible risk has a direct impact on cost. The way to evidence the correct safety 
managements is by techniques that the standards associate with a specific Safety 
Integrity Level (SIL), DAL or risk classification [Machrouh et al. 2012] Machrouh also 
mentioned that “Defining the commonalities between safety standards in various 
domains allows one to reduce the development cost of the critical-embedded systems by 
mutualising the developments by reuse of components”.  
Papadopoulos and McDermid in [Papadopoulos McDermid 1999] define a reference 
structure for the comparative review of standards. The structure is based on five principal 
dimensions of the certification problem: (1) Requirements for system development and 
safety processes, (2) Method for establishing the system Safety Requirements, (3) 
Definition, treatment and allocation of development assurance levels, (4) Requirements 
on techniques for component specification, development and verification and (5) 
Requirements on the content and structure of the safety case. They identified significant 
differences “in the recommended component specification, development and verification 
techniques, at the detailed level”. 
None of these comparisons took in consideration the perspective of component 
assurance and reuse requirements. The medical device related standards do not appear 
on the previous comparison. For that reason we have tried to provide a brief analysis on 
the avionics, automotive and health domains. These domains provide a good view of the 
different standards situation. All these domains consider the IEC 61508 [IEC 61508] as the 
mother standard in which they have based their own domain specific standards. All these 
domains differ on their approach to functional safety. Avionics standards trust on 
process-based standards, automotive applies a goal-based standard for functional safety 
while standards for medical devices development can be categorized as product-based. 
These provide us a good view of safety standards and have been selected for the 
comparison and later on to be the domains in which the case studies have been 
developed. 
In Fig. 26, we have tried to describe the scope of the different standards from the 
avionics, automotive and health domains. 
In order to make a more systematic comparison we have defined a comparison 
framework using the GQM (Goal Question Metrics Technique). “Writing goals allowed us 
to focus on important issues. Defining questions allowed us to make goals more specific 
and suggested the metrics that were relevant to the goals.” [Solingen Berghout 1999]. 
Table 5 depicts the analysis done for the framework creation 
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Fig. 26 Standards scope in relation to decomposition concepts 
Table 5 GQM definition for standards analysis 
Goals Questions Metrics 
Scope 
Which is the scope of the 
elements to be reused? 
Is reuse on the system allowed? 
Is reuse on a system level allowed? 
Is reuse of SW systems allowed? 
Is reuse of SW components 
allowed? 
Is reuse of HW systems allowed? 
Is reuse of HW components 
allowed? 
Context 
Which is the scope of 
reuse permitted? 
Is the reuse done on same context 
or different context that previous 
one? 
Complexity level/ 
Integration level 
Number of activities impacted by 
the reuse 
Number of artefacts impacted by 
the reuse 
Number of properties to be verified 
after the integration 
Composition 
requirements 
Is the composition 
included on the standard? 
Number of guidelines to comply 
with in order to perform a reuse  
Vehicle / Aircraft /Medical device 
Functional Unit 
System 
Platform 
Comp. 
DO-297  
App. 
Comp 
ISO 26262 / IEC 61508 / 
ARP-4754 / ARP-4761 
CS-25 / IEC 600601 / 
ISO 14971 
HW SW 
DO-254 / ISO 26262 Part 5 
DO-178 / ISO 26262 Part 6 / 
IEC 62304 
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For the analysis we have taken into account the following standards and guidelines: ISO 
26262, DO-297, DO-178, DO-254, ARP 4754, ARP4761, AC 20-148, AC 20-170, IEC 60601, 
ISO 14971 and IEC 62304. In the following table the results from this comparative studio 
is shown. 
Table 6 Results of the GQM to the standards analysis 
Metrics Avionics Automotive Medical Devices 
Is reuse on system 
level (vehicle...) 
allowed? 
IMA application Proven in use n.a. 
Is reuse on a system 
level allowed? 
n.a. 
System SEooC 
Proven in use 
n.a. 
Is reuse of SW 
systems allowed? 
IMA software 
module 
SW SEooC Software product 
Is reuse of SW 
components 
allowed? 
RSC (reusable 
software 
component) 
 
Qualified SW  
Software SEooC 
SOUP 
Is reuse of HW 
systems allowed? 
 HW SEooC n.a. 
Is reuse of HW 
components 
allowed? 
Just the FAA accepts 
the hardware 
component reused 
on an IMA platform 
on its ETSI 504 
order.  
HW SEooC 
Qualified HW 
Hardware compliant 
item (according to 
IEC 61508) 
Is the reuse done on 
same context or 
different context 
that previous one? 
Different context are 
accepted. Using the 
concept of RSC 
(reusable software 
component) where 
analysis should be 
done to ensure the 
behaviour. IMA 
modules accept to 
be used on different 
contexts if 
previously the have 
been defined on 
parameters which 
can be configured. 
The reuse can be 
done on the same 
context by applying 
the concepts of 
qualified Software or 
proven in use. 
Different Context 
reuse is also 
accepted, this time 
the concept of 
SEooC is applied 
Different context are 
accepted. The 
concept SOUP 
(Software Of 
Unknown 
Provenance) permits 
the use of software 
from other context. 
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Metrics Avionics Automotive Medical Devices 
Number of activities 
impacted by the 
reuse 
31. We have 
analysed the 
activities mentioned 
on DO-297 and on 
AC 20-148 
9. We have analysed 
the activities 
mentioned on ISO 
2626 
14. We have 
analysed the 
activities mentioned 
on IEC 62304 
See the annex A for the analysis of activities mentioned on the 
standard that should be ensured for reuse. 
Number of artefacts 
impacted by the 
reuse 
37. We have 
analysed the 
artefacts mentioned 
on DO-297 and on 
AC 20-148 
45 (SEooC), 6 
(Qualified software 
component), 3 
(qualified hardware 
component). We 
have analysed the 
activities mentioned 
on ISO 2626 and 
depending on the 
concept we will 
apply for reuse the 
number of artefacts 
differ. 
As the artefacts are 
not defined by the 
standard, this metric 
do not apply 
See the annex A for the analysis of the properties mentioned on 
the standard that should be ensured for reuse. 
Number of 
properties to be 
verified after the 
integration 
36.  30 24 
See the annex A for the analysis of the properties mentioned on 
the standard that should be ensured for reuse. 
Number of 
guidelines to 
comply with in 
order to perform a 
reuse  
AC 20-148 for 
software 
DO-297 for IMA 
TSI for hardware 
Part 10 of ISO 26262 
for guidelines on 
qualified HW&SW 
and for SEooC 
Guidance for 
Industry, FDA 
Reviewers and 
Compliance on Off-
The-Shelf Software 
Use in Medical 
Devices 
3.3.1 Common features 
Taking all the previous information in account, we have developed a harmonized criterion 
for comparison and management. Guidelines and standards give us the notions about the 
information we need to manage with respect to assurance, those are the concepts that a 
components need to deal with. Details on the results for the analysis can be consulted in 
annex A. When analysing the material we noticed that the data required for assurance 
can be classified in three main categories which forces the proposal for compositional 
assurance to include: 
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• Artefacts: referring to the data required by an authority or similar when doing the 
safety assessment 
• Properties: these are characteristics that need to ensure before and after the 
integration in order to confirm that there are no concerns or an emerging 
unknown behaviour.  
• Processes: refers to activities that should be performed in order to prepare the 
reuse and after the reuse itself in order to comply with the standards 
requirements. 
All the tables shown in annex A can be seen as viewpoints of the component, defining a 
subset of information which gives useful information. However, the tables should not be 
understood by themselves but in combination. They are linked, each of them impacting 
the other, artefacts, properties and processes are connected. 
One of the core concepts in assurance standards is the notion of explicit and traceable 
requirements. In the avionics domain, specifically for software two important documents 
are defined in the DO-178 standard: the Software Requirements Standards and the 
Software Requirements Data artefacts.  
According to DO-178 clause 11.6: "Software Requirements Standards define the methods, 
rules, and tools to be used to develop the high-level requirements”. Software 
Requirements Standards should include: 
a) The methods to be used for developing software requirements, such as 
structured methods. 
b) Notations to be used to express requirements, such as data flow diagrams and 
formal specification languages. 
c) Constraints on the use of the tools used for requirements development. 
d) The method to be used to provide derived requirements to the system processes. 
Clause 11.9 defines the information the software requirements data shall contain: 
“Software Requirements Data is a definition of the high-level requirements including the 
derived requirements. This data should include: 
a. Description of the allocation of system requirements to software, with attention 
to safety-related requirements and potential failure conditions. 
b. Functional and operational requirements under each mode of operation. 
c. Performance criteria, for example, precision and accuracy. 
d. Timing requirements and constraints. 
e. Memory size constraints. 
f. Hardware and software interfaces, for example, protocols, formats, frequency of 
inputs, and frequency of outputs. 
g. Failure detection and safety monitoring requirements. 
h. Partitioning requirements allocated to software, how the partitioned software 
components interact with each other, and the software level(s) of each partition.” 
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The standard also connects these two artefacts in what is defined as the “Software 
Requirements Process Activities” in clause 5.1.2. In that clause it is mentioned: Inputs to 
the software requirements process include the system requirements, the hardware 
interface and system architecture (if not included in the requirements) from the system 
life cycle processes, and the Software Development Plan and the Software Requirements 
Standards from the software planning process. When the planned transition criteria have 
been satisfied, these inputs are used to develop the high-level requirements. The primary 
output of this process is the Software Requirements Data.” 
We have here two artefacts: the Software Requirements Standards and the Software 
Requirements Data. The first one is the input of the activity “Software Requirements 
Process Activities” while the second one is the output of the mentioned activity. This is 
not an activity specific for the reuse but related to the development itself. When looking 
to which properties to these artefacts and processes are involved; we need to pay 
attention to the following: 
• Interface specification 
• Intended use description 
• Safety features 
• Safety related requirements 
• Failure categories 
• Operational specifications 
• Architecture & design features 
• Performance specifications 
The information is linked one another and although the data is required in different 
formats depending on the stakeholders, all is necessary in order to be able to compose 
the argumentation for assurance compliance. 
Another example that can be found in avionics where the link is cleared that previous one 
and which is essential for component composition is the so called Reusable Software 
Component (RSC) artefact data Sheet. This artefact is the key for selecting one 
component or another to be reuse on a new project. It is specified on AC 20-148 clause 6i.  
“… This data sheet must concisely summarize: 
• RSC functions; 
• Limitations; 
• Analysis of potential interface safety concerns; 
• Assumptions; 
• Configuration; 
• Supporting data; 
• Open problem reports; 
• Software characteristics; and 
• Other relevant information that supports the integrator’s or applicant’s use of the 
RSC.” 
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AC 20-148 also mentions that the RSC developer shall “produce an analysis of the RSC’s 
behaviour that could adversely affect the users’ implementation (for example, 
vulnerabilities, partitioning requirements, hardware failure effects, requirements for 
redundancy, data latency, and design constraints for correct RSC operation). The analysis 
may support the integrator’s or applicant’s safety analysis.” This artefact identifies many 
of the properties for reuse we have included on annex A.  
The settable parameters specification property is related with the behaviour as it is the 
selection of a parameter what impact on a specific behaviour or another. Also all the 
properties which might be an issue for reuse such as: Timing, Memory Usage. Resource 
usage, Resource items, Data coupling, Partitioning, Protection, Deactivated code, 
Traceability or Robustness are part of the content of this artefact. The value they have is 
not enough; the method used for calculating it is needed as well. Many activities are 
related to define, evaluate, validate and verify those properties at development time but 
also at the integration time. The developer should proceed with: 
• Analysis of any potential functional, operational, performance and safety 
effects 
• Analysis of all interfaces  
• Analysis of all settable parameters  
While the integrator also needs to perform activities related such as: 
• Validate and verify the throughput, timing, memory usage, resource usage, and 
other resource items 
• Open problem reports on the RSC and analysis of any potential functional, 
operational, performance and safety effects 
• Analysis of data coupling and control coupling of the RSC 
• Retest where new setting or parameters may affect the requirements, code, 
function, performance, or protection features 
• Validate the assumptions made by RSC’s developer 
This is not only an avionics case, it also affects to the automotive domain. Focusing on 
how requirements are handled on the automotive domain where evidence that the SW 
component complies with its requirements is required. The objective of this document is 
to: 
• Show requirement coverage. This is done by showing the requirements 
coverage on the different Software verification Plan, Software verification 
specification and Software verification report  
• Cover both normal operating conditions and behaviour in case of failure 
• Results from known errors to show that they do not lead to the violation of 
safety requirements 
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When looking at the content we can easily map with some of the properties we have 
identified before, the safety requirements, the maximum ASIL of any safety requirement, 
the requirements coverage, and requirements for testing equipment, the known 
anomalies or the failure modes. The activities proposed in the standard related to these 
properties and artefacts are the software component specification or verification 
activities for both normal operating conditions and behaviour in the case of failure and 
known error verification. 
In the medical device domain according to the guidance for off the self (OTS) software use 
on medical device, the component should provide the basic documentation. This 
documentation should answer the following questions:  
“1. What is it? - For each component of OTS Software used, specify the following: 
• Title and Manufacturer of the OTS Software. 
• Version Level, Release Date, Patch Number and Upgrade Designation as 
appropriate. 
•  Any OTS Software documentation that will be provided to the end user. 
•  Why is this OTS Software appropriate for this medical device? 
•  What are the expected design limitations of the OTS Software? 
2. What are the Computer System Specifications for the OTS Software? - For what 
configuration will the OTS software be validated? Specify the following: 
• Hardware specifications: processor (manufacturer, speed, and features), RAM 
(memory size), hard disk size, other storage, communications, display, etc. 
• Software specifications: operating system, drivers, utilities, etc. The software 
requirements specification (SRS) listing for each item should contain the name 
(e.g., Windows 95, Excel, Sun OS, etc.), specific version levels (e.g., 4.1, 5.0, etc.) 
and a complete list of any patches that have been provided by the OTS Software 
manufacturer. 
3. How appropriate actions taken by the End User are assured? 
• What aspects of the OTS Software and system can (and/or must) be 
installed/configured? 
• What steps are permitted (or must be taken) to install and/or configure the 
product? 
• How often will the configuration need to be changed? 
• What education and training are suggested or required for the user of the OTS 
Software? 
• What measures have been designed into the medical device to prevent the 
operation of any non-specified OTS Software, e.g., word processors, games? 
Operation of non-specified OTS Software may be prevented by system design, 
preventive measures, or labeling. Introduction may be prevented by disabling 
input (floppy disk, CD, tape drives, modems). 
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4. What does the OTS Software do? – What function does the OTS software provide in 
this device? Specify the following: 
• What is the OTS Software intended to do? The sponsor’s design documentation 
should specify exactly which OTS components will be included in the design of the 
medical device. Specify to what extent OTS Software is involved in error control 
and messaging in device error control. 
• What are the links with other software including software outside the medical 
device (not reviewed as part of this or another application)? The links to outside 
software should be completely defined for each medical device/module. The 
design documentation should include a complete description of the linkage 
between the medical device software and any outside software (e.g., networks). 
5. How do you know it works? – Based on the Level of Concern: 
• Describe testing, verification and validation of the OTS Software and ensure it is 
appropriate for the device hazards associated with the OTS software.  
• Provide the results of the testing.  
• Is there a current list of OTS Software problems (bugs) and access to updates? 
6. How will you keep track of (control) the OTS Software? - An appropriate plan should 
answer the following questions: 
• What measures have been designed into the medical device to prevent the 
introduction of incorrect versions? On start-up, ideally, the medical device should 
check to verify that all software is the correct title, version level and 
configuration. If the correct software is not loaded, the medical device should 
warn the operator and shut down to a safe state. 
• How will you maintain the OTS Software configuration? 
• Where and how will you store the OTS Software? 
• How will you ensure proper installation of the OTS Software? 
• How will you ensure proper maintenance and life cycle support for the OTS 
Software?” 
The data for compliance is wide in the sense that many topics and areas are affected by 
composition assurance but also that they are closely related. Other models have been 
focusing on one on the areas presented here and the last example the behaviour 
properties are a good example on this. This has been tackle at technical level by using 
reference architecture such as IMA or AUTOSAR and EAST-ADL or MARTE [MARTE 1.1] do 
support the specification of these properties. Other standards like BPMN [BPMN 2.0] or 
EPF (Eclipse Process Framework) provide the functionality to express the information 
related to process. However, these models lack in the work of relating all of this for the 
compliance purpose in general and at composition assurance specifically.  
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3.4 Overview of the proposed approach  
After the standards analysis, we present the main elements underpinning the approach 
presented in this thesis. This thesis has been partially framed under the European 
OPENCOSS project.  
In Fig. 27, the block on the top left corner represents a component-based system where a 
component is missing. This system will be the target system in which a component will be 
integrated. When we analyse the integration of the target system plus the component 
assurance data, we result in a system where there is still missing information for a 
complete system assurance analysis. At the bottom of the figure is shown the approach 
followed in this thesis where we do not only include component assurance data but also 
integration assurance data for a complete system assurance analysis. 
 
Fig. 27 Compositional assurance description 
As a result of this approach we get an incremental assurance process as it is shown in Fig. 
28¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia.. The platform or system is being 
developed independently from the component development. The objective is to provide 
enough assurance information to the integration phase, so this phase is reduce in time 
and effort before it is ready for a complete system assurance analysis. 
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Fig. 28 Incremental assurance process 
We proposed here a common high level process for the compliance process for 
component-based systems that will be operating in safety-critical domains. This process is 
shown in Fig. 29.  
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Fig. 29 Compliance processes for component-based systems 
The blue square highlighting activities done by the component developer are described 
and decomposed in detail in chapter 4. The green square highlighting activities done by 
the component integrator are described and decomposed in detail in chapter 5. Finally, 
the orange square remarks the activities that will be described in chapter 6. 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 6 
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4  Assurance Modelling 
4.1 Introduction 
This section focuses on the assurance problems that have been mentioned on Chapter 1 
and the needs for modelling that have been identified in the standard analysis described 
in Chapter 3. In the previous section, the needs regarding compliance with the objectives 
of standards have been highlighted. Furthermore, the heterogeneous objectives and 
information that should be available in order to make a system compliant within one or 
more standards according to the domain it is going to be used have been mentioned. The 
information required to be managed is complex. In different domains we have different 
approaches for safety compliance and for composition assurance; however, all are ruled 
by standards.  
In the previous chapter, we have analysed the information contained in the standards. 
More concretely, we have analysed how standards and assurance processes treat 
components of a system in the different domains. We have also detailed the differences 
among each of the domains along with the assurance lifecycle and how it connects to the 
final product development. We have finally identified the commonalities and points of 
agreement between standards. These commonalities and the capability to specify the 
variances will be the basis of this section. 
In this section, we propose modelling as a means for assurance management. Having a 
common approach for standards modelling will benefit different stakeholders by 
providing a framework for comparison. This framework will support comparison among 
distinct projects in the same domain but as a secondary goal, it also provides stakeholders 
from the different domains with a common language to relate the various concepts for 
assurance. It can also improve communication among stakeholders by reducing 
misunderstandings due to differences in interpretation. Stakeholders from different 
phases of the development could have different views as to the level of detail required 
for a specific development artefact, e.g. a safety plan. Having a common framework can 
support the understanding of the compliance requirements for each of the stakeholders 
that collaborate on demonstrating compliance of the system at all levels of integration. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First the challenges section introduces the 
requirements from the standards regarding assurance. We will identify the issues we 
identified and that need to be analysed in order to provide a common modelling 
"If you talk to a man in a 
language he understands, that 
goes to his head. If you talk to 
him in his language, that goes 
to his heart." – Nelson Mandela 
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framework. Following this, there is a literature review on existing approaches in 
modelling assurance. The next section concerns how standards are able to be modelled 
with a common modelling language for different domain standards. Following this we talk 
about the capability to model project specific requirements by tailoring or interpreting 
the requirements of standards. Then we describe how argumentation of the project can 
be explicitly recorded, and finally how evidence artefacts should be managed. 
As in previous s chapters, we use a process view of the component-based development to 
place the contributions of this thesis. In Fig. 30 we have highlighted the activities that are 
covered in this chapter. In the previous chapter, we have described compliance processes 
for component-based systems from the high-level perspective. In this chapter, we focus 
on components compliance along the component development.  
 
Fig. 30 Scope for chapter 4 in the compliance processes for component-based systems 
Note: Whilst much of this chapter is joint work with the OPENCOSS project team, design 
rationales, examples, and methodological contributions in this chapter have been entirely 
defined by the thesis author. The remaining thesis contributions are not a part of 
OPENCOSS. 
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4.2 Challenges 
Component-Based Software Engineering (CBSE) is seen as a common and well-known 
strategy for dealing with complex systems. As systems grow in complexity, so does the 
trend in using components. 
However, when assuring a component-based system, issues arise. One of the first 
questions we identified concerns the standard the component should comply with. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter 3, sometimes it is not simply mandatory standards 
which apply but also guidance material, such as the advisory circular AC 20-148 in the 
avionics domain for reusable software component. This guidance references the need to 
comply with parts of the DO-178C standard. If the component will later be part of an IMA 
application or part of an IMA module, then the DO-297 standard should also be applied. 
There is not a systematic way to show compliance to the set of standards the component 
has fulfilled. 
Standards often define objectives that cover the entire system lifecycle and the 
development of complete systems. Component developments can find it difficult to show 
compliance with all of these objectives. Components developers need to find a way to 
show in a clear and unambiguous way how far they have gone in standard compliance.  
Component developers also need to produce artefacts along with their development and 
assessment lifecycle. These artefacts might be later on be used when demonstrated 
compliance within the integrated system. It is not clearly stated in the standards the level 
of details these artefacts should cover, or as a result of what activity they are created or 
what claim they are supposed to support. 
Each of the components should have their own assurance case arguing about the safety 
of the component product, the compliance with standards and the level of confidence in 
the demonstration of safety. However, some of the claims presented will be based on the 
assumptions made concerning the characteristics of other components, like the 
operational environment or a specific property of the overall system such as the 
assumptions made during the SEooC development. The component makes assumptions 
about claims supported by other components and about evidence from other 
components that are used to support claims done at component level. Inside the 
assurance case the component developer may analyse many properties of the 
component, but chose to only reveal certain claims about the component to those using 
the component. In this case, we can consider the component assurance case as a black 
box with assumptions and guarantees, which can be utilised by external stakeholders. 
An overall system could be developed using components developed by different suppliers 
using different assurance frameworks. It is important from an industry point of view that 
assurance information about components is provided in a standardised, recognisable 
format. 
Regarding the assurance case, developers need a framework to help them structure their 
claims about their components, and the assumptions that they have made so that when 
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the component is reused the necessary safety assurance information for integration is 
available. 
These challenges are not a problem just for component-based systems but for safety-
critical systems in general. Larrucea identifies [Larrucea et al. 2013] the following 
challenges in safety-critical systems in relation with assurance cases and evidence 
approaches: 
• Unawareness of the certification process. The lack of awareness on the 
certification aspects is a frequent problem in the current practice, in large part 
arising due to poor visibility into the architecture of systems, their design 
rationale, how components were verified and integrated, and finally how the 
system components and the system as a whole were certified. This is related to 
the lack of information a developer has when dealing to which standard the 
components will work into. 
• Data exists in many places, with different formats, multiple copies and versions. 
Usually, engineers submit paper-based reports and do not know where the 
reports go and are unable to follow up. Quality and safety managers assess and 
classify information. Excel and Word documents are often exchanged, of which 
multiple copies and versions exist. The detail of information requested for the 
component evidence is linked to this problem. 
• Difficulties in interpretations of argumentation. Determining the degree of 
compliance with specified standards or practices for the different safety-critical 
market and technological domains is a challenging task. There are a variety of 
definitions of evidence, and how to evaluate it or derive it in regard the 
technology used, which makes cross-acceptance difficult.  
We [Espinoza et al. 2011] identified several factors that impact on the safety-critical 
systems such as 
• Lack of precision and large variety of certification requirements 
• Lack of composable/modular view for certification 
• High and non-measured costs for (re)certification 
• Lack of openness to innovation and new approaches 
4.3 Existing Assurance Modelling Approaches in the Literature 
In chapter 3 Standards Analysis, we have identified the information that should be 
modelled for assurance regarding components. Components assurance modelling shall 
treat processes, artefacts and properties. Previous approaches in the literature have been 
mainly created not for components but for system assurance. It is important to highlight 
their coverage for: 
• handling different standards,  
• manage information about the process followed, 
• trace the artefacts evolution from the planning, during the development and 
after the integration,  
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• treat properties about the components and its behaviour and context, 
• and if there is tool support. 
4.3.1 Standards modelling 
In [Arana et al. 2011] a Software Engineering Process for Certification Metamodel is 
proposed. They created a general certification “language” by means of a structured semi-
formal meta-model, which will act like a template for certification requirements 
specification.  
It includes information about standard regulations however, the mechanism for showing 
compliance is based in checklists without any structured justification. Also, product safety 
and evidential artefacts are not traced during its evolutions. 
They still need to consolidate a set of concepts for compliance management. This 
approach still lacks for reuse strategies (from standard to standard, product upgrade, 
assessment scope). As it has just been mentioned, there is no integration with evidential 
repository or with process-related tools to support compliance assistance. This approach 
does not handle information about component properties. However, we have taken the 
idea of getting a common metamodel for different standards. 
One of the limitations to the proposals made by the project, ModelMe! is that it was 
specifically created for the IEC 61508 standard and it does not take other standards into 
consideration. Their work has inspired this work in the idea of the concepts that should 
be included to model the standards. 
4.3.2 Component’s properties modelling 
In the automotive industry the domain specific language EAST- ADL [EAST-ADL V2.1.12] 
already mentioned in chapter 2, includes a dependability package which provides support 
for safety information organization according to ISO 26262. The focus of EAST-ADL 
dependability package is part 3 of ISO 26262 standard. However, it does not provide 
support for the evidence management and the safety case class element is too simple to 
include all kind of argumentations elements that do contain other approaches. It also 
does not trace evidence used to support the claims for the safety case to compliance 
requirement for the standard. 
4.3.3 Assurance cases modelling 
This work has used the idea proposed in [Stensrud et al. 2011] where patterns are related 
to certification objectives. Their main interest is to take advantage of the goal-based 
structure of the safety cases and integrate the prescriptive elements of the standard so as 
to improve the transparency and consistency of the safety certification. The method used 
by Stensrud in [Stensrud et al. 2011] to transform the certification objectives into goals 
has been used to support the generation of prescriptive argumentation in the assurance 
cases presented in this chapter.  
As mentioned in chapter 2, in the SACM standard “suppliers must not only ensure their 
delivery of adequate systems, but acquirers and users require the explicit, valid, well-
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reasoned, and evidence-supported grounds for their confidence and decision making 
including related engineering conclusions and their uncertainty”. SACM standard aims to 
provide “a framework for analysing and communicating the assurance arguments and 
evidence that relates to a system under consideration. Suppliers and customers can see 
how the system lifecycle products (system requirements, design, testing, field experience, 
etc.) relate to and satisfy the assurance requirements, enabling sufficient confidence to 
be gained in the behaviour and integration of the system within its operational context”. 
However, SACM metamodel provides a poor support for arguments decomposition into 
modules and integration into a safety case architecture. We have used the SACM model 
to model arguments, but extending to improve its poor support to composition. The 
extension is described in detail in this chapter. 
4.4 Components compliance process perspective 
As we have previously mentioned components assurance modelling shall treat processes, 
artefacts and properties and how a components works up to a specific standard or a set 
of standards and guidelines. We have based our vision on extending the Common 
Certification Language (CCL) proposed by the OPENCOSS project [OPENCOSS D4.4]. The 
CCL defines a common conceptual and notational framework for specifying certification 
assets, as a means to get mutual recognition agreement and to be employed to discuss 
abstract notions from different domains. Using a common conceptual framework for 
different certification standards enables management of claims, evidence and arguments 
in a common format, sharing patterns of certification assessment, and allowing cost-
effective re-certification between different standards. The concept of reuse of assurance 
assets relies on a clear understanding of three inter-related aspects of assurance: 
compliance management, safety argumentation and evidence characterization. The 
compliance management takes care of the level of compliance with standards and 
guidelines a component have work (such as DAL B, ASIL C or Class I). The evidence 
characterization handles the artefacts that a component should create during the 
development lifecycle and the safety argumentation makes a proper justification about 
the properties of a component. These concepts are further clarified below: 
• Compliance Management encompasses the process and activities which are 
required to be carried out in order to demonstrate compliance to a 
standard/best practice/company standards by means of a series of defined 
deliverables specified in, for example, a compliance matrix. 
• Safety Argumentation is the process by which the safety of a system is explicitly 
justified against a series of safety goals.  
• Evidence and Process Management: both approaches depend on evidence - 
assurance artefacts as a result of an activity which support the claims made in 
the safety argument, or which can be used to fill out a compliance requirements 
objectives.  
For this purpose the CCL was created. The goals CCL should achieve are: 
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• Getting mutual understanding of fundamental concepts of safety assurance and 
certification 
• Reconciling argument-based and standards-based approaches to certification 
• Devising, based on the common concepts, domain-specific “solutions” 
• Facilitating reuse of safety assurance and certification assets 
In Fig. 31 the CCL and its abstraction layers used are described as the structure to detail 
the concepts. In the “Conceptual Layer”, the meta-models for the CCL are defined. These 
models address the three main project concerns– compliance management, safety 
argumentation and evidence characterisation.  
 
Fig. 31 CCL approach (3 layered structure) 
In the “Domain Level” layer, standard-specific and domain-specific models are identified. 
These are models of the relevant assurance aspects of the applicable standards and 
guidance from the target domains, together with company and industry ‘best practice’ 
standards, to which assurance projects are developed and with which they need to 
demonstrate compliance. These models are developed in such a way as to conform to the 
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metamodels defined at the conceptual level, and will be expressed using terminology 
from the CCL.  
 
Fig. 32 Component compliance process 
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At “Project-specific” level, the project-specific process, assets and assurance artefacts, 
which are the actual target of the reuse effort, are captured. Metadata concerning these 
artefacts and the processes used to create them should be stored. This metadata is 
stored according to the metamodels specified at the conceptual level via the domain-
specific models.  
As we mentioned previously, in this chapter we are focusing on modelling assurance for 
the component development. A more detailed process for the component compliance 
development task is represented in Fig. 32. 
4.4.1 Standard expert  
The standard expert is the role in charge of the safety assurance and certification area 
concerned with the specification and handling of standards’ information, as well as any 
other information derived from or based on them (interpretations, tailoring, mapping 
between standards, etc.) This is done by means of Reference Frameworks.  A Reference 
Framework represents criteria to which the lifecycle of a safety-critical system might have 
to show compliance.  
Reference Framework specification deals with how to comply with a standard which is 
not the same as specifying the standard, it needs some further work and analysis on the 
standard itself. It is recommended that domain experts with experience on previous 
certification or assurance task take care of modelling the reference framework itself. The 
text of a standard does not exactly represent how to comply with it. For example on the 
avionics DO-178 standards it says “The objective of the software coding process is: (a) 
Source Code is developed from low –level requirements”. In practice a way to show 
compliance with this requirement is to trace from a specific requirement to the piece of 
source code implementing that specific requirement. In general, the text is structured in 
sections, clauses, tables, etc., whereas Reference Framework models the text and relates 
the concepts based on compliance requirements. For example, the standards usually 
present an overall lifecycle, but further reference activities might be identified in its 
clauses. The rationale why it is called reference framework and not standard framework is 
because sometimes we do not deal just with a standard but also with guidelines, circulars, 
company processes for standard compliance. In previous 3 Standards Analysis 
chapter it has been mentioned that for example in the case of an avionics application, the 
application should follow the ARP 4754 guidelines for safety Assurance assessment and 
the ARP 4761 guidelines for system concerning requirements. If the application is 
deployed in IMA architecture then the DO-297 standard should be followed with special 
attention to application related requirements. The application software should fulfil the 
DO-178 standard and in case it includes reusable software components, then they should 
follow the guidelines from the AC 20-148 advisory circular. If the application has specific 
hardware, that hardware should be DO-254 compliant. Thus for an avionics application, 
the compliance with two guidelines, three3 standards and one advisory circular is 
mandatory. 
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A detailed explanation of the Reference Framework meta-model is shown in [OPENCOSS 
D4.4]. Following we will describe with some detail some of the main concepts used to 
model the different standards and reference guidelines. 
Reference Criticality Level: This concept references to the categories that indicate the 
relative level of risk reduction that needs to be provided for a reference assurance 
framework. Examples of this concept are: SIL (Safety Integrity Level), DAL (Development 
Assurance Level), and ASIL (Automotive Safety Integrity Level) levels correspond to 
criticality levels 
Reference Applicability Level: This references categories of relevance or appropriateness 
that a reference assurance framework defines for its elements. Most safety standards 
define reference applicability levels in the form of recommendation (e.g., something is 
highly recommended), independence (between the participants of an assurance project), 
or control category (for the artefacts of an assurance project) levels. The specific 
reference applicability levels can vary among reference criticality levels. 
Reference Activity: Unit of behaviour that a reference assurance framework defines for 
the system lifecycle and that must be executed to demonstrate compliance. Safety 
standards define different system lifecycle activities, from system inception to 
decommissioning, which correspond to reference activities. 
Reference Role: This is a type of agent that participates in a reference activity. In AC 20-
148 the activities and responsibilities from the developer of the reuse software 
component and from the integrator are described. Even if some standards (e.g., DO-178C) 
do not specify their reference roles, a company can define them. 
Reference Technique: It is a specific way to create a reference artefact or execute a 
reference activity. For example, ISO 26262 specifies techniques that can or must be used 
during system lifecycle such as testing techniques for software validation. This 
information is usually provided in tables. Depending on the applied standard and the 
criticality level some techniques are mandatory whereas other for other criticality levels 
they are not requested. 
Reference Artefact: Type of units of data that a reference assurance framework defines 
and that must be created and maintained during system lifecycle to demonstrate 
compliance. Data items, documentation, and work products correspond to reference 
artefacts for example for DO-178C, ISO 26262 … 
Reference Artefact Relationship: Existence of a relationship between two reference 
artefacts. This is especially relevant for components; as this serves us to link system and 
components level artefacts. For example in ISO 26262 the item definition artefact 
includes the item definitions for the SEooC. 
Reference Requirement: This is a condition or criterion that a reference assurance 
framework defines or prescribes to comply with it. The objectives specified in DO-178C 
tables correspond to reference requirements. In most of IEC 61508-based standards, the 
clauses specify reference requirements. 
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A Reference Framework mainly corresponds to the requirements to comply with, the 
process to execute, and the information to manage in an assurance project for 
compliance demonstration. People using reference assurance frameworks must be 
careful with the difference between the frameworks and the text of the standards. 
We will model as an example the following excerpt of table A2 from DO-178c. The two 
rows represent the objectives related to the software requirements process. The first 
concept we model is “Software requirements process” as a Reference Activity. As 
mentioned, the objectives specified in DO-178C tables can be modelled as reference 
requirements, so next modelled concept is “High level requirements comply with system 
requirements” as a Reference Requirements. In Table 7 a column called “Output” is 
illustrated and indicates the data resulting for an activity. We will model “Software 
Requirements Data” as a Reference Artefact. Both the activity and the requirements 
should be fulfilled accordingly to a reference applicability level which is DAL C which we 
also model. 
Table 7 Excerpt of table A-2 taken from DO-178C standard 
 
 
Fig. 33 Excerpt of a DO-178c reference framework 
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One of the first challenges we came into when modelling the different standards is a 
unique way, is the differences on terminology. We must take into account that the 
concepts (i.e., the name of the elements) of a reference framework correspond to 
abstract, generic notions of how to comply with safety standards and there is no need to 
follow the same naming conventions as a standard for a specific domain. Such notions are 
common to different standards and different application domains. For example: 
• ISO 26262 work products correspond to reference artefacts 
• DO-178C objectives correspond to requirements 
When we decompose the reference activities and reference artefacts we should take into 
account that both reference activities and reference artefacts can be specified with 
different granularity levels. For instance, a reference activity can correspond to a system 
lifecycle phase, such as the system design phase and be later decomposed into other 
reference activities corresponding to sub-activities or tasks. In case of the reference 
artefact, one can correspond to a document and be later decomposed into document 
constituents. For example, a software test specification can be decomposed into test 
cases. 
Table 8 includes a comparison of concepts modelling across different standard and the 
differences on terminology can be seen. However, there are points for comparison. 
Table 8 Examples of reference framework metamodel concepts for specific safety standards 
Concept Standard 
DO-178C EN 50128 IEC 61508 ISO 26262 
Ref. 
Criticality 
Level 
Software Level 
A-E 
SIL 0-4 SIL 1-4 ASIL A-D 
Ref. 
Applicability 
Level 
Objective 
satisfaction 
should be 
shown as 
Satisfied or 
Satisfied with 
independence
, or is at 
applicant’s 
discretion 
Mandatory, 
Highly 
Recommended, 
Recommended, 
Not 
recommended, 
no 
recommendatio
n for or against 
Recommended, 
Highly 
Recommended, 
Not 
Recommended, 
no 
recommendatio
n for or against 
Recommended, 
Highly 
recommended, 
No 
recommendatio
n for or against  
Ref. Activity Software 
development 
processes 
Component 
design 
Software design 
Software unit 
design 
Ref. Role - Designer 
 
Designer 
Ref. 
Technique 
- Modelling Formal methods 
Control flow 
monitoring. 
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Concept Standard 
DO-178C EN 50128 IEC 61508 ISO 26262 
Ref. Artefact Software 
Requirements 
Data 
Software Design 
Specification 
System Design 
Specification 
Software unit 
design 
specification 
Ref. Artefact 
Relationship 
Design 
Description 
satisfies 
Software 
Requirements 
Data 
Software 
Component 
Design 
Specification 
links to Software 
Component Test 
Specification 
Software System 
Design 
Specification 
derived from 
Software 
Architecture 
Design and 
Hardware 
Architecture 
Design 
Descriptions 
Software Unit 
Design 
Specification 
links to 
Software 
Requirements 
and specifies 
Software Unit 
Implementation 
Ref. 
Requiremen
t 
(11.3b) 
Independence
: A description 
of the 
methods for 
establishing 
verification 
independence 
(7.4.4.1) 
Software 
Component 
Design 
Specification for 
each component 
(7.4.5.3) 
Software 
modularity, 
testability, and 
safe 
modification 
3-8.4.5.1.1 
Consistency 
and 
compliance  of 
Functional 
Safety 
Requirements 
with respect to 
the safety goals 
4.4.2 Component Safety Manager 
The Component Safety Manager is responsible for Assurance Project Lifecycle 
Management which factorizes aspects such as the creation and maintenance of 
component assurance projects. Fig. 34 shows the compliance process the Safety Manager 
should follow to seek component safety assurance. 
The first step is the creation of the component assurance project. The Assurance Project 
defines the assets produced during the development, assessment and justification of a 
safety-critical system, including those associated with justifying the safety of the system. 
This is done by the creation of a Project Baseline. A Project Baseline is a subset of 
reference framework (e.g., subset of a standard, part 6 software development of ISO 
26262) that will be applied to a given assurance project, it indicates which standards and 
up to what level the component plan to comply with. An Assurance Project has three 
main elements: Baseline configuration, Permissions configuration and the Assurance 
Assets Package.  
The Baseline Configuration has a set of Baseline Models. Each baseline model can 
reference to a specific Reference Framework model. In case of an avionics IMA software 
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component, the assurance project includes a baseline referring to the DO-178C standard 
for software and another baseline referring to DO-297. A Baseline model represents what 
is planned to do or to comply with, in a specific assurance project. 
The Assurance Assets Package is a pointer to project-specific Artefacts models, and 
Argumentation models, and Process models. From the standard analysis done in chapter 
3 Standards Analysis we have identified that the assurance information for a 
component should include data about activities, artefacts and properties. The Artefacts 
model includes information about the data created during the component development 
that will be used to show compliance. The process model includes information about the 
process followed for the component development. Finally, the argument model includes 
claims about properties of the component. These three models represent what has been 
done in a specific assurance project.  
 
Fig. 34 Component compliance process 
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During step 2, the safety manager tailors the reference framework for component 
assurance. The baseline model gives us the capability to model and tailor the needs for 
compliance for a specific project. In case of a project for developing a software SEooC 
then not all the ISO 26262 standard applies and so the assurance project can be tailored 
to the specific needs of the project. It is similar to a project where we are developing an 
IMA application, not the whole DO-297 standard applies. In both cases, model-driven 
engineering is used along the project. This affects the means of compliance and in the 
assurance project and should be explicitly shown. In case it is decided that for a project 
model-driven engineering is used for a specific project, the verification activities can be 
tailored showing they refer to model checking techniques as compliance means. 
There are not models to support step 3. In case the component is not a new 
development, the safety manager should perform an impact analysis and identify those 
activities, artefacts and properties that might be affected and modify the baseline. 
During step 4, the safety manager should define the assurance case structure in the 
argumentation model. The assurance case structure defines the strategy followed for the 
component assurance case creation. We propose the use of the following argumentation 
pattern shown in Fig. 35 to structure the component assurance case. 
 
Fig. 35 Component Assurance case structure 
The structure defines 4 argumentation modules: 
• C_Characteristic: Includes claims about the component characteristics and 
properties and how they are derived or verified. 
• C_Assumptions: Includes assumptions about the context and environment the 
component will work as well as dependencies for other components.  
• C_Specification: Includes claims about the component specifications. 
• C_Compliance: Contains claims about compliance means of the component. 
The C_Compliance module is populated at this point. We propose an automatic 
argumentation generation based on the baseline decisions. The compliance means and 
objectives have already been specified in the baseline so the C_Compliance module just 
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have to refer to them. The generation is based on the transformations proposed in 
[Stensrud et al. 2013] and in [Denney Pai 2012]. In this way the reference activities model 
included on the baseline are transformed into top claims. The references requirements 
which those activities should fulfil are transform into sub-claims of those top claims. The 
sub-activities are also transformed into sub-claims and the artefacts are turned into 
information elements. The reference framework previously modelled as an example in 
Fig. 33, is transformed into the argument shown in Fig. 36. 
 
Fig. 36 Compliance argument generated after the transformation of an excerpt of DO-178c reference 
framework [Fig. 33] 
Step 5 refers to the C_Assumptions argumentation module. The safety manager should 
include the assumptions made during the development of the component, the context 
and environment the component is designed to work in, interfaces with other 
components, expected intended use… The term "assumptions" captures a large and 
varied amount of information. There are design assumptions, from which the component 
specification was developed. In addition, there are usage and deployment assumptions, 
which need to be adhered to when the component is used (e.g. environmental 
conditions, input output values, failure behaviour of other components, expected hazards 
of the system...). We provide an assumption taxonomy that could support on this. In 
chapter 6 of this work we provide further details for this task. 
In step 6 the safety manager should agree on the evidence the component will provide to 
show compliance. This is done by the support of the evidence model being this one the 
responsible of collecting and handling the body of safety evidence of an assurance 
project, including chains of evidence. 
Safety evidence can be defined as the artefacts that contribute to developing confidence 
in the safe operation of a system and that are used to show the fulfilment of the criteria 
of a safety standard (e.g., safety analysis results, testing results, and source code). The 
evidence is used in the assurance project with two different aims: evidence used to 
support the compliance of an assurance project request and evidence used to support an 
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argument. Further details about the evidence model can be checked in [OPENCOSS D4.4], 
here we describe the main concepts of the model.  
At this point the safety manager will specify the artefact definitions of the model. That is 
an abstract concept that represents an artefacts that’s has not yet been created but will 
be used as evidence.  
Steps 7, 8 and 9 are done in parallel during the component development. Step 7 follows 
the component processes progress is related to the activities to be executed during the 
component development lifecycle. The activities and the progress in those activities are 
modelled in the process model. The process management provides confidence on the 
results of the activity execution as it managed the process in a systematic way proving 
information regarding timing, people, techniques or relationship with other activities. 
Details about the process model can be checked in [OPENCOSS D4.4] 
Step 8 is directly linked with step 6. During step 6 we have identified the artefacts that 
will be used as evidence while on step 8 we will handle the evolution of those artefacts 
during the component development lifecycle.  At this time the artefacts model will be 
enriched with more concepts and relationships such as: 
Artefact: The instantiation of the artefacts definitions previously defined. Concrete, 
individual, and identifiable unit of data managed in an assurance project. It represents an 
instance and version of an artefact.  
Resource: The place, either electronic or not, where an artefact is stored. A hazard log 
can be maintained in a spreadsheet. Such a resource can correspond to an Excel file 
(format) in a local file (location).  
Artefact Relationship: It explicitly specifies the relations among different artefacts. For 
example, the component requirement specification artefact has a relationship with the 
system requirements specification. Not only indicates if a component artefact is part of a 
system level artefact but also the relationship between the artefacts for the component. 
This is useful when doing an impact analysis as it can help the safety manager to detect 
possible artefacts affected by a modification.  
Event: It represents a happening in the lifecycle of an artefact. Events are necessary to 
track artefact lifecycles. For example, the lifecycle of the final version of the hazard 
analysis and risk assessment report could be: creation, modification (e.g. change in the 
hazards analysis due to the inclusion of a new situation scenario), evaluation, 
modification (to address the result of the evaluation), evaluation, evaluation, 
modification (to address the result of the evaluations), and approval. 
Evaluation: Specification of the result of making some judgement regarding an artefact. 
For example: The final hazard analysis and risk assessment report could be evaluated 
according to the following criteria: completeness, clarity, and reliability. As shown in the 
example for Event, some modification in the hazard analysis and risk assessment report 
might be necessary for addressing evaluation results. 
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The granularity of artefacts can vary: set of documents (e.g., system specifications), 
document (e.g., requirements specification), parts of a document (e.g., a given 
requirement), etc. The granularity depends on the purpose of an artefact.  
When an artefact is used in an argumentation structure as evidence for a claim, such a 
use as evidence can have its own, emerging properties (e.g., confidence in the evidence). 
Step 9 is related to step 4. The argumentation modules define the argumentation 
structure in step 4, while in step 9 we should complete and finalize the assurance case 
structure. In order to follow the best practices the safety manager can instantiate 
argumentation patterns. The argumentation model will be explained in detail in section 
4.5 Argumentation Model - SACM extension for modular and pattern support. 
Step 10 identifies the activities to be done at integration phase. The safety manager 
should specify the activities for compliance that are not done during the component 
development because they require that the component is integrated in the target 
environment to be executed. These activities should appear on the component project 
baseline model. They will be referenced again in chapter 5 Compositional Assurance 
Approach. 
During Step 11, the safety manager should specify the component compliance maps. The 
compliance maps model is the mechanism to indicate up to what level a component 
complies with the baseline. The baseline specifies what it is plan to do and the 
compliance maps indicate the level of deviation from that planning. In the compliance 
map section we will describe this mechanism in detail. 
Step 12 highlights the assurance case information required for the assurance contract. 
This is the last step before the component is released.  
4.5 Argumentation Model - SACM extension for modular and 
pattern support 
According to ISO 26262 a safety case is defined as “argument that the safety 
requirements for an item are complete and satisfied by evidence compiled from work 
products of the safety activities during development.” In fact in the automotive domain it 
is clearly stated that a safety case should be released in order to fulfil the ISO 26262 
standard, and in fact it has been one of the artefacts that needs continue refinement 
along the project.  
As previously identified in section 2.3. Assurance cases, there is one standard which is 
focused on the assurance cases modelling by the OMG. When analysing the latest version 
of the SACM [SACM 1.1] one of the lacks detected on this metamodels is that neither the 
argumentation patterns nor the modular argumentation are being supported. This could 
easily be solved by extending this metamodel, which is what we have done.  
This section presents an adaptation of the OMG SACM meta-model, allowing us to 
present arguments in a graphical form similar to GSN, but using the richer concepts 
provided by SACM. 
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The first point to note is the modifications made on the SACM argumentation metamodel 
in order to include concepts for both modular argumentations and patterns. On the one 
hand, the modifications proposed here try to minimize the impact the actual SACM meta-
model and, on the other hand, to include the concepts of modular GSN. Some 
modifications have been made also to facilitate the task of implementing the meta-
model. 
One of the first changes we have made is the inclusion of the agreement concept on the 
administration class container. As we know the Assurance cases are composed of 
arguments and evidences which support those arguments. This extension includes the 
new concept of agreement which is similar to what a contract should be.  
The changes made in order to fulfil needs for modular argumentation and patterns are 
highlighted in green while the changes made in order to make it connect with other parts 
of the CCL metamodels are highlighted in blue.  
Agreements are made between argumentation concepts. This is done to support 
arguments modularity. The mechanism to integrate the arguments modules, which in the 
end are argumentation concepts, is the application of the agreement. Agreements put in 
connection elements of the different argumentation to make a coherent and consistent 
argumentation.  
In order to include modular argumentation, one element has been included, Agreement 
class. The Agreement class is a specialization of an Assurance Case element. The 
Agreement element represents agreements between parts (Argumentation). 
Agreements are done between two or more Argumentation parts. It includes the 
premises and promises validated when both Argumentation are integrated. The 
argumentation class can be seen as an argument module. 
The InformationElementCitation Class enables the citation of a source that relates to the 
structured argument. The information element citation can be used in the following 
situations: when we want to reference to an information element already supporting a 
claim in another argumentation but can also be useful to support a claim in the actual 
assurance case. However, this concept in SACM does not explicitly say what type of 
information is citing, that is why we have extended the concept including a type property.  
The ArgumentElementCitationt Class cites an Argumentation, or an ArgumentElement 
within another Argumentation, for use within the current Argumentation. This concept is 
the key to understand the modular argumentation. There are times when it becomes 
necessary to be able to make a reference from the argument of one case module to some 
defined context that exists within the boundary of another, or to a Claim that is 
supported within another argumentation structure. Similarly to the 
InformationElementCitation Class, the ArgumentElementCitationt Class in SACM does not 
explicitly say what type of information is citing, that is why we have extended the concept 
including a type property. 
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The Claim clause is used to record the propositions of any structured Argumentation. This 
class has been extended from SACM; original definition. SACM proposes the use of the 
assumed property to indicate it is an assumption. We have also included the property 
public to indicate that this claim can be reference by others. In the component assurance 
case, those claims which indicate their property public to be true are considered the 
component guarantees.  
 
Fig. 37 Extension of SACM Argumentation Class meta model 
CHAPTER 4 · ASSURANCE MODELLING 
109 
 
 
Fig. 38 Relationships view diagram  
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The following classes have also been extended: Claim, Argument Reasoning and 
InformationElement citation to include patterns related information. When they are 
intentionally declared as requiring further evidence or argumentation can be denoted by 
setting toBeSupported property to be true. They can intentionally be declared as 
requiring further adaptation and modification to be used in a new context by setting 
toBeInstantiated property to be true. 
The Choice class which is a subtype of the AssertedInference Class has been added. It is 
used while developing argument patterns. It is used to denote possible alternatives in 
satisfying an inference. It is used to denote possible alternatives in satisfying an inference. 
It can represent 1-of-n and m-of-n selection, an annotation indicating the nature of the 
choice to be made.  
The Asserted Inference, Asserted Evidence and Asserted Context association classes have 
been extended to include new properties so as to be used in patters. The multi-extension 
property indicates if the association is normal, optional or a multiple association. In case 
of a multiple association the cardinality property indicates the number of associations 1 
to N. 
The Asserted Challenge and the Asserted Counter Evidence classes do not have a 
graphical notation in GSN and SACM do not propose any. We have proposed a graphical 
notation for both of them.  
4.6 Compliance maps 
The compliance maps are part of the mapping model proposed in [OPENCOSS D4.4 ]. We 
identify a compliance map as a mechanism to indicate how exactly we are complying on a 
specific project to the reference requirements. Essentially, there are three types of 
mapping: 
• Full Map – the elements in the mapping are identical.   
• Partial Map – there is some similarity between the elements, but they are not 
identical (and there may be significant differences, depending on the context and 
requirements). In this case, a clear record of the similarities and differences is 
necessary, some quantitative indication of the “degree of map” should be 
provided in a form of justification. This is the case in which we need an artefact 
that should conform to a Standard “A” but as it is being reused from another 
project it is not completely mapping. We should identify to which level is 
compliant and what else need to be done to complete the mapping. 
• No map – there is insufficient similarity between the elements to permit a 
mapping to take place.  
We can make compliance maps for: activities, artefacts, requirements, roles and 
techniques. 
Activity compliance maps indicate the activities in the process model that have been 
executed and comply with reference activities in the baseline. The level of confidence in 
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the compliance with the reference activities is defined with the type of map: no map, 
partial or full.  
 
Fig. 39 Compliance maps 
Similarly the artefacts in the artefact model are mapped with the reference artefact in 
baseline. The artefact definition is not valid for the mapping, as it is an abstract concept. 
4.7 Tool support 
We have implemented a tool to support the tasks for assurance modelling. The tool 
architecture and functionality is presented here [Ruiz et al. 2015_1]. Here we describe 
how the tool is used to support the tasks to be executed by the standard expert ad by the 
component safety manager. The complete user manual for the tool is available in 
[OPENCOSS D2.3] 
4.7.1 Tooling for the standards expert 
The first thing the standards expert should do is to create a Refframework Diagram 
following the wizard.  
 
Fig. 40 Process to create a reference framework 
After completing the Refframework Diagram creation wizard, the perspective of the tool 
will be opened composed by five views: 
1. The Repository Explorer shows the contents of the repository. 
2. The Outline shows the elements of the model and its edition. 
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3. The Diagram Editor the graphical modeller of a subset of concepts of the 
Reference Framework. 
4. The Palette is a toolbox with the concepts of the model and the connections 
between them to add to the diagram. 
5. The Properties to edit the properties of the element of the model selected. 
The reference framework can be edited graphically by selecting the concepts in the 
palette on the right hand side of the editor and then editing the properties. The concepts 
with a graphical notation are the reference activity, the reference artefact and the role. 
These concepts have already been described previously. The connections indicate 
relationships between concepts.  
Preceding activity connection links two activities and indicates the order of execution 
between the two activities. 
Produced artefact connection links a reference activity and a reference artefact which has 
been produced as a result of executing the activity. 
Required artefacts connection links a reference activity and a reference artefact which is 
necessary prior to the execution of the activity. 
 
Fig. 41 Reference framework graphical editor perspective 
Other concepts included on the reference framework model are accessible through the 
properties view. 
There is also a tree view editor which can also be used for creating and modifying a 
reference framework. 
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Fig. 42 Editing a Reference Framework in the tree view editor 
The reference frameworks are stored in a database and can be retrieved and used when 
necessary. 
4.7.2 Tooling for the component safety manager 
Once we have a reference framework created, the safety manager can create a new 
component assurance project. To create a new assurance project go to the menu File 
New  Project and select New Assurance Project inside the OPENCOSS category. We will 
start the assurance project wizard.  
The first page is to enter the name of Assurance project. The second page of the wizard 
will show in the left the list of reference framework models which are stored in the 
repository. Select the desired reference framework and in the right list will appear its 
contents in form of checkable tree for the generation of the baseline. Select the nodes of 
the tree that will be applied to the project are creating, give a name to the baseline and 
click the Finish button to generate all the project information.  
CHAPTER 4 · ASSURANCE MODELLING 
114 
 
 
Fig. 43 Reference framework selection 
Now in the Repository Explorer the new project will be displayed. The project is 
composed by 4 folders: 
• Argumentation folder for storing the argumentation models with and 
argumentation model (with diagram) generated automatically based on the 
baseline’s selected entities. As we mentioned on step 4 we are able to generate 
the compliance argumentation based on the selection made of the elements from 
reference framework at the assurance project creation time. This compliance 
argumentation can be modified and complete afterwards. 
• Assurance Project folder that has the project information in .assuranceproject 
model, the baseline information in .baseline model(with diagram) and the 
.mapping model to store the compliance mapping information. 
• Evidence folder for saving the evidence models 
• Process folder for the processes execution. 
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Fig. 44 Assurance Project structure 
To edit the Assurance Project information double clicks over the model and its editor will 
appear. By default the assurance project has related all the models generated 
automatically, the baseline and mapping models in the active BaselineConfig and the 
argumentation model in the active AssetsPackage.  
 
Fig. 45 Assurance Project editor 
4.7.2.1 Baseline model edition 
A baseline model is automatically generated when creating the assurance project. The 
editor is the same as the one used for reference framework creation. 
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To edit the baseline information in a tree view just double click over the .baseline model 
and its editor View will appear. The elements which have not been selected are displayed 
in the upper tree with a different icon, with a red cross on it. 
 
Fig. 46 Baseline editor 
The baseline model can be edited also by means of a graphical editor, to use it double 
click in the .baseline_diagram model. The way of using this editor is exactly equal than the 
reference framework’s editor. 
The safety manager can create new baselines, for example if the component need to 
comply with more than one reference framework, the safety manager should create a 
baseline per reference framework.  
To create a new baseline choose the wizard Creates or Updates Baseline under the 
OPENCOSS category. The first page of the wizard requests the selection of the assurance 
project model to update. The following steps are exactly the same than for the generation 
of a new assurance project. Select the desired reference framework model to be used as 
source for the generation of the baseline in the left list, then in the right list will appear its 
contents in form of checkable tree for the generation of the baseline. Select the nodes of 
the tree that will be applied to this baseline and give a name to the baseline taking into 
account that if the given name is the same as previous existing baseline, the contents of 
the previous one will be replaced with the information selected and the same will occur 
with the argumentation model. Finally, click the Finish button to generate the new 
baseline and argumentation models that will be added to the assurance project model 
and stored in the appropriate Assurance Project Folders. 
4.7.2.2 Artefact model edition 
Steps 6 and 8 are related to the evidence model edition. The first thing to do is to create a 
new evidence model. This is done by selecting Evidence Model to repository under the 
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OPENCOSS category. In the wizard select the folder where the evidence will be stored and 
include a name for the model. Once the Artefact Model has been created, the first item is 
presented to the user. 
 
Fig. 47 Evidence model editor 
For executing step 6, the safety manager should create the artefacts definition. In the 
artefact model editor, once the artefact model element is selected in the editor, in the 
properties view, in the Artefact field the component safety manager can add new 
artefacts definitions.    
In the properties zone, the framework presents several fields to describe the new 
Artefact Definition divided in tabs. 
For the step 8, the component safety manager can add artefacts to an artefact definition 
in two ways: 
• Select the artefact definition, press the right button of the mouse and select the 
contextual menu New Child –> Artefact 
• Or, select the artefact definition, select the Artefact Definition Artefact tab 
Properties, and press the button Add 
When component safety manager modifies one Artefact, the system automatically adds 
to it an AssuranceAssetEvent of type Modification. 
In the properties zone, the framework presents several fields to describe the new 
Artefact divided in tabs. 
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The component safety manager can also add a resource associated to an artefact in two 
ways: 
• Once selected the artefact, press the right mouse button and select the 
contextual menu New Child -> Resource to bring up the Artefact File properties. 
• Or, select the Artefact Version tab and press the + button. 
In the recourse properties view the component safety manager can indicate the 
location of the file corresponding to an artefact. 
 
Fig. 48 Resource properties 
4.7.2.3 Process model edition 
For step 7 the component safety manager should create a process model by selecting ne 
process model under the OPENCOSS category and the wizard will start. It will ask about 
the name of the process model and selecting the parent folder to be stored. 
 
Fig. 49 Process model creation wizard. 
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Once the Process Model has been created, the first item is presented to the user. It is a 
similar editor as the one used for editing the artefact model. 
 
Fig. 50 Process model editor. 
The Process Model allows defining activity, participant, person, tool, organization or 
technique objects. To create these objects, in the Model zone, click on the branch Model 
and press the right mouse button and select the contextual menu New Child or use its 
properties view: 
 
Fig. 51 Create Process Model data using context menu 
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4.7.2.4 Argumentation model edition 
To create a new database-based argumentation diagram, follow the procedure below and 
generate a new diagram in the project folder. 
 
Fig. 52 Process to create an argumentation model 
To open an argumentation diagram just double click on the Argumentation Diagram 
information file (.arg_diagram) to open a diagram in the editing window. The diagram can 
then be edited. 
Nodes and relationships (or links) selected from Palette can be added to the canvas. Just 
select the node from the Palette, go to the editing window and select the place and size 
of the element. 
The palette is structured into three different sections. Section “Argumentation core” 
includes the main nodes for argumentation. These nodes implement the GSN graphical 
notation. The “Argumentation relationships” includes all the different links between the 
different nodes. “Argumentation modular extensions” includes those nodes specific for 
the modular argumentation. 
 
Fig. 53 Argumentation model editor 
For step 9 the component safety manager can take advantage of the use of 
argumentation patterns. The list of available arguments patters is available in the 
Templates view.  
Enter the name of 
the diagram to be 
created and click the 
“Finish” button. 
Select “New”  
“Other…” from the 
File menu  
Select “Arg Diagram to 
Repository” in the OPENCOSS 
category and click the “Next” 
button. 
Select the folder to 
store the new 
diagram  
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When the user double click on an Argumentation Diagram file (.arg_diagram) will open 
the diagram in the editing window. 
 
Fig. 54 Argumentation templates view 
An Argument Pattern can be instantiated (thus all its content copied) into the diagram 
under edition. To proceed, drag a Pattern Diagram file from the templates view and drop 
it into the diagram under edition. Once you drop you will see the new elements that have 
been copied into your argumentation diagram. 
4.7.2.5 Compliance maps edition 
For step 11 the component safety manager should open the project baseline using the 
tree view editor. Then press the button “Mapping Set” on the properties form. This 
window automatically saves the mappings when checking or unchecking elements of the 
target baseline tree. 
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Fig. 55 Compliance map creation 
 
Fig. 56 Compliance map form 
The Compliance Map form is organized in three zones: 
• The left zone shows the actual baseline, and it loads the type of elements for 
which we want to make the compliance maps. For default, activities.  
• The middle zone allows to make different filters like: 
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o Filter Mapping Model lists all the mapping models stored in the database, 
and it will be necessary to select one of them and one group model. It’s 
also possible to create a new map group pressing the button “New 
group”. This map group has to be part of the active Baseline Config of the 
project. 
o Filter Map Element. It is possible to create compliance maps for activities, 
artefacts, requirements, roles and techniques, and the allowed maps are: 
 BaseArtefact  ->  Artefact 
 BaseRequirement  ->  Artefact , Claim or Activity 
 BaseActivity  ->  Activity 
 BaseRole  ->  Participant 
 BaseTechnique  ->  Technique 
When the filter changes, also the information showed by the reference 
framework changes. For example: 
 If the filter “Artefact” is selected: 
 
Fig. 57 Compliance Map, select map element 
Remember that these models have to be part of the active Assets 
Package of the project. 
o Filter Compliance Map. This filter allows making different compliance 
maps for the same element. 
• The right zone shows the list of models; depend on the map filter, stored in our 
database. We should select one of them. This selected model will be the target of 
the compliance map to create. 
For making a compliance map, follow the next steps: 
1. Select a mapping model and a map group. 
2. Select the target reference framework. 
3. Select the filter map element. 
4. Select the element from the source reference framework. 
5. Select o create the compliance map. 
6. And for last, check or uncheck the element from the target model. 
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4.8 Conclusions 
In Table 9 we have tried to summarize the issues and challenges which were identified at 
the beginning of the section and how we have tried to give them a response. 
Table 9 Conclusions to challenges identified in chapter 4 
Id Challenge Challenge Description Mechanism Solution description 
1 Standard 
indication.  
There is a need to 
indicate which standard 
a component should 
work to. Sometimes it is 
not the prescriptive parts 
of the standards which 
apply but advisory 
circular like the avionics 
domain where for 
reusable software 
component the AC 20-
148 should be applied. 
This advisory circular is 
not prescriptive, 
however, it is hard to 
show compliance if it is 
not followed 
Baseline The baseline of an 
assurance projects 
reference to the 
specific reference 
framework- standard 
the projects aims to 
fulfil.  
2 Level of 
compliance 
We need to have the 
capability to indicate up 
to what level we are 
complying. 
Mappings Mapping traces the 
requirements on one 
specific project to the 
requirements 
specified on a 
standard. We can 
indicate if there is a 
full/partial or not 
compliance at all for 
a requirements 
Moreover 
argumentation also 
includes information 
about the rational for 
means of compliance 
of one requirement 
on a project to what 
it was required. 
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Id Challenge Challenge Description Mechanism Solution description 
3 Evidence 
detail level 
It is not clear to define 
up to which level of 
deepness these artefacts 
do goes and as a result 
of what activity or to 
support what claim have 
they been created. 
Evidence 
model 
The evidence model 
instantiation for a 
project will indicate 
the relationships of 
the different 
evidences 
4 Different 
formats, not 
recognizable 
information 
It is important from the 
industry point of view to 
provide the information 
required in a 
recognizable, standard 
format. 
Reference 
framework 
Modelling standards 
with a known model 
reduces the 
ambiguity and 
produces an 
harmonized way to 
show information 
among different 
stakeholders 
5 Assumptions The components is 
making assumptions 
about claims supported 
by other components 
and about evidences 
from other components 
that are used to support 
claims done at 
component level. 
Argumentation On the 
argumentation 
model, the concept 
of assumed claim 
indicates that you are 
making an 
assumption. Also the 
concept of 
information element 
citation indicated 
that that assertion 
will be supported by 
other component. 
6 Guarantees The components is 
making assumptions 
about claims supported 
by other components 
and about evidences 
from other components 
that are used to support 
claims done at 
component level. 
Argumentation On the 
argumentation 
model, the concept 
of public claims 
indicates that that 
assertion can be seen 
as a guarantee and 
reference by other 
components 
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5 Compositional Assurance Approach 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is focused on the composition assurance associated with integrating 
different components into a critical component-based system. Assurance is done at 
system level as it is a system property and as mentioned before it is hard to decompose 
across components. However, in the end the systems need to accomplish all assurance 
activities and show compliance with the safety standards, no matter if the systems is 
component-based or not. In this chapter we will try to find answer to the main problems 
that occurs when assuring a component-based system in a critical context according to 
functional safety standard. 
In the previous chapter we have mainly talked about assurance at component level is 
managed. We have defined how assurance should be managed inside a component in 
order to get the assurance assets to be provided at system level. Reuse is taken into 
account from the development phase. In this chapter we move on a higher level as we try 
to describe how assurance should be done at system level managing all information 
which is taken from the different components that are part of the system.  
This chapter shows the integrator point of view where a previously developed component 
using the assurance approach presented in the previous chapter is incorporated into the 
final system where it will work. We try to express the hierarchy of compliance 
responsibilities across the system components in a systematic and unique way. 
Here, we show the application of the approach on simple examples extracted from 
industry situations so the concepts are better understood when put them into practice 
with tool support. These are not complete use cases but some excerpts of common 
situations, that industry usually faces and how the presented approach can be used on 
these situations. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, the challenges section introduces the main 
problems the industry and the integrator are facing. Following, there is a context 
literature review on the existing approaches regarding composition assurance from the 
integration point of view. We try to see how the problem has been treated for other 
aspects such as design or argumentation and how we can take advantages of those 
solutions on this new situation. Next section is about how standards from different 
"Any intelligent fool can make 
things bigger, more complex, 
and more violent. It takes a 
touch of genius — and a lot of 
courage — to move in the 
opposite direction." ― Albert 
Einstein 
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domains handle the integration of components. Then, we talk about the mechanism 
proposed to be able to model the requirements for composition and components 
integration taking into account concepts described on previous section. We define some 
rules we should follow in order to make composition in a systematic way. Then we 
described some examples where this can be applied on common industry situations. 
Finally we describe some conclusions and resume how we have fulfilled some of the 
issues described at the beginning of the section.  
In chapter 4  Assurance Modelling we have described compliance processes for 
component-based systems from a high level perspective. In this chapter we focus on 
components compliance along the component development. In Fig. 58 the activities that 
are covered in this chapter are highlighted. 
 
Fig. 58 Scope for chapter 5 in the compliance processes for component-based systems 
This chapter focuses in the activities done by the integrator prior to the system validation 
and release. 
5.2 Challenges 
In the composition phase we deal with the reuse of a subsystem or component into a new 
context. When an already-assessed system has to be reused, even in a new context, then 
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some pieces of evidence might become inadequate or new evidence might have to be 
provided.  
Innovation and productivity in safety-critical systems is curtailed by the lack of affordable 
(re)certification approaches. Major problems arise when changes to the system entail the 
reconstruction of the entire body of certification arguments and evidence.  
In Fig. 59 it is describe how assurance is treated during the integration of a component in 
a new system. 
 
Fig. 59 Composition assurance scenarios 
Responsibility decomposition 
The theory of component-based systems is easily applied here. However, in critical 
systems we need to assure properties such as reliability, availability, safety, security and 
standard compliance. When decomposing the system into smaller parts usually 
developed by different teams and even different suppliers, responsibilities are hard to 
assign. Whole system assurance is not possible to be accomplished without the support 
of component assurance.  
In [Espinoza et al. 2011] we mention that: “The challenge in such systems is to assess not 
only the certifiability of each component or module, but also its certifiability once it is in 
an ‘integrated’ state”. If the assurance case relies on justifying the properties of 
components, then we should ensure that the system has been built out of the specific 
component for which there is evidence that the component has the necessary properties. 
“The mean to transfer a common frame for functional and design characteristics of a 
component from provider to integrator for the compatibility/gap analysis would bring a 
big benefit to the embedded system community for sharing components and increasing 
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the safety by the broad service history.” Espinoza identifies some of the main problems 
teams need to solve when reusing a component or a sub-system in a new system. It is 
important not only the component by itself but the system in which it will end up being 
used. In critical systems is the ultimate system what in the end succeeded on the 
certification process. 
We start by reusing a component in a system which need to comply the same standard as 
the component original did on its development. The context and environment match with 
the ones assumed and verified on the first time the component was used. However, the 
first variation appears when the assumptions are not directly compatible and further 
analysis should be done. In this case, analysis on the reuse viability is necessary so as to 
check after a throughout analysis on the assumptions validation and impact.  
Reusability on the same context but taken into account a new standard often happens 
while reusing a component. They need to be adequate to the system level standards.  
Teams are focused on their subsystem development as their development will end up 
working on a fully integrated system. In order to make their development they need to 
make assumptions on the behaviour of other components.  
Need to reference to other component activities 
Components might be developed by different teams or suppliers, however, on their 
assurance processes they do need to reference other components or the system 
development activities. For example, the advisory circular AC 20-148 [AC 20-148] includes 
as information the reusable component developer should provide to the integrator: “… 
verification procedures, especially for verification activities that the integrator or 
applicant must repeat for the integrated software installed on the target computer 
environment”. Component assurance will not be fully accomplished until the components 
are part of the whole system and the entire assurance activities takes place. 
Reference to other components evidences 
Not only does a component need to reference others team’s activities but also evidences. 
Results from analysis would not have any sense without the context, or safety constraints 
defined and verified on others component. An example of this evidence reference 
appears in the automotive domain when developing a SEooC. The hazard analysis and risk 
assessment process done at concept phase is done at vehicle level. However, when 
developing a SEooC we should reference the analysis done at item level. 
Evidence refinement by composing artefacts from different components 
Evidences from a component are necessary to refine artefacts used as evidences at 
system level. In this sense safety analysis like a component fault tree analysis is required 
to complete and refine safety analysis at the whole system level. Plans at system level 
should reference the use of the reusable components and the evidences provided to 
integrators. 
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Need to show integration from the assurance perspective 
It is important that component integration is done not only at technical level but also 
assurance should be addressed. Zimmer [Zimmer et al. 2014] defines interference as “a 
failure propagation scenario in which a failure of one software component propagates to 
another software component via the platform's shared computational resources.” This is 
related with the concept of assuring freedom of interference, a property requested by 
functional safety standards. 
Capability to trace what each team is doing regarding assurance 
From the system responsible point of view it is important to see the progress of the 
whole project, the fully accomplished system, how each of the team is going. If we can 
consider the system as a set of components working all together, then the assurance can 
be seen as the addition of the assurance activities for each of the components. Of course 
this is a very simplified vision; however, it does highlight the need to trace every team 
work regarding assurance. This is not only required for responsibilities assignments but 
also for planning and monitoring work. Estimations on efforts and costs at the system 
level are impossible to define without these inputs. 
5.3 Analysis on existing approaches 
There is a special interest on modular certification as is aimed to be feasible. Initially this 
is done by informal reuse of safety arguments in relation with a function from one 
application to the next, and this is aligned to the way systems is actually developed as 
well—as separate components with interfaces between them [Rushby 2002]. 
Kelly in [Kelly 2001] proposed a modular and compositional construction for safety cases 
that can be adopted to create a modular safety case architecture for IMA-based systems 
to correspond as far as possible with the modular partitioning of the hardware and 
software of the current system. In the same way as system architecture is design, it is 
possible to establish interfaces between the modular elements of the safety justification 
such that safety case elements may be safely composed, removed and replaced. Similarly 
as with system architecture, it will be necessary to establish the safety argument 
infrastructure required in order to support modular reasoning. In this work we have 
inherit the idea proposed by Kelly by adopting a modular view aligned with the system 
architecture. 
One of the main challenges that modular certification has in contrast with the modular 
design is that certifications must consider not only the regular operation but also 
abnormal operation and malfunction components [Rushby 2007]. Rushby affirms in 
[Rushby 2002] the problem is that conventional design and the notion of an interface, are 
concerned with normal operation, whereas much of the consideration that goes into 
certification concerns abnormal operation, and the malfunction of components. More 
particularly, it concerns the hazards that one component may pose to the larger system, 
and these may not respect the interfaces that define the boundaries between 
components in normal operation. In order to cope with this we propose the use of 
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assumptions and guarantees in the component assurance development that will be 
checked during the compositional phase. 
5.4 Compositional Assurance 
Component-Based Software Engineering (CBSE) is seen as a common and well known 
strategy for dealing with complex systems. As systems grow in complexity, so does the 
trend in using components. In CBSE approaches the concept of contract appears as a 
means of connecting components together thus allowing them to interoperate. More 
specifically, contracts record agreements in terms of assumption and promises as is 
described in [SPEEDS D2.5.4]. Assumptions are the functionality that a component 
requires from other components in the system, and promises are the functionality that 
the component can offer to other components in the system. A component's assumptions 
need to be validated before its contract promises can be fulfilled.  
There are challenges when using this approach for dealing with safety, and safety 
assurance, properties. Safety is a system property and because of that, it can be hard to 
define the contribution of components that have an impact on safety. Contract 
specifications addressing safety have been proposed in the past regarding modular safety 
case development. 
From the safety perspective, safety and assuring the correct function of components does 
not mean that the (composed, integrated) system will remain safe. The context in which 
the component is going to be integrated is important, and as we indicate in [Ruiz et al. 
2013-1] for the SEooC (Safety Element out of Context) perspective, the assumptions of 
the item can be understood as the context characterization. In addition, to support safety 
assessment, failure behaviours of components, and their behaviour in the presence of 
failures, must be defined. A primary challenge is identifying all of the assumptions made 
and secondly envisaging all of the different contexts in which the element might be used. 
Regarding assurance we also need to define the set of claims that need to be made 
concerning a component to support its certification against a particular safety assurance 
standard. Different standards address this problem in different ways. In ISO 26262 
Development Interface Agreements (DIA) are described as a way to specify both 
procedures and responsibilities allocated to distributed developments for items and 
elements. The DIA includes information beyond technical safety by addressing procedural 
and confidence related issues. In the avionics domain we can find similar requirements 
while talking about modules and application reuse on an IMA (Integrated Modular 
Avionics) platform. In DO-297 [DO-297] for reuse of component acceptance it is required 
that component limitations, assumptions, etc. are documented and a usage domain 
analysis is performed to ensure that it is being reused in the same way as it was originally 
intended. 
Guidelines and standards prescribe the information needed to manage at the assurance 
project level as we have indicated in chapter 3 Standards Analysis. When analysing 
guidelines and standards, we noticed that the data required for assurance can be 
classified in three main categories: 
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• Artefacts: referring to the data required by an entity when doing the safety 
assessment 
• Properties: these are characteristics that must be present in the component and 
after the integration in order to confirm that there are no concerns or an 
emerging unknown behaviour.  The properties need to be verified, and the 
verification needs to be included as part of the evidence. 
• Processes: refers to the activities that shall be performed in order to prepare the 
reuse and after the reuse itself in order to comply with the standards 
requirements. 
 
Fig. 60 Assurance contract view for a component 
5.4.1 Components integration compliance process perspective 
Fig. 61 shows the activities performed by the integration in the context of compliance 
processes for component-based systems in detail.  
In the previous chapter we have agreed on the creation of an assurance project per 
component to develop. The Common Certification Language (CCL) relies on three aspects: 
Compliance management, safety argumentation and evidences management as described 
on previous chapter. Composition can take advantage of the CCL and relate those aspects 
regarding how assurance at the whole system level could be composed by the addition of 
all the information for each of the components integrated with the system. 
The standard expert should also play a role in this process. The expert is the responsible 
to model the standards and guidelines for composition, the focus here is the integration 
of the different components and the division of responsibilities between the component 
safety manager and the integrator. When we talk about component composition, we 
highlight relationships that exist between concepts from different reference frameworks. 
These frameworks are related to each of the components that are being integrated.  
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Fig. 61 Components integration compliance process 
In managing complex industrial projects, it is a common practice to decompose the 
project into different subprojects for different teams to develop. Each of these teams will 
focus just on one of the subsystems in which the whole project is decomposed. These 
groups can be from the same company but they can also be part from different 
companies which are suppliers for the manufacturer. Each of them should see their 
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development as a project they need to assure compliance, it is an assurance project as we 
have defined on previous section. In this sense we will have a hierarchy of subprojects for 
each of the parts or component of the system. A subproject might focus just on the 
development of a software component or just on the hardware of a component. We can 
use this divide-and-conquer approach to manage the assurance of an overall system using 
this approach. We need a project of the systems and as many subproject as parts the 
system is decomposed in. In the same way, an “integration/reuse” is needed. It is 
necessary to open up another project to manage assurance aspects of the integration of 
components. This new integration project will include all the component assurance 
projects as subprojects. The integration assurance project will include information on the 
compliance requirements regarding integration and should reference to activities done 
on the components that are being integrated. This is done by the integrator during steps 
1 and 2. First the integrator creates an integrator assurance project and then the 
integrator will, tailor the baseline for the integration project. 
For each component we should create a dedicated assurance subproject. On each of 
these subprojects we need to define which standard(s) and requirements apply to the 
specified component and up to what level we need to comply with. We also need to 
specify for each of the subprojects the evidences that we will provide to support 
assurance of those compliance requirements. In some cases, evidences could be a 
composition of evidences done on other subprojects so we should address that on the 
project evidence model.  
All this approach can easily be sustained with the meta-models we have described on 
previous section. The assurance project meta-model described includes the concept of 
subprojects. The new integration assurance project should be treated just as another 
assurance project but with the particularities that the baseline should include all of the 
post-conditions which it is necessary to meet for a complete integration.  
For each of the components we need some contract data relating to a component needs 
to include information about assured properties and behaviours of that component, the 
artefacts that should be accessible to the authorities and the evidence of the process and 
activities executed to fulfil the component’s assurance requirements. All this information 
is related to the component assurance information that the integrator should collect in 
step 3. Contract references to the artefacts and their properties, and the rest of the 
information from the artefact model is considered as a black box. 
Integration assurance project should also include an assurance case focused on the actual 
safety integration of the components and the adequacy of the component reuse; this is 
the objective to fulfil in step 4. Components are safe standalone and that is what we will 
include on each of the components assurance project but on the integration assurance 
project we should focus on the integration and the actual verification that no 
unintentional interference occurs. For the reuse feasibility we have created an 
argumentation pattern in order to show the feasibility for component reuse. In Fig. 62 
this pattern is illustrated. The reuse is analysed based on four pillars: 
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• Functionality: this aspect is critical for reuse. The main rational for a reuse is to 
provide the same functionality as needed on the same environment and at the 
same operational conditions and it if not the same it should be compatible. 
• Compliance to standard: this aspect refers to standard objectives fulfilment by 
the reuse, showing requirements compliance to the standard requested on the 
environment where the component is going to be reused. 
• Criticality levels: this aspect is referring to up to which level of criticality is the 
component developed. In safety-critical systems, functions are associated to 
hazards and the level of severity they could end up in case of occurrence. Based 
on this critical level, the level of demand to requirements coverage might differ. 
Components should only be reused into environments in which the critical level 
they are required is the same the one they were developed up to. 
• Business case: on this aspect we should look if the IP (intellectual property) rights 
are not violated or if it is part of the strategy defined by the company or if the 
reuse worth the cost of the component. 
In step 5 we deal with the compliance maps. Compliance maps, as described in previous 
section 4.6 Compliance maps, are the mechanism to indicate how exactly we are 
complying on a specific project to the reference requirements. In the integration 
assurance project we should reference to activities, requirements, roles, techniques that 
took part on the development of the component and are what we have called pre-
conditions for the integration. We define preconditions as those constraints the 
component should fulfil in order in order to be reused. These pre-conditions can be either 
activities to be performed prior to the integration, artefacts that should be released to 
the integrator or claims about properties that should be ensured at component level. In 
the baseline for the integration assurance project we will include all the post-conditions 
which are all the activities requirements, techniques or roles that we have to fulfil during 
the integration and once the integration is done.  
During the integration in step 7, the integrator should monitor all the activities that are 
performed during the integration. Some of these activities might have been specified as 
post-conditions. Some example of these activities is the execution of the analysis 
specified by the component developer to be executed in the target environment as it is 
mentioned in AC 20-148. 
In step 8 in the integration assurance project we should add an artefact model where we 
all the evidences related to the integration appear and we also should include those 
evidences that are composed of parts which are components evidences. For example, the 
system safety plan should include all the components safety plans. In this sense in the 
integration assurance project, we will have the artefact model where we reference to the 
safety plans for all the components. 
All these aspects are linked to each other and a change in one of them will impact on the 
others. In step 9 we should create the new compliance maps regarding the activities, 
artefacts claims about properties regarding the integration and at system level. 
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Fig. 62 Argumentation pattern for reuse feasibility 
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When validating a contract, it is necessary to take into account not only component 
functionalities and guarantees but also the context inherited by the components 
integration are compatible with the system context, and the assumptions made at 
development are valid once the integration is done. Details on how to specify and 
validate these assumptions will be detailed in the next chapter. 
5.4.2 Rules for compositional certification 
A complex project should be decomposed into different subprojects that different teams 
will develop. Just as previously mentioned, these teams can be from the same company 
or from different suppliers and companies. 
Each of this team can be responsible of a subproject. A subproject might focus on the 
development of a component but this is not a limitation. 
For integration of the work developed by different teams on different subprojects, an 
integration subproject is needed. 
A project, “mother project”, should be the responsible off all the subprojects in which it is 
decomposed. This main project will take care of the assurance at system level. This 
project is called the “mother project” as all the subprojects are decompositions of this 
one and so they can be seen as sons-daughters of this mother project. 
The integration project could also be the mother project if it also considers the system 
level compliance requirements. Sometimes it might be important to have these projects 
differentiated if the system level compliance requirements are too many to be considered 
in the integration or if the responsible for the system and the integration are different 
teams. 
Each subproject packages a baseline model, an argumentation model, an evidence model 
and a process model. Compliance maps are also part of the aforementioned package. This 
is basically what we have described on the previous section about the meta-models 
required to model assurance. In this case this package will reference to information 
regarding just to the component.  
A subproject/package could reference to multiple reference frameworks. It is clear for 
example in the case of an avionics reusable software component which need to comply 
with the DO-178c standard which is required for software developments on avionics and 
AC 20-148 advisory circular which is a guideline for reusable software component . In this 
example the component should reference to these two reference documents. The way to 
this can be to have one baseline per standard or reference document or either have a 
unique baseline combining all the references needed. For the first case we should have 
modelled both documents separately and have two reference frameworks to reference. 
For the second option we should have modelled in a unique reference framework both 
documents and the relations among them. 
One reference framework can reference to other reference framework’s information like 
activities, requirements and/or artefacts. Following the previous example of the reusable 
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software component, AC 20-148 references to DO-178 lifecycle data, so in order to 
comply with the AC 20-148, the component should reference to artefacts (lifecycle data) 
which are part of other baseline, the one for DO-178 compliance. In the automotive 
domain, if we are considering that the hardware part of the system is one component and 
the software another component then we will have two assurance projects. The software 
component project will reference to an artefact which is shared by the two projects: the 
hardware project and the software project; this artefact is the hardware-software 
interface. 
At subproject level we need to include as minimum one baseline in order to mark to 
which standard/recommendation we will comply with. Each subproject should be 
compliance as minimum with one reference document.  
On a subproject, there can be as many baselines as necessary. At least there will be one 
baseline per reference framework associated. It has been previously mentioned, if we 
want to reference different standards we can have one baseline per each of them. Apart 
from that, we can also update a baseline if we need to refine or tailor the way the 
standard is complied. If we update a baseline with modifications, we should store 
previous baseline for tracing purposes. To distinguish if a baseline is an update or a 
previous version, we will only have active those up to date baselines. Old versions will be 
deactivated but stored. 
Regarding specific interpretations, we will take care of those one at (sub) project level. A 
subproject level should be done by tailoring baselines. For example ,if on a project it is 
agree to use a specific tool used to cover specific requirements, for sample used a 
requirements management tool to cover the trace of the requirements, this is done at 
project level. Decisions of this type done at “mother project” level could affect all the 
subprojects if it is agreed this way but it is not necessary on all cases.  
On a subproject we can reference to activities, artefacts or argumentations developed on 
another subprojects. For instance, when one team assumes that specific activities are 
done by other team. On automotive a system team assumes that the hardware team will 
make some verification activities regarding the hardware. This implies that a subproject 
can reference and have access to any other related subprojects public activities, 
requirements, artefacts or argumentations.  
Evidence models of a subproject can reference to other parts of evidence models for 
other subprojects. In the avionics domain we have the artefact PSAC (Plan for Software 
Aspects of Certification) at system level should include information of a 
component/subsystem PSAC. In the automotive domain the hardware-software 
interfaced can be the responsibility and be managed by the hardware team and the 
software team will reference it on their evidences. 
Evidence model of a subproject can be referenced from other subprojects in order to 
create compliance maps. Following the previous example the software subproject will 
reference to claim compliance with the standard ISO 26262 to the interface software-
hardware that is created and compiled on the evidence model of the Hardware 
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subproject. At system level project we will also reference the hardware-software 
interface as it is requested at this level as well. 
Referring to other subprojects activities or evidences, introduces the problem regarding 
confidentiality versus accessibility. If we consider components as black boxes with only 
the interfaces to others accessible, then all the activities done for component compliance 
might not be accessible. There should be a clear profile policy where depending on the 
user role the access to different elements should be allowed. 
Claims for one subproject can use evidences from others subprojects to support the 
argumentation. This is the application of the notion of the away solution from the GSN 
standard or the argument element citation in the SACM standard. 
Claims can be decomposed into sub-claims and these sub-claims can be developed into 
other subprojects. This is the application of the notion of the away solution from the GSN 
standard) 
We can consider a contract as a collection of all dependencies between subprojects of a 
project. When a subproject references to an element of another subproject, then this 
dependency should be reflected in the contract. 
There should be contract at system level with all the dependencies of the subprojects 
which are part of the mother project. In this contract, we should reference to the safe 
integration that is included on the argumentation from the integration subproject. 
A contract should reference to process done (activities) compliance related concepts 
(reference frameworks and compliance maps), public evidence and argumentation, both 
public claims and integration argumentation. 
5.5 Tool support for composition assurance 
The tool support presented in previous chapter has been extended in order to support 
the integration phase described in this chapter. 
For creating reference framework the process is the same as the one described in section 
4.7.1.  
After the creation of the reference(s) framework needed is time for the creation the 
system assurance project and all the subprojects in which it is decomposed. 
The first step will be the creation of the “mother project”. To do that, we will use 
Assurance Project Wizard. There, we will define which standard(s) and requirements 
apply to the specified component as it can be seen in Fig. 63. 
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Fig. 63 Assurance Project wizard 
Additionally, it is necessary to open up as many new Assurance Projects as components 
the systems is decomposed. In our example the mother project will also manage 
assurance aspects of the integration of components, for doing that we should define the 
component assurance projects as subprojects of this integration project. In Fig. 64 we see 
the assurance project hierarchy. 
 
Fig. 64 Assurance projects hierarchy 
We select the integration assurance project, in order to have access to its properties. One 
of the properties an assurance project has is the subproject. We will add all the 
subprojects which are involved on the integration. 
For an assurance project (in this case, for a component), we should define the evidences 
that we will provide to support assurance onto the evidences model editor, Fig. 65 shows 
an example of evidences associates with robust portioning compliance. 
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Fig. 65 Evidences Model Instantiation for Robust Partitioning Related Evidences 
We will create assurance cases related to each of the component in each of subprojects. 
In Fig. 66 we can see the editor developed to support this creation. 
 
Fig. 66 Assurance case editor 
In order to facilitate the task of creating the argumentation, the tools also provide 
support for the argumentation pattern use. In the argumentation templates view we can 
see the list of patterns stored on the platform. Just by drag and drop the needed pattern 
we can start instantiating and adapted to the actual component. 
In each of the assurance project we will also create a process model to follow the project 
at all times and manage the execution of the processes. The process model editor is 
shown in Fig. 67. 
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Fig. 67 Process model editor 
We will need to create compliance maps as a mechanism to show compliance with the 
standard requirements for each of the subprojects. To create Compliance Maps, first of 
all, it is necessary to press the button “Mapping Set” on the properties form of the 
baseline of each of the assurance subproject. 
 
Fig. 68 How to create Compliance Map 
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The Compliance Map form is organized in three zones: 
• The left zone shows the actual baseline, and it loads the type of elements for 
which we want to make the compliance maps. For default, activities.  
• The middle zone allows to make different filters like: 
o Filter Mapping Model lists all the mapping models stored in the database, 
and it will be necessary to select one of them and one group model. It’s 
also possible to create a new map group pressing the button “New 
group”. This map group has to be part of the active Baseline Config of the 
project. 
o Filter Map Element. It’s possible to create compliance maps for activities, 
artefacts, requirements, roles and techniques, and the allowed maps are: 
 BaseArtefact  ->  Artefact 
 BaseRequirement  ->  Artefact , Claim or Activity 
 BaseActivity  ->  Activity 
 BaseRole  ->  Participant 
 BaseTechnique  ->  Technique 
When the filter changes, also the information showed by the reference 
framework changes. 
o Filter Compliance Map. This filter allows making different compliance 
maps for the same element. 
 
Fig. 69 Compliance Map, select map element 
The right zone shows the list of models; depend on the map filter selected. We should 
select one of them. This selected model will be the target of the compliance map to 
create. 
In the integration baseline we should include all of the post-conditions which it is 
necessary to meet for a complete integration. For example all the activities that should be 
performed, once the components have been integrated. The argumentation section of 
the integration assurance project will focus on the actual safe integration of both 
components. 
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In the integration assurance project we should also define compliance maps for those 
concepts that have been included on the baseline. We are able to reference activities, 
evidence and parts of the argumentations which belong to the subprojects. 
 
Fig. 70 Compliance maps at the integration assurance project 
We just have to follow the same procedure as with the subprojects but on the integration 
project we will reference to activities, evidences or claims that are described on the 
different subprojects. 
Apart from these editors we also need to check the status for compliance at any time of 
the project lifecycle. For that need, a compliance report feature has been developed 
inside a server letting users assess the current compliance of their project to the selected 
safety standard. 
The functionality is intended to be used by: 
• Project team members, such as developers, when the project is in progress, in 
order to have up-to-date insights into which of the baseline framework items are 
already satisfied and to what extent. 
• Project safety manager in order to monitor the project general compliance, 
observe the compliance details and add, assign, or un-assign specific evidence 
resources to/from the given requirement of the safety standard which is followed 
by the project. 
• Independent safety assessor, when the project draws to an end, in order to 
browse the assigned safety evidence, evaluate it and independently assess the 
actual project compliance to the specific safety standard. 
In Fig. 71 we can see an example of the online version of the compliance report. 
The “Project Compliance” table, which is placed on the left, presents base artefacts and 
base activities of the selected safety standard. The most important column is the 
“Compliance Status” one, which presents the overall compliance status of a project to the 
specific safety standard item. The column can be sorted by value, thus allowing user to 
assess the project compliance at one glance. 
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Fig. 71 Online version of the compliance report 
Internally the compliance report feature analyses the project to check the compliance 
maps created and shows a summary of the status of all the compliance maps in relation 
with all the compliance obligations defined on the project baselines. 
5.6 Different applications for the Composition approach  
In the standard analysis section we have mentioned different concepts accepted by 
standard which maps with the idea of compositional assurance. 
In this section we will show some of these examples extracted from the standard and 
from a high level perspective describe how the approach presented on this section is 
applied. For a more detailed demonstration we should reference to the case study 
section of this thesis.  
Avionics domain section 
In the avionics domain we have mentioned the IMA architecture as the modular 
reference platform. For this example, we will think on the sense and avoid function. This 
is a critical function that allows pilots to detect whether there are any possible collisions 
on the way and defines the most adequate respond to avoid them. This application 
function can be reused from different airplanes or even from UAV (unmanned avionic 
vehicle). In this case we will define this as our reusable application.  
This avionic function should run on a platform and as mentioned before in this case we 
will be allocated into an IMA platform. Inside this platform different modules will run the 
basic software to make the platform run. In our example we will highlight one core IMA 
module which is in charge of the partitioning services.  
When analysing this example we detect three teams working in parallel: 
• Sense and avoid function team 
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• IMA platform team 
• Partitioning module team 
Above these three teams, a fourth team is waiting to integrate all their results.  
If we extrapolate the approach describe to this example we have four assurance projects, 
one per team. The integration team will be considered as the “mother project” which will 
take care of the integration assurance and system level assurance. This mother project 
will consider the other projects as its sub-projects or children. 
A variant for this example could be to have the IMA platform team and the partitioning 
team as two subprojects and the IMA platform team will also take care just of the 
integration of the partitioning services with the IMA platform. Then in parallel we will 
have another integration project just focusing on the integration of the IMA function (the 
sense and avoid) with the IMA platform.  
The sense and avoid function will have two baselines, one associated with the DO-178C 
compliance and one with just some part of the DO-297 standard, just the requirements 
for IMA functions reuse. 
Similarly the partitioning module will also have 3 baselines, one regarding the compliance 
with the ARINC 653 (Avionics Application Standard Software Interface) which specifies 
some requirements for the interface the module should comply; the DO-178C as it is a 
software development and some parts of the DO-297, the parts about reuse IMA modules 
and also some specific requirements regarding partitioning and isolation. 
Automotive domain section 
In the automotive domain we can have the idea of the SEooC, the qualified software or 
the qualified hardware as possible concepts for the system decomposition. For this 
example, the system is a new full electric car. This system is decomposed into different 
systems, but we will focus on two systems, one is the parking system which is going to be 
developed by a complete different team as a system SEooC.  
The responsible of the car will see the parking system as a black box and only some 
information will be released to the integrators. On one hand the assumptions made at the 
developments will be accessible along with all the work products requested by the ISO 
26262 for the system SEooC.  
We will also have three more teams working on the car; all of the teams will be working 
on the powertrain system. The powertrain system will be decomposed into hardware and 
software, one team will work on hardware and the other team will work on software. A 
third team will work on the integration of hardware and the software from the system 
perspective, The software team will only work compliance with part 6 of ISO 26262, the 
part that deals with software. This team will reference to work products done at system 
level such as the system technical requirements; they will share a work product with 
hardware team; that is the interface hardware/software. The hardware team in a similar 
way will focus on the compliance of the part 5 of the standard, which is the part that 
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deals with the hardware requirements. The integration team for the powertrain system 
will deal with part 4 of the standard and reference the results of the other two teams. 
There should be an integration project that will see all the previous projects as 
subprojects and will deal with the integration of the parking system and the powertrain 
system with the vehicle. This project will include on its compliance activities one more 
which is the validation of the assumptions made during the SEooC development. 
To sum up we have the following subprojects: 
• Powertrain system hardware development team 
• Powertrain system software development team 
• Powertrain system integration team 
• Parking system SEooC development team 
• Vehicle integration team 
Health domain section 
In the medical devices sector there is a concept for reuse which is the SOUP, software of 
unknown procedure. In our example, we have an automatic external defibrillator (AED) as 
the medical device to develop. Inside the AED we have two components that are being 
developed by two teams, the signal analysis and the shock generator, for each of them 
we will have an assurance project. And we also need the AED system project which will 
act as the “mother project” and will also take care of the integration of the two 
subprojects. For the integration we will treat the outputs of the subprojects as SOUP, 
with the same level of requirements. Medical devices should comply with a great variety 
of standards. In our case the “mother” project will have to comply with ISO 14971 which 
addresses the risk management and it will also address the IEC 60601 for the electric 
safety. However, ISO 62304 which is about the software development will be addressed 
by the other two teams which are the responsible for software development fir the 
device. In the subprojects then the standards IEC 60601 for electric safety and the IEC 
62304 for software development will be addressed.  
5.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have shown how the components are reused and integrated in a 
complete system. The proposed CCL presented in chapter 4 is adapted in this chapter to 
be used for composition. The concept of subprojects and the new integration assurance 
project is important to understand the contributions of this chapter. The component 
assurance project that was described in chapter 4 is used here as a subproject for the 
system assurance project. The integration assurance project will reference to them and 
integrate their activities and artefacts into the integration baseline. We have introduced 
the idea of the baseline for integration to ensure the activities, artefacts and 
requirements for the standards and guidelines are managed. The concept of compliance 
maps is used in the integration assurance project to as a mechanism to trace compliance.  
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The argumentation pattern for reuse feasibility is also introduced in this chapter. This 
pattern takes into account elements for compliance, for safety and also for business 
strategy. 
We have intentionally left out of this chapter the validation of the assumptions made at 
component level as this will be described in detail in chapter 6. 
In Table 10 we have summarized the issues and challenges which were identified at the 
beginning of the section and how we have tried to give them a response. 
Table 10 Conclusions to challenges identified in chapter 5. 
Id Challenge Challenge Description Mechanism Solution description 
1 Responsibility 
decomposition 
When decomposing the 
system into smaller parts 
usually developed by 
different teams and even 
different suppliers, 
responsibilities are hard 
to assign. Whole system 
assurance is not possible 
to be accomplished 
without the support of 
component assurance. 
Assurance 
Project 
hierarchy 
We propose to have a 
component assurance 
project for component 
assurance and a 
“mother” project which 
will take care of full 
system assurance. On 
each of the subprojects 
the responsibilities are 
assigned.  
2 Need to 
reference to 
others’ 
activities 
Components are 
developed in an isolated 
way, however, on their 
assurance processes they 
do need to reference 
other components or the 
system development 
activities 
Baseline On each of the 
component assurance 
projects we will create 
baselines indicating 
what activities are 
planned to be 
performed at 
component plans to 
comply with the 
standard. These 
activities can be 
referenced from others 
baselines, from 
example from the 
integration assurance 
project’s baseline 
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Id Challenge Challenge Description Mechanism Solution description 
3 Reference to 
others’ 
evidences 
Not only a component 
need to references 
others team’s activities 
but also evidences. 
Results from analysis 
wouldn’t have any sense 
without the context, or 
constrains defined and 
verified on others 
component. 
Compliance 
maps 
On each of the 
component assurance 
projects we will create 
evidences model 
indicating the 
evidences generated at 
component level. Other 
projects could use the 
mechanism of the 
compliance maps and 
reference other 
projects evidences in 
order to fulfil their own 
requirement. 
4 Evidence 
refinement by 
composing 
artefacts from 
different 
components 
Evidences from a 
component are 
necessary to refine 
artefacts used as 
evidences at system 
level. In this sense safety 
analysis like a 
component fault tree 
analysis is required to 
complete and refine 
safety analysis at the 
whole system level.  
Evidence 
composition  
At the “mother” 
project, we will create 
an evidence model that 
can have access to all 
the components 
evidences model. 
Other evidence models 
from other projects will 
have access to these 
evidences and 
reference them on 
their own evidence 
models. 
5 Need to show 
integration 
from the 
assurance 
perspective 
It is important that 
component integration is 
done not only at 
technical level but also 
assurance should be 
cared 
Integration 
assurance 
project 
The integration 
assurance project is the 
responsible to take 
care of assurance for 
integration related 
issues. We are able to 
see the integration 
compliance by looking 
at the compliance 
report of the 
integration assurance 
project 
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Id Challenge Challenge Description Mechanism Solution description 
6 Capability to 
trace what 
each team is 
doing 
regarding 
assurance 
For the system 
responsibility point of 
view it is important in 
order to see the progress 
of the whole project, the 
fully accomplished 
system, how each of the 
team is going 
Compliance 
Report / 
compliance 
maps 
At any time we are able 
to see by accessing to 
the compliance report 
the status of the 
assurance projects. 
Internally the 
compliance reports will 
check the compliance 
maps created at each 
of the assurance 
projects 
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6 Contract-Based Assurance 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter is focused on the contract-based approach for components assurance on 
safety-critical systems. Contract-based approaches are seen as a common and well know 
strategy while dealing with complex systems. As systems have grown in complexity, so 
does the trend in using contract-based development approaches to deal with 
components integration.  
Contracts are defined in [Benveniste et al. 2012] as the agreement between an OEM 
(Original Equipment Manufacturer) with its suppliers on the subsystem or component to 
be delivered. “Contracts involve a legal part binding the different parties and a technical 
annex that serves as a reference regarding the entity to be delivered by the supplier—in 
this work we focus on the technical facet of contracts. Contracts can also be used through 
their technical annex in concurrent engineering, when different teams develop different 
subsystems or different aspects of a system within a same company”. 
Contract-based approaches differ when we see them from the development perspective, 
from the safety perspective or from the assurance perspective. Benveniste proposes 
contracts for design to be used at nearly all stages of system design, from early 
requirements capture, to embedded computing infrastructure and detailed design 
involving circuits and other hardware. Contracts explicitly handle pairs of properties, 
respectively representing the assumptions on the environment and the guarantees of the 
system under these assumptions. The component is assumed to have a correct 
functionality just by ensuring the interfaces with others are compatible. From the safety 
perspective, assuring the correct function of components does not mean that the 
(composed, integrated) system will remain safe. From the assurance perspective the 
component not only need to be safe but also should comply with the standard 
requirements. Just as safety, assurance is evaluated at whole system level, in case of the 
avionics domain, the assurance is done at aircraft level, in the automotive domain at 
vehicle level and in the health domain, and we look at the complete medical device no 
matter if these are a set of systems working together. 
In chapter 5 Compositional Assurance Approach we talked mainly about how 
assurance should be done at system level managing all information which is extracted 
from the different components that form the systems. However, we did not mentioned 
"Imagination is more 
important than knowledge." ― 
Albert Einstein 
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information about the properties that should be assured on system level and how this 
information should be treated.  
This chapter shows a structured way to describe the assurance contract approach in order 
to reduce ambiguity and creating the first step for tool support on managing contract 
information. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First the challenges section introduces the main 
problems we are facing when creating assurance contract, then we distinguish between 
the different types of contract we can see on a safety-critical system. Following there is a 
context literature review on the existing approaches regarding contract approach. 
Afterwards we talk about the structure for contracts and the structured expressions 
proposed for each part of the contract. Next section is about how the contracts evolution 
through the system development lifecycle and what is their purpose on each phase. 
Finally we describe some conclusions and resume how we have fulfilled some of the 
issues described at the beginning of the section.  
Fig. 72 highlights the scope of this chapter in relation with the compliance processes for 
component-based systems. This chapter impacts in the activities done by the component 
developer and by the integrator. 
 
Fig. 72 Scope for chapter 6 in the compliance processes for component-based systems 
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6.2 Challenges 
In 2013 there was a request to the OMG in order to define a standard for Machine-
checkable Assurance Case Language (MACL) [MACL 2013]. The intent was to solicit 
information for standardizing an abstract syntax and semantics for languages that 
describe construction methods of machine-checkable assurance cases. Information 
sought includes what technologies exist for checking integrity of assurance cases, what 
features of assurance-case description languages and notations enable those 
technologies, and how those features interact with other features of the languages such 
as abstraction and modularization. As they say their objective was to define: “A language 
to describe assurance cases and more generally their construction methods has potential 
to enable mechanical checking that replaces mundane and not-so-mundane parts of 
those manual reviews. Its role will be similar to a strongly typed programming language: 
type checking frees programmers from worrying about type-errors that can be subtle and 
burdensome to check manually; avoiding them is only a part of the problem but type-
safety can guarantee a great deal when used wisely.” 
There are some identified reasons behind formalizing text, and multiple ways of 
expressing rely/ guarantee conditions. [MACL 2013] provides the following examples: 
• Avoid human errors 
• Support for validation or checking 
• Interoperability between different actors from a system supply chain” (including 
OEMs and component providers) 
• Facilitate the integration of the components within the system  
Human factor 
The human factor is a very important topic in safety-critical systems. People get tired, 
distracted, and they can omit some details. System are becoming more and more 
complex, this complexity is being managed by decomposition into components however, 
the assurance should be handled at system level and this complexity could affect those in 
charge of assuring the whole system. The Nimrod review [Haddon-Cave 2009] is a report 
demanded by the UK ministry of defence to wider issues surrounding the loss of plane 
Nimrod XV230 in Afghanistan on 2 September 2006. There it was pointed out that: 
“Complexity is normally the enemy of Safety and the friend of Danger”. 
In the previous chapter the requirements from the standard in relation to composition 
have been analysed. We have extracted the properties that should be checked during the 
component development and after they are integrated (See ANNEX A). Having just an 
overview of them we discovered the heterogeneity of the properties. We have grouped 
them by categories as: installation, safety, operational, functional, performance and 
reuse. This classification came from the avionics guidelines AC 20-148 [AC 20-148] which 
identifies the first four categories as the topics that stakeholders should identify any 
possible concerns that could came up when reusing a software component. We have 
added a new category, the reuse category for those properties which do not fit on the 
other categories but needed to be assured on the components so they could be reused. 
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Validation and checking 
One of the benefits of formalizing safety contracts will be the possibility of tool support 
for checking or generating contracts. The creation of a formal grammar that information 
inside a contract should follow could supports the technical approaches and instantiate 
the guidance from the standards. Moreover, with the provision support of a defined 
grammar for safety contracts we will be able to support validation of contracts (e.g. 
helping identify incomplete contracts). 
There is a need for a checklist so as the person in charge of assuring the system takes into 
account all the information which is provided in a simpler way. Depending on the 
perspective and information a person needs at some point, different information from 
the contract is relevant. In [Ruiz et al. 2013-2] we say: “viewpoint will let us handle the 
different aspects in a unify framework, this way different type of contracts in a common 
and systematic way structuring the information and this way helping to assure 
completeness. Managing contracts may be complex but with the suggested approach, we 
will give a process for component composition a structure, making it more manageable 
and linking safety behaviour with safety properties”.  
Interoperability between different suppliers 
As mentioned in the previous chapter there is a need for a uniform way to express what a 
component is offering and what a component expects from others. This unique way to 
express this is especially important for the different stakeholders. We need to show that 
are the demands from the components from other parts of the system that while the 
components has been developed this demands have been assumed as fulfilled demands. 
We are also requested to express the guarantees the component offers. We shall 
illustrate this on a uniform way to the different people which participate on the system 
development, so the integrators and other component owners knows what is expected 
from them and what can they ask to that particular component. The unique way would 
benefit all stakeholders as information will interoperable among all.  
Facilitate integration of the components within the system 
Having a structure and a clear way to define the interfaces of the component from the 
assurance perspective will benefit the integration. At integration phase we have seen the 
contract-based approach for technical integration for some properties such as timing. 
These approaches have been valid for complex system integration but their use from the 
assurance perspective has not been extended.  
Assurance is a system property and although it is difficult to decompose on the different 
components, with a contract-based approach we could benefit from this approach. 
Contract with assurance information for the properties will let us verify its correctness for 
a safe integration. If the information is provided in a formal or semi-formal way, then 
some tools could be later on applied to confirm the validity of the contract.  
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Learning curve 
Specifying contracts in a formal way is not widespread in the industry due to the 
difficulties in learning a formal language. Formalizing contracts should be done in a way 
that it is easy for the developer and integrator and supported by tools, other ways it will 
be difficult to be adopted. 
6.3 Analysis of Contracts use 
Contracts have been used on safety-critical systems for a long time and for different 
purposes. One of the main problems that arise here is the naming problem. Contracts are 
used for different purposes depending on the interest on the people who are applying it. 
When people with different roles and/or backgrounds come together and decide to apply 
a contract approach, their interests on the results differ. In this section we have 
categorized the contract-based approaches depending on the purpose. The main interest 
here is to disambiguate the term.  
We have identified three phases in the use of contracts to support the certification of 
components: 
• Design contracts 
• Safety contracts 
• Assurance contracts 
Design-by-contract 
A contract-based design in system engineering involves the following cornerstones: 
• Components and subsystems 
• Contracts 
• Interaction points 
We can define design contracts as those agreements made for development purposes 
where interfaces between components are identified and agreed in order to facilitate the 
interoperability and integration of components. Design contracts have as one of their 
main challenges the interfaces within other components, so the integration is done 
correctly. The component is assumed to have a correctly functionality just be assuring the 
interfaces with others. From the safety perspective, safety is a whole system property and 
just by assuring the correct function of one components does not mean that the system 
will remain safe, as that precise component could have impacted in the behaviour of 
another that with the integration is unable to get to a safe state in case of an event. The 
first step is the use of design contracts to support the technical integration of different 
components within a system. Design contracts focus on the necessary conditions for 
correct component operation. In an integrated component configuration if component 
contracts are satisfied the set of components can be assumed to function correctly 
together.  
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Safety-by-contracts 
For this type of contracts we focus on those characteristics and properties that need 
special attention regarding safety. Behaviour is one of the characteristic that SPEEDS 
[SPEEDS D2.5.4] first and then CESAR meta-models [CESAR D_SP1_R3.3_a_M3] did take 
into account. However, behaviour for those meta-models is seen as nominal function 
behaviour, reaction to its environment. Abnormal behaviours or behaviours when failures 
occur where ignored but are essential from the safety perspective. Safety is a system 
property so the task of allocating the safety properties to specific components is difficult 
as the responsibility is shared by all the components. The context in which the 
component is going to be integrated is important and as we [Ruiz et al. 2013-1] indicated 
for the SEooC perspective the assumptions of the item can be understand as the context 
characterisation. In addition, to support safety assessment, failure behaviours of 
components, and their behaviour in the presence of failures, must be defined. Ruiz shows 
some needs of the industry in relation with the application of the SEooC concept and 
proposed the use of safety contracts as a possible strategy. A primary challenge is 
identifying all of the assumptions made and secondly envisaging all of the different 
contexts in which the element might be used. The core of those safety contracts will be 
the characterization of the context in which the components is expected to be integrated 
with and the possible behaviours of the component. Understanding of the safety 
decisions made at design time are important while analysing the different environments 
in which the component can be integrated as it support the impact analysis required in 
case of a discrepancy of the context. 
Assurance contracts 
Assurance contracts define the set of claims that need to be made concerning a 
component to support its certification against a particular safety assurance standard. 
Different standards address this problem in different ways. In ISO 26262 [ISO 26262] 
Development Interface Agreements (DIA) are described as a way to specify both 
procedures and responsibilities allocated to distributed developments for items and 
elements. The DIA includes information beyond technical safety by addressing procedural 
and confidence related issues. The use of DIAs is intended to help address risks such as: a 
supplier with inadequate capability, improper understanding or definition of the 
boundary of component and its interactions with its environment, or failing to fulfil 
requirements. 
Regarding those assurance contract, different standards has focus the problem in 
different ways. An example of the contract could be seen in the ISO 26262, where the 
term Development Interface Agreement (DIA) is used to define the procedures and 
responsibilities allocated within distributed developments for items and elements.  
In the avionics domain we can find similar requirements when talking about modules and 
application reuse on an IMA (Integrated Modular Avionics) platform. On the DO-297 [DO-
297] (amongst other requirements) it is required that limitations, assumptions, etc. are 
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documented and a usage domain analysis performance to ensure that any component is 
being reused in a way that is compatible with the original design intent. 
In the avionics domain the context is already known as the IMA application can only be 
integrated inside an IMA platform and the specification of the platform is well known so 
technical information for the integration is not discussed. But in the avionics domain, 
adequacy of the supplier such as the DIA requested on the automotive domain is also a 
big concern. Big companies such as AIRBUS are starting to put into practise a 
methodology to ensure the quality and capability of their suppliers especially for the 
critical functions. Anne Yani presented [Yani 2011] the plans for Airbus on the idea of 
extended airworthiness. The main certification constrains for EASA on this topic were: 
- Delegation of authority 
- The cascade on certification requirement 
- The surveillance of suppliers 
Airbus has a strategy were principles and means are validated with EASA, defined the 
supplier contributors for the certification process and different stakeholders’ feedback 
can serve for improvement. In order to put this strategy into practice Quiniou [Quiniou 
2011] presented a methodology where AIRBUS classifies their suppliers depending on two 
aspects: 
• Severity as design: Level of risk of the engineering activities based on their impact 
on Aircraft) and 
• Confidence in supplier : Assessment of the supplier organization and associated 
supply chain including sub tiers to deliver to their contractual obligations 
Suppliers are aware of the certification process and take part into it, in order to do it 
responsibilities and work need to be clearly defined in order to integrate the different 
suppliers’ products into the system. 
The proposal from [Ye Kelly 2004] Ye and Kelly where use of a contract “must record an 
account of the match achieved between the objectives required by the application 
argument module and addressed by the COTS component argument module. In addition 
the contract must also record the collective context agreed as consistent between the 
participant modules” has inspired this work. The contract-based assurance approach 
proposes the use of contract not just for COTS but for any component included in a 
system. The contract shall highlight the context in which the resulting system from the 
component integration will work in. This context is defined in form of linked assumptions 
and guarantees between the components and the system. 
SAFECER project has been analysing the possibility to provide support for system safety 
arguments based on properties of system components that can be extracted from the 
system models. Sljibo [Sljivo et al. 2013] proposes a contract extending the approach of 
the basic contract form of assumptions/ guarantees in a form of assertion by broaden the 
scope of the assumptions. They propose “to include not only the component 
environment in terms of other connected components, but also usage context (e.g. 
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frequency if a service usage), hardware context (e.g. available memory), development 
context (e.g. compilers) and system context. This work takes their idea of assertion forms 
for assumptions and guarantees specifications. 
Rushby [Rushby 2010-2] proposed to have formalised the claims in the safety cases. 
Formalizing some elements of the safety argumentation will support precision and could 
be used to apply checking methods like SMT solvers He does not provide a complete 
formulation proposal but just some examples on the feasibility to do it. We have followed 
this approach by proposing structured expression for the claims in the safety cases that 
are used as assumptions or public goals. 
We have mentioned in chapter 2 the initiative at the OMG, where there is an ongoing 
discussion for the need to create another standard, the MACL (Machine readable 
Assurance Case Language) in relation with the SACM standard [MACL 2013]. In Fig. 73 we 
can see the relation between the two standards.  
 
Fig. 73 MACL relation with SACM metamodels  
Our proposal is aligned with the MACL vision where we apply the SACM extension 
metamodel for argumentation modelling and structured expressions are used in claims. 
6.4 Formalized assurance contracts  
As we have mentioned previously a contract can be defined as a collection of all 
dependencies between all subprojects of a project. In Fig. 74 it is shown the relationships 
between the components assurance subprojects that have been described in chapter 4, 
with the integrator assurance subproject, described in chapter 5. 
Inside each of the subprojects we can identify the contract information that will include: 
• Compliance maps that represents how the components is compliant to the 
standard requirements  
• References to compliance elements from other subprojects 
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• Processes (activities) done by the components in relation with the integration as 
well as activities done in order to make reuse feasible. 
• Evidence that is public and accessible to other subprojects.  
• Public claims that can be reference by other subprojects but are justified inside 
the component 
• Assumptions in form of claims or evidence that are reference inside the 
subproject but are supported in other subprojects. 
• Pre-conditions, that are related to requirements for the component to make the 
reuse feasible 
• Post-conditions which are resulting from the integration, these could include 
assertions in form of new requirements, or side condition or new activities. 
All these aspects are validated in assurance contracts. The formalization of the assurance 
contract is focused on the public claims and assumptions included on the contract data 
from each of the components to be integrated.  
In Fig. 75 the processes related with the assurance contract are shown. The assurance 
contracts have an impact in the activities performed by the component safety manager, 
the integrator and the system safety manager.  
System safety manager will be in charge of system decomposition into components and 
define the system components architecture that is provided to the integrator. In many 
cases the system safety manager and the integrator safety manager are roles shared by 
the same person. Here we will treat the two roles separately. 
The component safety manager is responsible for specifying the component data for the 
contract assurance. First, the component safety manager specifies assumptions about the 
context, the environment and use of the components. The specification of the 
assumptions are refined during the component development, and with each new 
refinement the level of technical detail increases. When the component is developed the 
guarantees should be included. Guarantees include the functional and performance 
behaviour of the component.  
The component’s assumptions and guarantees are included in the component 
argumentation model. Those claims that are considered guarantees shall be specified 
with the property public as true while the claims that are considered assumptions should 
be specified with the property assumed as true. We also considered component 
assumptions those information elements with the property type indicating context. 
The integrator safety manager gets the system decomposition into components and the 
system architecture retrieve the information of the components from the components 
assurance subprojects. It is especially important the component’s argumentation models 
as we have just mentioned, the component’s assumptions and guarantees are specified 
there. 
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Fig. 74 Assurance subprojects relationships with assurance contracts 
The integrator should take care of the reuse feasibility, the outcomes of this analysis is 
included in the integration argumentation model. The argument pattern for the reuse 
feasibility has been described in chapter 5. 
After checking the reuse feasibility the component’s assumptions should be validated to 
be included in the assurance contract. The integrator should also execute the post-
conditions before the assurance contract can be validated and provide the system safety 
manager the integrated system. 
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Fig. 75 Assurance Contract related Processes 
The scenario of a simple assurance contract is when a component integrates within the 
system. In this case we will contract information data from the system and from the 
component. Each of the subprojects will have the “contract data”, this is the information 
from the component/system available to other subprojects and the collection of 
assumptions made during the development. This information should be available before 
the integration takes place. The contract will serve as the mechanism to compile in form 
of assertions the link between the assumptions and guarantees and should be evaluated 
as true to be valid. We also need a rationale when the link is not direct link. As it has 
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already been mention, the integration subproject will include an argumentation focusing 
on: 
- The integration has correctly being done and all the pre-conditions and post-
conditions have been fully accomplished. 
- The links between the assumptions and guarantees are correctly justified and 
supported. 
Assurance contracts can differentiate between two levels of specification. A first level or 
general level, depending on the aspect of the contract we are able to define a pattern. 
Also a company could include special requirements for contracts, for example an audition 
or specific analysis or a confirmation that there are not IP related issues for reuse. 
Second level: at instance or project level. At this level, we need to do the specification of 
the contract data for an already defined component.  
For the component is only possible to have post conditions at all if those are based on 
pre-conditions where that context is ever defined 
Pre-conditions are inputs that will be artefacts; they provide knowledge about the usage 
scenarios. Those pre conditions should be defined before the integration time. 
Defined assumptions are mapped to pre-conditions. Validated assumptions are mapped 
as post conditions.  
One of the benefits of formalizing safety contracts will be the possibly of tool support for 
checking or generating contracts. Moreover, with the provision of a defined grammar for 
safety contracts we will be able to support validation of contracts (e.g. helping identify 
incomplete contracts). When defining this grammar, four characteristic where requested 
for the language to be specify: 
• semi-formal 
• finite 
• exhaustive 
• extensible 
The contract language should be formal and structured in order to reduce ambiguity that 
has been detected as one of the challenges for assurance. With the proposal defined 
here, we will take advantage of the SACM extension meta-model presented on chapter 4 
and extended it in order to benefit from concepts from ontologies approaches, and 
Semantics of Business Vocabulary and Business Rules (SBVR) and Backus Normal Form or 
Backus–Naur Form (BNF) rules so as to define the basis for formal and detailed natural 
language declarative description of an assurance assertion. 
When we define our language as finite, we mean that the content of an assurance 
contract could include a finite number of concepts: processes, evidences and properties. 
These concepts in fact are the ones extracted from the analysis of the standard which has 
been described on chapter 3. Only these concepts will be included in the assurance 
contracts, other type of information is out of the scope of this language. 
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When creating an assurance contract we need to create assertions with sufficient 
expressiveness, for doing so with such a language, this should be exhaustive. We provide 
capabilities to deal with the concepts mentioned before. Nonetheless, the classification of 
the properties will serve as a guideline to check all the needed information is taken into 
account. 
To deal with expressions used on assumptions and guarantees which are not covered we 
propose the use of either the informal free-text or either extends the list of structured 
expressions and links them to an existing category. We recommend that the contract 
creator use informal free –text the first time this time occurs and monitor the need. If the 
lacks continues with a certain frequency the best option is the extending the list of 
structured language expressions stored. 
Guidelines from the standards offer the best practices and interpretations of the 
standards in order to comply with certain requirements. Those best practices can be 
modelled within the different technical approaches and impact on the methodology for 
the system development. Different technical measures can be put into place in order to 
assure the correct and complete following of the guidance and practices.  
The use of contracts in component-based development is a well-known approach in the 
development of complex systems. It is based on the idea of “divide and conquer” where a 
complex development is done by the sum of various smaller and more manageable blocks 
or components that together form the whole. Joining blocks is a difficult task where the 
pointing and sharp borders need to life together without affecting one to another. On this 
environment is where contracts come out. 
Contracts structure 
The contract is structured into 4 main parts depicts in Fig. 76: 
 
Fig. 76 Contract structure 
For the definition of the agreement two things must be taken into account: 
Assumptions 
- Activities/processes that shall be done by the integrator of the component 
- Properties of the component that shall be checked after the integration 
- Artefacts that shall be completed or done after the integration of the 
Guarantees 
- Activities/processes that shall be done by the developer of the component 
- Properties of the component that shall be checked after the integration 
- Artefacts that should be completed or done after the integration of the 
Rationale 
- Impacts on the guarantees if any of the assumptions is not valid 
- Correct reuse and integration 
- Rationale about the limits, conditions, and use of the component 
Definition 
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- a unique identifier for the agreement in order to distinguish it from other 
contract that might be for the same system and  
- a unique identifier of each of the subprojects involved on the agreement due to 
the integration. 
The assumption part includes the collection of the assumptions made at the development 
time. The guarantee parts includes the public information about the subprojects involved 
that is accessible by other subprojects even though they are not involved at the moment 
on the contract. This part prepares the way to future contracts when new components 
are integrated on the resulting system from the first integration.  
We should also include a rationale for assumptions validation as well as an argumentation 
about the correct reuse and integration.  
6.4.1 Connections with the CCL 
The parts of the contract are directly linked to the argumentation meta-model presented 
on chapter 4. The contract is identified by the agreement concept on the extended SACM 
meta-model proposed before.  
This agreements or contract are done between argumentation that represents safety 
cases module for a specific component. In Fig. 77 the connection between the assurance 
contract and the CCL concepts are shown. 
 
Fig. 77 Assurance Contract Connections with CCL 
The assurance contract is a type of agreement. The assurance contract is done between 
at least two different assurance projects.  
The contract consists of assumptions on the baseline referring to compliance maps in the 
component assurance project that will reference to an activity or an artefact. We can 
have a subtype of assumptions which are the pre-conditions and post-conditions which 
are described in a form of an assertion. They can be an assumed claim or an information 
element with property type as context.  
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As shown in Fig. 78, assumptions can be done about activities, properties and evidences. 
The activities that should be done after the integration can be seen as post-conditions of 
the reuse feasibility. Those activities should be included in the integration baseline and 
their process be monitored in the integration process model. Properties assumed 
represent the component expected context. Artefacts assumed should be included in the 
integration evidence model. Those artefacts should be released as they are requested by 
the standards and/or guidelines for compliance.  
These claims could be about a property, evidence or a compliance element.  
Guarantees will also be shown as assertion in the form of a claim. The difference from the 
assumptions because they are marked as public and other assurance project’s elements 
are able to reference them.  
Guarantees should be done about component properties. Guarantees about artefacts and 
processes do not necessary are included in the argumentation model as they are already 
reference by the compliance maps in the component assurance project. 
 
Fig. 78 Information contained in the assumptions and guarantees 
Both, assumptions and guarantees can be extracted from the argumentation model. In 
the integration assurance project, we should include an argumentation model that will 
extract the information from the arguments model from the assurance subprojects 
involved. In this case, we will have a collection of all the claims set as public which are 
mapped as guarantees, claims set as assumed and information elements citations which 
are mapped as assumptions. The objective of this new argumentation is two folds, to link 
these assumptions and guarantees and to provide a justification about the correct reuse. 
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6.4.2 Structured expressions 
The argumentation model for the assurance contract mentioned before is formed by 
assertions in form of claims. These assertions are usually made using natural language. 
The use of natural language can be counter-productive as it can induce to ambiguity 
which is one of the identified challenges we try to achieve with this proposal. The use of a 
formal language has a big barrier to be used on the industry to the difficulties to learn a 
new language. For that reason the use of structured expression formulated in natural 
language can be the solution. 
We can leverage full benefit of the use of these controlled expressions by providing 
guidelines to the developers in accordance with the best practices of the guidelines for 
assurance and will be used by the people involved on the each of the component 
assurance. In compositional assurance it is important the use of coherent and adequacy 
terminology as we will need to “match up” information from different sources (assurance 
projects) created by different people and roles. This is particularly important in 
compositional argument structures, where the scope of the rely-guarantee agreements 
between components and services must be as clear as possible. 
One important means of constraining the scope of the assertions is to specify the type 
and structure of claim structures which can be used. Claim types can be represented 
using structured expressions, where the nouns which can be used as grammatical 
subjects and objects are variable within defined limits, and where the verb phrases which 
carry the proposition (by governing the grammatical interaction of the nouns) does not 
vary.  
In [Opencos D5.3] there is an initial list of claim types that we present in Table 11 
Table 11 Initial claim types list. 
Claim Type Definition 
Activity-Artefact Claim 
Claims relating to the production of particular artefacts as a 
result of particular activities 
Artefact Compliance 
Claims 
Claims relating to the necessity of particular artefacts for 
compliance.  
Artefact Adequacy 
Claims 
Claims relating to the adequacy and appropriateness of 
particular artefacts – i.e. moving beyond compliance into a 
justification of the evidence artefacts provided.  E.g. the 
adequacy of a fault tree 
Activity Compliance 
Claims 
Claims relating to the necessity of particular activities for 
compliance 
Activity Adequacy 
Claims 
Claims relating to the adequacy and appropriateness of 
particular activities – e.g. the suitability of a particular analysis 
technique. 
Component 
Development Claims 
Claims relating to the adequacy of the process by which a 
iomponent has been developed 
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Claim Type Definition 
Fault Accommodation 
Claims 
Claims relating to the accommodation or elimination of a fault  
Hazard Mitigation 
Claims 
Claims relating to the adequacy of hazard mitigation achieved 
by safety measures in the design 
Claim types for this table have been identified for different sources:  
• An analysis of existing GSN argument patterns [Hawkins Kelly 2013]. 
• The Safety Case Repository assembled by the Dependability Research Group at 
the University of Virginia [Virginia]. 
In order to enrich this list we have taken into account the analysis of the standard 
presented on chapter 3. The information about the processes and artefacts are covered 
by the claim types identified, however, not all the properties identified are covered. 
Initially we have categorised the properties into: Installation, Safety, Functionality, 
Performance and Timing according to the different concerns a reusable software 
component should pay attention as it is mentioned on AC 20-148. 
We have focused here on the safety and performance categories and make a comparison 
across the different standard and extract some new types of claims.  
Table 12 Claim types list based on standard's analysis. 
Claim Type Definition 
Agent Action Claims 
Claims relating to the role of agents (external to the system), 
particularly where this affects system safety. Note that 
agents may be non-human (i.e. these are environmental 
claims) 
Environmental property 
claims 
Claims relating to conditions in the operating environment 
which have a bearing on the safety of the system 
Overall Safety Claim  
High-level claim about the acceptability of the safety of an 
entity, which is usually the root node in an argument   
Element Performance/ 
behaviour claim 
Claims relating to the functionality and behaviour of some 
system elements 
Element adequacy 
claims 
Claims relating to the appropriateness of certain 
characteristics of elements (e.g. weight, timing) 
Element compliance 
claims 
Claims related to the level of compliance of an element to a 
specific standard 
Extending the CCL in [OPENCOSS D5.6] a Metamodel for Structured Expressions is 
proposed as an extension to the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel [SACM 1.1]. 
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Fig. 79 Structured Expressions Metamodel. 
The next step has been the identification of structures expression and map them to the 
categories already identified. For doing so, we do not only look at the sources used for 
defining the claim types but also information provided as inputs for the execution of the 
case studies that will be presented on following chapters.  
Table 13 shows the connection between the claim types and the identified structured 
expressions. For the structured expression definition we used (Backus Normal Form or 
Backus–Naur Form) grammar. 
Table 13 Structured expressions proposed by each claim type. 
Claim Type Structured Expression Example  
Overall Safety Claim  
{item|platform|system|subsystem|element|component} is 
acceptably safe to operate in its defined context  
Activity-Artefact Claim 
1. {artefact} was produced during {activity} 
2. {artefact} was produced during {activity} using {technique} 
3. {artefact} was produced using {technique} 
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Claim Type Structured Expression Example  
Artefact Compliance 
Claims 
1.{artefact} satisfies {requirement} 
2. {artefact} satisfies {requirement} of {safety 
standard|guidance document} 
3. {artefact} has been generated in accordance with the 
requirements of {safety standard|guidance document} 
4. {artefact} has been generated using {technique} in 
accordance with the requirements of {safety 
standard|guidance document} 
5. {artefact} has suffered {action} 
Artefact Adequacy Claims 
1. {artefact} has {artefact property} 
1a. {artefact} is sufficiently {artefact property} 
1b. {artefact} shows {artefact property] to an appropriate 
degree  
2. {artefact} provides adequate support for {objective}  
Activity Compliance 
Claims 
1. {technique} has been applied in accordance with the 
requirements of {safety standard|guidance document} 
2. {technique} satisfies {requirement}  
3. {activity} has been carried out in accordance with the 
requirements of {safety standard|guidance document} 
4. {activity} satisfies {requirement} 
Activity Adequacy Claims 
1. {technique} used for {objective} has {technique property} 
1a. {technique} has {technique property} 
1b. {technique} is sufficiently {technique property} 
2. {technique} was carried out by {person|role} 
3. {activity} has {activity property} 
3a. {activity} is sufficiently {activity property} 
4. {activity} satisfies {objective} 
5. {activity} used for {objective} has {activity property} 
Component 
Development Claims 
1. {development technique} is appropriate for the 
development of 
{item|platform|system|subsystem|element|component} 
2. {development technique} has an appropriate level of 
{development technique property} 
3. {development technique} is sufficient to meet 
{requirement}  
4 {Parameter } is defined by {identification} with {range} 
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Claim Type Structured Expression Example  
Fault Accommodation 
Claims 
1. {fault|failure} is diagnosed by 
{item|system|element|component|agent} 
2. item|system|element|component|agent} diagnoses 
{fault|failure} 
3. {fault|failure} is diagnosed by 
{item|system|element|component|agent} and indicated by 
{action} 
4. {fault|failure} is indicated by {condition} and detected by 
{item|system|element|component|agent} 
5. {fault|failure} is adequately mitigated by {fault 
accommodation technique} 
6. {fault|failure} is adequately mitigated by {agent 
behaviour} 
7. {fault|failure} is adequately mitigated by 
{system|element|component property} 
Hazard Mitigation Claims 
1. {hazard} has been identified 
2. {hazard} is adequately mitigated by {hazard mitigation 
technique} 
3. {hazard} is addressed by {design technique} 
4. {hazard} is adequately mitigated by 
system|element|component property} 
Agent Action Claims 
1. {agent} will {action}{condition} 
1a. {agent} will {action}{condition} when {stimulus} 
2. {traffic-participant} will {action}{condition} 
Environmental property 
claims 
1. {environmental property} is fixed 
2. {environment agent} will {action} when 
{condition|stimulus} 
3. {environment property} is <value> 
4. the rate of {environment property} is <value> 
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Claim Type Structured Expression Example  
Element behaviour 
claims 
1. {item|system|subsystem|element|component} performs 
{function} 
2. {item|subsystem|element|component} performs 
{function} with {fuction property} <value> 
3. {item|system|subsystem|element|component} will 
perform {function} when {condition|stimulus} 
4. {item|system|subsystem|element|component} will 
perform {action|function} to maintain {state} when 
{condition|stimulus} 
4b. {item|system|subsystem|element|component} will 
perform {action|function} to achieve {state} when 
{condition|stimulus} 
4c {item|system|subsystem|element|component} will 
perform {action} to avoid {state} when {condition|stimulus} 
4d. {item|system|subsystem|element|component} will 
perform {action} to prevent {state} when {condition} 
5. {state} will be prevented when {condition} 
5a. {state} will be achieved when {condition} 
5b. {state} will be avoided when {condition} 
5c. {state} will be maintained when {condition} 
CHAPTER 6 · CONTRACT-BASED ASSURANCE 
172 
 
Claim Type Structured Expression Example  
Element adequacy claims 
1. {item|system|subsystem|element|component} has 
{item|system|subsystem|element|component property} 
1a. {item|system|subsystem|element|component} has 
{item|system|subsystem|element|component property} 
<value> 
2. {item|system|subsystem|element|component} as an 
appropriate degree of 
{item|system|subsystem|element|component property} 
3. {item|system|subsystem|element|component}’s 
{item|system|subsystem|element|component property} is 
acceptable 
4. {item|system|subsystem|element|component}’s 
{item|system|subsystem|element|component property} 
satisfies {requirement} 
5. {item|system|subsystem|element|component}’s 
{item|system|subsystem|element|component property} is 
<value> 
6. {item|system|subsystem|element|component}’s 
{item|system|subsystem|element|component property} is 
sufficient 
6a. {item|system|subsystem|element|component} 
{item|system|subsystem|element|component property} is 
sufficient to show {objective} 
{item|system|subsystem|element|component}’s 
{item|system|subsystem|element|component property} is 
<value> determined by {technique} 
Element compliance 
claims 
1 {item|system|subsystem|element|component} shows 
{'partially compliance | full compliance | not compliance} a 
level of compliance  to objective {objective id} for the 
standard {standard} to level {criticality level} 
2 {Objective| requirements} specific mean of compliance is 
{Verifiable| Formal Review/Audit | Analysis | Test| 
Inspections | Process Evaluation |Software Certification 
Data } and the status is {complete, approved and released | 
still in progress} 
6.5 Contracts lifecycle  
The contract specification progresses through the development lifecycle. Similar to the 
development, the contract has its own lifecycle as well. In following Fig. 80 we try to 
express the different phases of the contract. 
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Fig. 80 Contracts Development Phases 
Pre-contract phase — During this phase we will need to ensure that general 
requirements for reuse have been fulfilled. At this stage we need to check whether the 
company defined requirements for reuse (for example, IPR analysis) has been done and 
the results permit the reuse. As a result of this stage we will be able to have a template of 
a contract created, where the first level of abstraction of the contract is specified. 
Initial phase — From this stage on the contract is project-specific. In this phase we will 
reference the different assurance interfaces and recompile the contract data from each 
component. 
At development time we should extract from the project the different assumptions made 
and the guarantees. It is important at that phase that we take advantage to use 
structured expressions mentioned before and used them on the contract interfaces. In 
the argumentation models for the components the public claims will be considered the 
guarantees and the assumed claims and the information element citations will be 
considered the assumptions of the components. This is the last phase done at 
component/assurance project standalone level. 
Once the component is going to be reused, we should argue about the feasibility of the 
component reuse. In order to follow the best practices and have a complete 
argumentation, we have created an argumentation pattern that we explained in chapter 
5 (see Fig. 62).  
Assertion phase — In this phase we need to map the interfaces in order to create non-
ambiguous assertions. We also need to declare post conditions to be met once the 
agreement is done and to define the rationale behind the assertions. In the integration 
assurance project, we will create a new contract inheriting all the assumptions and 
guarantees from the assurance projects involved. We will also include a new 
argumentation model focusing on the correct integration and the feasibility of the reuse. 
Validation phase — In this phase, each of the assertions defined during the previous 
phase needs to be evaluated as either true or false. If any of the assertions is declared 
false as a result of the evaluation then all of the agreement must be considered to be 
invalid and further analysis needs to be undertaken. All the assumptions and guarantees 
need to be linked and trace, for doing so, the classification based on the structured 
Pre-
contract
Initial Assertion Validation Release
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expression used will be beneficial as we link assumptions and guarantees of the same 
typology.  
Activities must be checked first because they produce artefacts. Evidence artefacts could 
be used to support part of the assurance case, and therefore need to be valid in the 
context of use. 
Release phase — In this phase, all of the post conditions that were declared during the 
assertion phase need to be executed and validated. Only after those conditions are 
executed can the agreement be considered to be valid 
Premises and promises are the core of the contracts. Premises need to be validated 
before the contract promises can be fulfilled. Those premises are typically identified at 
the component level. Promises can be made at component level but also new promises 
can appear as the integration of components enables new promises (regarding the 
composition of components) to be made. The documentation of assumptions and 
intended context of use are seen as premises here. They indicate the boundaries and 
operation conditions that ensure the correct and safe use of the component.  
Promises and premises are closely interconnected. Guarantees identified at component 
level but promises that are not ensured and validated by contracts could make the 
contracts not valid. It is also important to consider behaviour, not only nominal behaviour 
but also failure and degraded behaviour are important to consider for both the safety 
contracts and assurance contracts. 
6.6 Conclusions 
In Table 14 we have tried to summarize the issues and challenges which were identified in 
6.2 Challenges section and how we have tried to give them a response. 
Table 14 Conclusions to challenges identified in chapter 6 
Id Challenge Challenge Description Mechanism Solution description 
1 Human factor People get tired, 
distracted, and can they 
can omit some details. 
System complexity is 
being managed by 
decomposition into 
components however, 
the assurance should be 
treat at system level and 
this complexity could 
affects those in charge 
of assuring the system. 
Categorization The claims typology 
and the data base 
with the possible 
strutted expression 
offer the user the 
support needed to 
take into account all 
the views which are 
needed on the 
contract creation and 
validation 
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Id Challenge Challenge Description Mechanism Solution description 
2 Validation and 
checking 
The possibility of tool 
support for checking or 
generating contracts 
Formalized 
contracts 
Having a contract 
structure and the 
structured 
expressions provide 
the basis for the tool 
support for creating 
the contracts 
3 Interoperability 
between 
different 
suppliers 
We also need to express 
the guarantees the 
component offers on a 
uniform way to the 
different people which 
participate on the 
system development, so 
all of them know what is 
expected from them and 
what can they ask to 
that particular 
component.  
Unique 
language 
Having a unique and 
understandable 
language to express 
what is a guarantee 
and an assumption. 
The language 
distinguish the parts 
of the contract and 
reduces the 
ambiguity 
4 Facilitate the 
integration of 
the 
components 
within the 
system 
Having a structure and 
clear way to define the 
interfaces of the 
component from the 
assurance perspective 
will benefit the 
integration. At 
integration phase we 
have seen the contract 
based approach for 
technical integration for 
some properties such as 
timing 
Categorization 
Reuse pattern 
The claims categories 
offer a good option 
to check the 
complexity of the 
integration. The 
reuse pattern also 
provides support to 
ensure the correct 
reuse of a 
component. 
5 Learning curve The learning curve to 
learn a formal language 
is big barrier for the 
introduction of those 
languages on the 
industry 
Structured 
expression 
Using structured 
expressions 
formalized in a 
natural language 
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7 Case Studies 
7.1 Background  
According to [Yin 2013] a case study is the preferred method when ‘(a) “how” or “why” 
questions are being posed, (b) the investigator has little control over events, and (c) the 
focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context’.  
Runeson and Höst [Runeson Höst 2009] indicate that “The analytical research paradigm is 
not sufficient for investigating complex real life issues, involving humans and their 
interactions with technology”. Runeson defines the study objects for a case study in the 
scope of software engineering as those corporations or agencies that develop software, 
which are project oriented with an advanced engineering work behind. 
This chapter presents the industrial case of the study used to benchmark the thesis 
objectives. The study objects are private corporations: Thales, France for the avionics case 
study, Centro di Ricerche di Fiat, Italy for the automotive case study and NUTES, Brazil for 
the case related to the medical device study. In all the cases the study is focused on a 
given industrial project, the corporations are working on and in all the cases the people 
involved where either Ph.D. or long experienced (more than 12 years) engineers. 
Case studies are often criticised aspects of the case study for being of less value and 
impossible to generalized from. In order to cope with this issue, the idea has been to 
provide three case studies in three different industrial domains using the same template 
in order to harmonize the way their specifications are presented.  
An evaluation framework has also been developed and all case studies will be evaluated 
using the same procedure. The evaluation framework will be described and the results 
explained in the next chapter. This chapter is focused on the design of the case studies 
and how they have been implemented using the approach presented in previous 
chapters. 
The objective when defining the following case studies was to answer the question on 
how should we manage compositional assurance data in order to: 
- Reuse previous developments 
- Reduce certification costs 
"What is now proven was once 
only imagined." Hindsight is a 
wonderful thing but foresight 
is better, especially when it 
comes to saving life, or some 
pain! – William Blake 
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In order to verify the feasibility of the approaches presented in this thesis, all the case 
studies will follow the same approach and apply the same methodology (See Fig. 2). The 
case study development cycle consists of 5 process steps: (1) design the case study by 
preparing the procedures, (2) prepare to conduct the case study pilot, (3) collect the 
evidences for the case study, (4) analyse the case study evidence in contrast with the 
proposed theory and (5) share the case study report. This chapter describes the work 
done in steps 1, 2 and 3. Chapter 8 will focus on steps 4 and 5. 
 
Fig. 81 Phase 2 of the thesis methodology, case studies development cycle 
The approach has been developed inside the OPENCOSS project, presented to all partners 
of the project in October 2014 and to NUTES team in March 2015. 
Each case study has been described for the design following this template. 
1. System Description 
[Presentation of involved actors, operational scenarios, architectural model of the 
system and main functions.] 
1.1. Industrial use case actors and environment 
[Diagram describing the interfaces between the system and the actors] 
1.2. Industrial use case operational scenarios 
1.3. Main functions provided by the system 
1.4. Architecture of the system 
1.5. General characteristics of the system 
2. Description of the Compositional Approach 
[Description of which items in the industrial use case are re-used from other contexts.  
Identification of which components are pre-existing but undergo modification.] 
3. Summary of main argument for safety 
[This is a capsule summary of the case for safety that is presented in the use case, to 
facilitate identification of the most important aspects.] 
7.2 Avionics case study 
7.2.1 System description 
The avionics safety assessment process is depicted in Fig. 82. It includes the system 
development process because that is closely interlinked with the safety assessments; for 
example, the safety requirements are coming from safety standards and have a direct 
CHAPTER 7 · CASE STUDIES 
179 
 
influence on the product, while the evidence for demonstrating safety are based on the 
test results of the product. This makes it impossible to look at the safety assessment 
without considering the development process.  
 
Fig. 82 Safety assessment business process for the avionics domain 
Another important aspect is included in the overall safety assessment process: the 
process of the component supplier. As such it is important to know how the process of 
the component supplier is interwoven in the total system safety assessment process.   
In avionics there are three levels of development and construction activities: the platform 
or aircraft level, the system level, and the item or component level. Platforms are created 
by aircraft or rotorcraft manufacturers, components by equipment or component 
providers. Certification only happens at these two levels: the platform or aircraft level 
and the physical component level. Avionic systems are not yet certified as standalone 
systems, even though progress is made in this direction with IMA (Integrated Modular 
Avionics) certifications. 
The execution platform is considered as an independent item for which a qualification 
dossier will be built. This qualification dossier consists of plans, technical documents, and 
certification documents. Technical documents are specifications, validation and 
verification life cycle data. The certification documents are configuration index 
documents and accomplishment summaries. 
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7.2.1.1 Industrial use case study actors and environment 
The use-case proposed is relative to IMA general environment. This case study is focused 
on IMA platform integration specially related to the partitioning services. Fig. 83 
highlights the focus of the avionics case study in relation with the IMA elements: a 
software component from the platform (see grey boxes).  
 
Fig. 83 Focus of the avionics case study in relation of the IMA elements 
The Execution Platform is a common resource set used by several actors: 
• It is defined and validated by the IMA Platform Architect 
• It is provided by an Execution Platform Supplier, also called Module Supplier 
• It is also used by Function Suppliers in charge of developing applications 
Tools set is also delivered with the Execution Platform by the Module Supplier for the 
users (IMA Platform Architect and Function Suppliers), containing at minimum: 
• Operative System configuration tools 
• Operative System Simulation tools 
Remark: the use-case will be focused on technical data to be provided for Hardware and 
Operative System Tools will not be considered. 
The main technical interfaces to be managed for the Execution Platform are: 
• The API defining all services offered to applications 
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• The characteristics of Execution Platform and constraints for using it, necessary to 
establish Usage Domain of the IMA Platform 
The main relation relative to the use-case is between IMA Platform Architect and Module 
Supplier: the IMA Platform Architect will formally accept the Execution Platform provided 
by Module Supplier. 
 
Fig. 84 Use-Case environment and actors 
7.2.1.2 Industrial use case operational scenarios 
Use-Case operational scenario is the following: 
IMA Platform Architect establishes general hypothesis and certification baseline: 
• Sizing hypothesis (memory, processor throughput) 
• Certification standards applicable (DO-254, DO-178C …) 
• Functionality expected (API A653 …) 
IMA Platform Architect fixes Execution Platform perimeter for Module Supplier: 
• Hardware (Processing, IO, Mass Memory …) 
• Software (Operative System, drivers, Platform System functions …) 
Module Supplier provides Usage Domain (characteristics and usage constraints) 
Module Supplier provides qualification material for certification demonstrations 
IMA Platform Architect validates Module Supplier data and provides formal acceptation 
7.2.1.3 Main functions provided by the system 
Main resources and services provided by the Execution Platform are: 
• Computing resource (processor) 
• Operating System including: 
Execution Platform
Module 
Supplier
IMA 
Platform 
Architect
Function 
Suppliers
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Application Application Application
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o Operative System heart providing: 
• capability to manage real time scheduling 
• capability to manage application processes 
o Drivers offering capability to access to Inputs/Outputs and network 
Additional services (Platform System Applications) present on IMA Platform are not in the 
perimeter of the Execution Platform: 
• Initialization and modes management 
• Data-loading capability 
• Monitoring and BITE capability 
7.2.1.4 Architecture of the system 
Typical IMA Platform architecture is the following: 
Hardware level composed of: 
• CPU board supporting avionic network interface 
• IO boards connected to CPU via PCI internal bus 
Operative System level composed of: 
• Operative System kernel 
• Input/Output drivers addressing Input/Output boards 
IMA System level composed of system applications handling platform level services such 
as Data-Loading, BITE, Instrumentation 
 
Fig. 85 Execution Platform & IMA Platform block diagram 
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Avionic Applications are installed on the IMA Platform and use offered resources via A653 
API 
7.2.1.5 General characteristics of the system 
Environmental conditions: defined by DO-160 categories 
Performances: capability to manage several avionic applications on one processing unit 
Safety constraints: 
• robust partitioning capable to support incremental certification process 
• design insuring determinism: independence between parts of the Execution 
Platform (IO / IO, Network / IO, no demon processes in background, 
performances characterized in worst case, …) 
• Undetected failure rate at 10-6 / h 
• Loss rate at 10-5 / h 
7.2.2 Description of the compositional approach 
The overall context is presented in Fig. 86. The following elements are identified in an 
integrated platform. These elements should be considered separately in the 
compositional approach, because they are provided by various actors: 
• The Execution Platform: object of the use-case, reused from another project, 
• Boards of computing module: provided by other suppliers, should not influence 
or be influenced by Execution Platform definition, except through identified 
interfaces 
• Platform Applications are applications implementing transverse services for the 
platform (Data-loading, BITE …): provided by other suppliers, should not influence 
or be influenced by Execution Platform definition, except through identified 
interfaces (API & Usage Domain) 
• Common Configuration: includes configuration parameters expressing the way 
the resource is organized and distributed to various applications. Provided by 
Platform Integrator, should not influence or be influenced by Execution Platform 
definition, except through identified interfaces (Usage Domain) 
• Applications: implement avionic functions. Provided by Function Suppliers, should 
not influence or be influenced by Execution Platform definition, except through 
identified interfaces (API & Usage Domain). 
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Fig. 86 Compositional approach for avionics industrial case study 
In the context of this case study, only part of the execution platform will be considered. 
This also represents a potential real industrial case where only part of platform is reused 
from another project (typically Operative System heart). 
As shown in Fig. 86, several items are composing the execution platform: 
• Operative System kernel  
• Drivers 
• Hardware items (boards) 
All items (software or hardware) should be considered as independent, provided 
interfaces are defined: 
• Hardware / Software interface 
• Driver / Operative System interface 
The proposed used-case focuses on data to be exchanged between stakeholders, mainly 
hardware and/or software data.  
7.2.3 Source data 
Life cycle data used from the avionics domain are described in the Table hereafter (Table 
15). 
Platform
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Config Appli Appli Appli
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Those documents were mainly used to provide evidences while creating the DO-178C 
model and illustrating the typical artefacts used in an avionics project. Those artefacts 
answer to both DO-178C standard and internal company referential. 
Table 15 Avionics Life Cycle Data 
Document Life Cycle Data provided 
Checklist_HLR.xls This document provides requirements for High Level 
Requirement Verification 
Checklist_LLR.xls This document provides requirements  for Low Level 
Requirement Verification 
Opencoss_PAS_Notebook.doc This document provides the Process Accomplishment 
Summary 
Opencoss_PRS.doc This document provides the Process Requirement 
Specification  
Opencoss_PSAC.doc This document provides the Plan For Software Aspects 
Of Certification 
Opencoss_SAS.doc This document provides the Software Accomplishment 
Summary 
Opencoss_SDVS.doc This document provides the Software Development 
And Verification Standards including rules for Software 
Requirement Specification, High Level Requirement , 
Software Design, Low Level Requirement, Software 
Verification Procedure and Software Test Document 
UD_Eamples.doc This document provides the Usage Domain 
Requirements 
Eurocae ED-12C Software Considerations In Airborne Systems And 
Equipment Certification 
Eurocae ED-124 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS (IMA) 
DEVELOPMENT 
GUIDANCE AND CERTIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS 
SAE ARP 4754A Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and 
Systems 
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7.2.4 Case study implementation 
7.2.4.1 Assurance Compliance Modelling 
In this step the Standard expert will follow the process already described in chapter 4 
which is shown in Fig. 87. Information Source used are ED-12/DO-178 and ED-124/DO-
297.  
 
Fig. 87 Process followed in the avionics case study by the standards expert 
We have modelled both standards into two different reference frameworks. In Table 16 
one of the tables included as annexes on the DO-178C standard can be seen. 
Table 16 Excerpt of table A.1 from DO 178c annexes [DO 178c]. 
Objective 
A
ct
iv
it
y Applicability by Software 
Level 
Output Control Category by 
Software level 
Description Ref Ref A B C D Data 
Item 
Ref A B C D 
The activities of the 
software life cycle 
processes are 
defined 
4.1a 4.2a 
4.2c 
4.2.d 
4.2e 
4.2g 
4.2i 
4.2l 
4.3c 
○ ○ ○ ○ PSAC 
SDP 
SVP 
SCM 
Plan 
SQA 
Plan 
11.1 
11.2 
11.3 
11.4 
11.5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
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Objective 
A
ct
iv
it
y Applicability by Software 
Level 
Output Control Category by 
Software level 
Description Ref Ref A B C D Data 
Item 
Ref A B C D 
The software life 
cycle(s), including 
the inter-
relationships 
between the 
processes, their 
sequencing, 
feedback 
mechanisms, and 
transition criteria is 
defined. 
4.1b 4.2i 
4.3b 
○ ○ ○ ○ PSAC 
SDP 
SVP 
SCM 
Plan 
SQA 
Plan 
11.1 
11.2 
11.3 
11.4 
11.5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
  
The column Objective is modelled as the objective parameter inside a compliance activity. 
The columns activity Ref is modelled as requirements for the compliance activity. The 
applicability software levels are modelled using applicability tables. The output column is 
modelled as artefacts with an arrow going out from the activity and pointing to the 
artefact. 
In Fig. 88 an excerpt of the DO 178c standard is shown.  
 
Fig. 88 Excerpt of DO-178c model 
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For the use case we have modelled the DO-178c standard but just some parts of the DO-
297, just the part about IMA module/platform development process (Task 1) and part 
about module or application reuse (Task 6).  
 
Fig. 89 Excerpt of DO-297 model 
7.2.4.2 Assurance Modeling for Platform/Component  
For the use case we have the “AvionicsMACSPlatform” assurance project which focuses 
on the development of the Execution platform and The Execution platform complies with 
the DO 178C and some parts of the DO-297. In the execution platform assurance project 
there are two baseline, one baseline per standard to apply. In the baseline referring to 
the DO 178c, it is shown that all the objectives have been applied. For the DO-297 we can 
see on the corresponding baseline that only apply the objectives mentioned in table A-1 
of the DO-297. 
7.2.4.3 Integration assurance 
The “Avionics_IMA_Reuse” assurance project which focuses on the integration within an 
IMA architecture. In Avionics_IMA_reuse assurance project references to the objectives 
mentions on DO-297, table A6 for module reuse. The “AvionicsMACSPlatform” assurance 
project is modelled as a subproject of the Avionics_IMA_Reuse project. There are two 
evidence sets for all the artefacts required by the standards explicitly shown on the 
evidence models. One evidence model is created for evidence associated with DO-178c 
and another for the DO-297. 
In this use case the argumentation is focused on the compliance arguments. Those 
arguments are automatically generated when creating the assurance project and 
selecting the parts of the standard the project will comply with. The objectives of the 
standard are transformed into claims and for this use case these claims have been 
identified as public, just as the evidences used for compliance. 
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Fig. 90 Evidence model for the Avionics_ExecutionPlatform Project 
 
Fig. 91 Excerpt of the compliance argumentation on the Avionics_ExecutionPlatform Project 
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The Avionics_IMA_Reuse project is focused on the compliance with the DO-297. The 
baseline includes the activities about the module reuse (Task 6) and from the IMA module 
development process the objectives: 
• Platform integration is complete 
• Health monitoring and fault management functions of the IMA platform are 
provided and documents for use by the hosted applications and the IMA system. 
• Quality assurance, configuration management, integration, validation, verification 
and certification liaison for the module/platform are implemented and 
completed. 
In the evidence model is shown the pieces of evidence created to comply with these 
objectives. 
The argumentation on this assurance project is focused on the feasibility of the reuse. We 
have taken advantages of the best practices on argumentation by instantiating the reuse 
argumentation pattern shown in Fig. 62. 
7.2.4.4 Assurance Contract 
In the contract of this two assurance projects, the objective of the arguments is ensuring 
that partitioning services will not introduce any interference on the application that will 
run on the platform.  
The information in the usage domain rules provide enough data to translated into the 
contract. Some of the structured expressions used are the ones presented in Table 17. 
Table 17 Structured expressions used in avionics case study 
Structured expression Instantiation on the case study 
{fault|failure} is adequately mitigated by {fault 
accommodation technique} 
Communications failure is adequately 
mitigated by the use of dissimilar 
redundant communications  
{artefact} was produced during {activity} {Software Requirement Standards} was 
produced during {Software Planning 
Process} 
{item|system|subsystem|element|component} 
shows {'partially compliance | full compliance | 
not compliance} a level of compliance  to 
objective {objective id} for the standard 
{standard} to level {criticality level} 
MACS platform shows { full compliance 
} a level of compliance  to objective 
{Software Development Processes 
Objetive 1} for the standard {DO-178C} 
to level {DAL Al} 
{activity} satisfies {requirement} {Software Requirements Process} 
satisfies {5.1.2a requirement} of {DO-
178C} 
CHAPTER 7 · CASE STUDIES 
191 
 
7.3 Automotive case study 
7.3.1 System Description 
The automotive safety assessment process is depicted in Fig. 92. The same structure as in 
the avionics domain in Fig. 82 is used, describing both the safety assessment as well as 
the system development process, and the component supplier process is detailed as well.  
The key difference between this automotive model and the processes in the other 
domains are that the automotive domain is characterised by the absence of national and 
international regulators or certification authorities for system safety. Whilst the services 
of reviewers (such as Independent Safety Assessors (ISAs)) are often used by the vehicle 
manufacturers (OEMs) and component suppliers, they are always engaged on a 
commercial rather than quasi-regulatory basis; reviewing practices and exact roles of 
reviewers vary between different countries and even different vehicle manufacturers’ 
supply chains.  
 
Fig. 92 Safety assessment business process for the automotive domain 
7.3.1.1 Industrial case study actors and environment 
The system environment is constituted by the electric vehicle interfaces (mechanical, 
electrical and electronic) and only one actor is involved: the driver. 
The man-machine interface of the vehicle dashboard communicates continuously to the 
driver the status of the gear shift that he has selected last time and, then, also the parking 
state, if the case. The communication is transmitted by the Vehicle Control Unit (VCU) 
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(see Fig. 93), which is an electronic board in charge of monitoring the complete status of 
the vehicle and, in particular for this case, the status of the gear shift. 
The parking actuation consists of a mechanical lock on the vehicle gear. When the vehicle 
is switched off, the only way to alert the driver of the parking actuation (mechanical) is an 
acoustic alarm (the electrical supply is assured by a direct connection to the 12 V auxiliary 
battery of the vehicle), whose intervention is triggered when the vehicle door is opened 
without a parking actuation. 
7.3.1.2 Industrial use case operational scenarios 
The driver decides to stop the vehicle and, once he has positioned the vehicle in the 
desired parking place, he must select the Parking mode (normally indicated by a “P” on 
the gear shift of an electric vehicle) by the corresponding switch on the gear shift. The 
dashboard signals the actual selection. The driver can open the door and leave the 
vehicle. If the driver does not select correctly the Parking mode, the opening of the door 
causes an acoustic alarm that signals to the driver the uncorrected and dangerous 
condition of the vehicle. 
7.3.1.3 Main functions provided by the system 
The main function of the electronic parking system is to maintain the transmission of the 
electric vehicle blocked, avoiding any undesired motion of the wheels when it is stopped 
for parking. 
This function of the system is achieved by the management of the park pawl (mechanical 
engagement) actuation when the Parking state is entered or exited by the Gear Selector 
Module logic, respectively when Parking mode has been selected or deselected by the 
driver. 
When the Parking mode is enabled, the torque request sent from the electronic Vehicle 
Control Unit (VCU) to the power inverter module of the drive train (power inverter + 
electric motor)  is set to zero and the latter is required to remain in torque disabled 
mode, thus the electric motor cannot receive any electric current able to make it rotate. 
When this mode is selected, a request is sent to the logic of the electronic parking system 
to engage the park pawl, thus providing the mechanical locking of the transmission. 
7.3.1.4 Architecture of the system 
The electronic parking system can be considered as composed of the following elements: 
• The electronic parking Control Unit, implementing the high level management 
logic; 
• The “PRND” Switches (Gear Selector Module), implementing the low level 
software and physically driving the motor which moves the park pawl; 
• The Parking Lock System, including mainly the park pawl, the motor for the 
actuation, the motor position sensor and the park pawl position sensor. 
Fig. 93 represents a block diagram of the system and in Fig. 94 a schematic drawing of its 
mechanical realisation is represented. 
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Fig. 93 Electric parking system main blocks 
 
Fig. 94 Schema of the electronic parking lock system 
7.3.1.5 General characteristics of the system 
There are no particular environmental constraints or performance requirements in terms 
of actuation, but the park pawl must be mechanically consistent in order to sustain the 
blockage of the vehicle also in case of a high degree of road slope. The position sensors 
must be able to guarantee the correct signalling of the effective actuation. 
7.3.2 Description of the Compositional Approach 
The system considered as SEooC, more specifically, does not reuse component from other 
contexts, but is itself a component reusable for various contexts. 
The electronic parking system is an example of an SEooC application, for which the safety 
is assured by a closed loop in ISO 26262: a list of assumptions to be used for the 
application of the system in new contexts is outlined as a part of the item definition and 
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this list will be verified during the integration of the system in the vehicle. If the 
assumptions are shown to be invalid, the impact analysis and the related configuration 
management and change management workflows will support the further modifications 
of the various safety work products for the envisioned aims. 
The SEooC can be viewed as a complementary way with respect to that of the proven in 
use argument: the second is a new element derived from a known and tested context 
(vehicle) and has to be integrated in a different context (vehicle), while SEooC is a known 
system (on the shelf) for an assumed context (vehicle) in which it should be integrated, 
once the initial assumptions would be shown.   
The electronic parking system is a safety element out of context in the sense that it is not 
developed for a defined electric vehicle, but it is assumed to be compliant to certain 
characteristics of an electric vehicle for its application (the assumptions). These 
characteristics are related to the vehicle maximum speed, weight and available sensors 
signals, and with respect to the electric/electronic basic interface of the dashboard and to 
the mechanical interface of the transmission. All the vehicles which have the suitable 
characteristics within a certain limited range (e.g. vehicle speed and weight under a 
certain maximum value, some standard interfaces for sensor signals and communication 
data, value of mechanical strength of parking pawl) can integrate this system after the 
verification of the assumptions. 
In Fig. 95 a schematic detail of an example for the SEooC application is reported, derived 
from the previous figure. 
 
Fig. 95 Example of automotive SEooC use case application 
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7.3.3 Source data 
All the information is generally collected into Word/Excel documents. Life cycle data used 
from the avionics domain are described in the table hereafter. 
Table 18 Automotive Life Cycle Data 
Document Life Cycle Data provided 
Item definition Description of the system, by collecting all the 
information from the functional point of view with 
reference to the final user(s)  
Hazard Analysis and Risk 
Assessment 
Results from the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment, 
the ASIL definition and the safety goal. It is structured 
with an Excel table organized mainly in three sheets, 
which receives in input the information from the “Item 
definition”. 
Functional Safety 
Requirements 
It contains the Functional Safety Requirements and the 
derived technical safety requirements. This constitutes 
the safety requirements chain that contains the 
Functional Safety Requirements (FSR) derived from the 
Safety Goals and the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) 
derived from the FSRs. 
The safety requirements chain is collected into an Excel 
table, containing also the allocation of the FSRs to the 
elements of the preliminary architecture and their ASILs 
derived from the SGs; also the TSRs have their respective 
ASIL assignment from the corresponding FSRs and their 
allocation to a more detailed system architecture 
consequent to TSRs definition. 
Vehicle functional safety 
requirements.xls 
Functional safety requirement for the electric park 
defined at vehicle level 
Assumptions.xls Assumptions about the vehicle made during the SEooC 
development 
ISO 26262 Road vehicles – Functional safety 
The matching of FSRs of the vehicle with the FSRs assumed for the electric parking system 
assures the validity of the assumptions and allows the integration of the SEooC into the 
target vehicle, for which the technical safety requirements of the electric parking system 
will be integrated in its technical safety requirements at the product development level. 
The above described documentation constitutes the evidences for the project 
deployment implemented into the platform for the electric parking system use case. 
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The evidences are supported by argumentations that are part of the content of the 
reports constituting the work products as required by the standard. 
7.3.4 Case study implementation 
7.3.4.1 Assurance Compliance Modelling 
The functional safety projects development in the automotive domain is conformant to 
ISO 26262 standard requirements. Our first step has been to create a model of ISO 26262 
creating standard to establish the reference framework. The objective of this phase is to 
be able to share a non-ambiguous and formal interpretation of the standard. We have 
focused on the parts 3 (Safety Concept) and part 4 (Product development at system level) 
of ISO 26262. We have addressed two top level activities, safety concept phase and 
product development at system level. Those activities are decomposed into sub activities. 
Table 19 extracted from the annexes of ISO 26262 will be used as example to show the 
modelling process. 
The elements of column ‘Clause’ can be mapped as Activity classes. The ‘Objectives’ 
column is mapped into the objective parameter of the Activity class. The columns 
‘Prerequisites’ and ‘Work products’ are easily mapped as artefacts in our meta-model. 
Activities might need to fulfil requirements on how they should be done. For example the 
clause 7.4 Requirements and recommendations from ISO 26262 includes elements that 
are mapped as requirements that should be fulfilled by the activity: Hazard analysis and 
risk assessment. 
Table 19 Excerpt of table A.1 from ISO 26262 annexes [ISO 26262]. 
Clause Objectives Prerequisites Work products 
5.  
Item 
definition 
The first objective is to define 
and describe the item, its 
dependencies on and 
interaction with the 
environment and other items. 
The second objective is to 
support an adequate 
understanding of the item so 
that the activities in 
subsequent phases can be 
performed 
None 5.5 Item definition 
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Clause Objectives Prerequisites Work products 
6  
Initiation 
of the 
safety 
lifecycle 
The first objective of the 
initiation of the safety lifecycle 
is to make the distinction 
between a new item 
development and a 
modification to a existing item 
(see ISO 26262-2:2011, Figure 
2) 
The second objective is to 
define the safety lifecycle 
activities (see ISO 26262-
2:2011, Figure 2) that will be 
carried out in the case of a 
modification. 
Item definition 6.5.1 Impact analysis 
6.5.2 Safety plan 
(refined) 
7  
Hazard 
analysis 
and risk 
assessment 
The objective of the hazard 
analysis and risk assessment is 
to identify and to categorise 
the hazards that malfunctions 
in the item can trigger and to 
formulate the safety goals 
related to the prevention or 
mitigation of the hazardous 
events, in order to avoid 
unreasonable risk. 
Item definition 
 
7.5.1 Hazard analysis 
and risk assessment 
7.5.2 Safety goals 
7.5.3 Verification 
review report of the 
hazard analysis and risk 
assessment and the 
safety goals 
8 
Functional 
safety 
concept 
The objective of the functional 
safety concept is to derive the 
functional safety requirements, 
from the safety goals, and to 
allocate them to the 
preliminary architectural 
elements of the item, or to 
external measures. 
Item definition 
Hazard analysis 
and risk 
assessment 
Safety goals 
8.5.1 Functional safety 
concept 
8.5.2 Verification 
report of the functional 
safety concept 
Artefacts in our model are mapped with work products from the standard. So the activity 
Hazard analysis and risk assessment will produced the HARA report such at is described 
on the standard ISO 26262 on clause 3-7.5.1. The work products sometimes are required 
to include some sections or information. In this case, we model them as requirements 
that constrain a specific artefact. (See Fig. 96) 
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Fig. 96 Excerpt of the ISO 26262 model 
7.3.4.2 Assurance Modeling for Platform/Component 
Once we have modelled the standard, the component safety manager will follow the 
process showed in Fig. 97. We create the assurance project for our SEooC, the parking 
system. In the assurance project the structure of the project, a baseline and the 
conformance related argumentation are generated.  
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Component Assurance Project 
(only part 3 and part4)
Baseline Model 
for SEooC
Define component 
assurance case structure
Make assumptions 
about vehicle context
Evidence Model 
for SEooC
Create Assurance 
Project for SEooC
Argumentation model 
for SEooC
Agree on the evidence 
required for SEooC
Monitor evidence evolution
Specify SEooCcompliance maps
Complete component 
assurance case
Highlight in the assurance case 
information for assurance contract
Avionics Ref. 
Framework Models
Specify SEooC guarantees
 
Fig. 97 Process followed by the SEooC responsible 
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For the SEooC assurance project we have tailored the baseline, the part of the standard 
that applies to this case. In Fig. 98 we summarize our interpretation of being compliant 
with the SEooC related activities. 
 
Fig. 98 Interpretation of the ISO 26262 for the SEooC development 
The ‘level’ label is a degree of evolution in the lifecycle assessment towards the whole set 
of required evidence, where its value represents a baseline for implementation. Each 
degree of evolution is built based on its previous baseline; but in some cases the 
requirement in some higher baseline can cause a revision (refinement) of a requirement 
in a lower baseline (e.g. item definition versus safety plan). Some requirements that are 
recursive or are simple ‘refinements’ belong to the same level, even if they are performed 
subsequently (e.g. refinements of the safety plan belong to the same level: the safety 
plan level). 
In this project not all the complete ISO 26262 applies but just some part; we have focused 
on part 3 and 4 of the standard. 
In the SEooC assurance project we have two types of argumentation created. One part is 
the automatic generated argumentation. This generation is created by a model 
transformation. All the activities and requirements selected on the baseline are 
transformed into claims, the squares and the reference artefacts resulting for an activity 
are converted into information elements, the circles. The other part indicates: 
• The public claims about the functionality offered by the SEooC.  
• Assumptions made about the vehicle 
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We also have an evidence model with all the evidences produced for the SEooC 
compliancy. The electric parking system evidence model is solved by the evidences 
represented by the content of the documents described in the previous section (7.3.3): 
“Item definition” (containing the SEooC assumptions), “HARA” report, List of Safety Goals 
and of the Functional Safety Requirements, together with the list of vehicle Functional 
Safety Requirements. All these elements are traces on the evidence model as it is shown 
in Fig. 99. 
 
Fig. 99 Assurance project evidence section 
Finally, at the SEooC baseline we have created the traces for the compliance using the 
mapping setting feature. At the baseline editor, we have available the compliance 
mapping menu as it is showed in the following figure, on which the available evidences 
(as “artefact models”) can be linked to the nodes of the baseline previously generated. 
 
Fig. 100 Mapping window. 
7.3.4.3 Integration Assurance 
For the composition approach we have created a vehicle assurance project that deals 
with SEooC integration. A sub-project represents the SEooC development which we have 
included information about how it has been developed. A “mother” project represents 
Evidence 
Baseline 
nodes 
CHAPTER 7 · CASE STUDIES 
201 
 
the vehicle assurance project. The vehicle level project is a black box; the information 
about how the vehicle is developed is not visible for us, it is only available information 
about the integration. 
 
Fig. 101 View of the assurance projects created for the case study 
In the vehicle assurance project we need to reference to elements that have been created 
on the SEooC assurance project. This way on the integration baseline we reference to 
activities such as Specification of assumption on SEooC functional safety requirements 
and establishment of validity of them with respect to the target vehicle functional safety 
requirements. 
 
Fig. 102 Process for the SEooC integration within the vehicle 
As the vehicle level information is considered a black box, on the baseline we only see 
those activities related to the integration of the SEooC.  
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7.3.4.4 Assurance contract 
In the argumentation we only see the context of the vehicle and the functional 
requirements expected for the SEooC. We also have created a contract that links the 
assumptions and public claims or guarantee made on the SEooC assurance project that 
are represented on the argumentation, with the functional requirements and context 
from the vehicle which are also shown on the vehicle argumentation. 
 
Fig. 103 Contract representation between the vehicle and the electric parking system 
Some of the structured expressions used for the assumptions and guarantees definition 
can be seen on the following table. 
Table 20 Structured Expressions used for the assumptions and guarantees of the automotive assurance 
contract 
Structured expression Instantiation on the case study 
{fault(s)} are diagnosed by {syselement} 
and indicated by {action} 
{VCU internal failure(s) [SW error(s), 
Electrical fault(s)]} are diagnosed by 
{parking system} and indicated by {setting 
an error status flag and transmit it on CAN 
network}. 
{syselement} diagnoses {conditions} {VCU} diagnoses {the failures on Electric 
Parking System button switches and 
related wired connections}. 
{failure} is indicated by 
{symptom:condition} and detected by 
{syselement} 
{GSM shut down} is indicated by {loss of 
communication} and detected by {VCU} 
{conditionexpression} are indicated by 
{action} 
{faults diagnosed by GSM} are indicated by 
error state flag transmitted to VCU via CA 
{syselement} will perform {action} when 
{condition} 
{parking system} will perform {Engagement 
command cancellation} when {engagement 
command is affected by an error} 
{syselement} will perform {action} to 
maintain {state} when {condition} 
{the VCU} will perform  {the handshake 
process invalidation and the GSM let park 
pawl to stay in its current position (if 
current position is park pawl engaged or 
unknown disable traction)} when {a parking 
pawl motor error is detected during VCU to 
GSM handshake} 
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{action} will be performed to (maintain | 
achieve | prevent | avoid) {state} when 
{condition} 
{A disengagement command cancellation} 
will be performed to {maintain {the parking 
pawl engaged} when {al error affect the 
disengagement}. 
{state} will be (maintained | achieved | 
prevented | avoided) when {condition} 
{The parking button LED set on/off} will be 
{achieved} when {the parking pawl is 
engaged/ disengaged}. 
{systemelement} has { 
attribute|{property} that does {action} | 
simpleproperty} 
{Vehicle electric parking system} has {the 
network signalling by CAN bus}. 
{syselement} allows {action} {Cockpit and charge port lid of the vehicle} 
allows {a stable visualization of a label}. 
{agent} will {action} {condition} {Driver} will {block the vehicle} { before 
leaving it in charging} + supporting claim: 
Label in charge port lid reminds driver to 
block vehicle” 
7.4 Medical devices case study 
7.4.1 System Description 
The case study focuses on the development of the medical device Automated External 
Defibrillator (AED), a current research trend inside NUTES. NUTES is part of an initiative 
for promoting the technological development of Brazil, where the Brazilian Health 
Ministry has started some technological transfer projects from well-consolidated 
manufacturers to institutes for science and technologies in order to retain the know-how 
of manufacturing medical devices inside the country. In this context, the NUTES project is 
in charge of receiving and improving methodologies for manufacturing AEDs from the 
Lifemed and providing new improvements. 
AEDs are consolidated as a therapy for the ventricular fibrillation/tachycardia, which are 
the cardiac arrhythmias with highest incidences of fatal cases. In the treatment of such 
conditions, any delay in the application of the defibrillator shock is an important issue for 
investigation, since each minute without the shock implies in a loss among 7% to 10% of 
the chance of surviving. The usage of AEDs has gained much more popularity, since they 
can be used even without a specialized rescuer team available. 
7.4.1.1 Industrial use case actors and environment 
Fig. 106 presents the essential parts of the AED system as a context diagram. Considering 
the safety case, we achieve the goal of showing each external entity, the main functional 
unities and their interaction with the system. The main input variable to be received is the 
cardiac pulses of the Patient. A module defined as Signal Analyzer uses of sophisticated 
algorithms for detecting the signal complexity and decide if a defibrillator pulse is 
necessary in case of fibrillation. If it is the case, the Shock Generator is in the 
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responsibility of controlling the main output variable, the energy by providing it in the 
Biphasic Truncated Exponential waveform to the Patient chest through the Pads. 
7.4.1.2 Industrial use case operational scenarios 
The patient suffers a tachycardia losing the heart beat signal. The rescuer put the AED’s 
pads on the patient chest and delivers the shock. The AED system must detect ventricular 
fibrillations through the ECG signal of the patient. Fig. 104 presents the essential parts of 
the AED system as a context diagram. Considering the safety case, we achieve the goal of 
showing each external entity, the main functional unities and their interaction with the 
system. The main input variable to be received is the cardiac pulses of the Patient. A 
module defined as Signal Analyzer employees sophisticated algorithms for detecting the 
signal complexity and decides if a defibrillator pulse is necessary in case of fibrillation. If it 
is the case, the Shock Generator is in the responsibility of controlling the main output 
variable, the energy by providing it in the Biphasic Truncated Exponential waveform to 
the Patient chest through the Pads. The time for generating the energy should be as low 
as possible. 
In Fig. 104 on the left presents the normal operating AED use case. On the right, the 
figure describes the main failures that could prevent the normal operation of the system. 
 
Fig. 104 AED use cases models 
7.4.1.3 Main functions provided by the system 
The system is implemented using model-based design. All the descriptions and figures are 
extracted from the model of the system. 
The functional requirements from the system are described in Fig. 105. 
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Fig. 105 AED functional requirements 
7.4.1.4 Architecture of the system 
The AED interacts with two entities that are outside of the system scope: 
• The Rescuer that is the operator of the AED; 
• The Patient that is the person who had the sudden cardiac arrest. 
 
Fig. 106 AED context use case with the main elements that are part of the system 
The AED has three entities inside it which are in responsibility of providing it features: 
1. The operator interface which is responsible for the Power On button and Shock 
button, LCD to display information, alarms, sounds, etc. 
2. The signal analyzer which has the algorithms to extract the cardiac frequency, 
signal complexity and decides if there is fibrillation or not. 
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3. The shock generator, which has the charge circuit in order to obtain the 
necessary energy, guaranteeing the isolation of high voltage circuits. It also 
manages the discharge of this energy to a load. 
In Fig. 107 the main architecture blocks in which the AED is decomposed are presented. 
 
Fig. 107 AED architecture internal blocks 
7.4.1.5 General characteristics of the system 
AED provides a controlled deliver of energy for the patient chest. AEDs are used 
extensively as a rescue tool for people arrested in cardiac attacks during their daily 
routine. The purpose of AED is to analyse the ECG signal of the patient and decide 
whether the shock is necessary or not. Therefore, the tool provides a very quick charging 
process allowing the discharge to the patient chest in the Biphasic Truncated Exponential 
waveform. It is operated by a rescuer that just needs to connect the pads, toggle the 
power on button and perform CPR for 5 cycles of 30 compressions to 2 breaths after the 
shock application. 
7.4.2 Description of the Compositional Approach 
The AED is composed by two main components the Signal Analyser component and the 
Shock Generator component. The case study is focused on the integration of the Signal 
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Analyser software which has been developed as a critical component into the AED 
system.  
From the AED system the Signal Analyser component is consider a SOUP. Term used in 
the IEC 62304 standard to refer to software components of unknown precedence.  
In Fig. 107 the overview of software development processes for the software 
development is explained. The composition approach will focus on the software 
integration and verification with the final AED target.  
 
Fig. 108 IEC 62304 Overview of software development PROCESSES and ACTIVITIES 
In Fig. 109 the main safety requirements are decomposed. Apart from that a high level 
safety case has been previously developed using GSN only about the shock generator 
component. During the case study this will be enhanced with arguments about the safe 
composition. 
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Fig. 109 Safety requirements decomposition [Antonino et al. 2015]. 
CHAPTER 7 · CASE STUDIES 
209 
 
 
Fig. 110 Excerpt of the shock generator component safety case 
7.4.4 Source Data 
The development of the system has been done in parallel with the assurance work. The 
system has been developed using model-based design and documents to comply with the 
standard have been explicitly created in order to follow the compositional assurance 
methodology proposed. Engineering data has been available to the assurance team at the 
same time as the design team and communication has been fluent between the teams. 
No data from previous certification experiences to comply with the standards was 
available. 
The model used has been AED.eap model using Enterprise Architecture.  
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7.4.5 Case study implementation 
7.4.5.1 Assurance Compliance Modelling 
Information Source used are IEC 62304 and ISO 14971. We have modelled both standards 
into two different reference frameworks. One of the main problems for doing so is that 
the documentation that should be presented for certification is not explicitly defined. The 
steps to follow in order to execute a process have been modelled as sun activities. 
Refinements of an artefact have been modelled as new artefacts. 
 
Fig. 111 Excerpt of the ISO 14971 modelization 
 
Fig. 112 IEC 62304 graphically modelled 
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Fig. 113 IEC 62304 modelization on a tree view. 
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7.4.5.2 Assurance Modelling for Platform/Component 
Once we have modelled the standards, we create the assurance project for our Signal 
Analyser SOUP. This assurance project has two baselines one referring to the IEC 62304 
conformance and another one for the ISO 14970 conformance. Concerning IEC 62304 the 
activities: 5.6 - Software integration and integration testing and 5.7 - Software system 
testing where not executed and have been left for the AED System assurance project. For 
the Signal Analyser component two set of evidences have been modelled, one in relation 
with the ISO 14971 and another one in relation with the IEC 62304. Two argument 
diagrams have been created for the component, one the auto-generated conformance 
argumentation and another one specifically focus on the safety requirements allocation 
and safety mechanism put in place on the component.  
7.4.5.3 Integration Assurance 
The AED system assurance project includes the integration activities and integrates the 
artefacts from the Signal Analyser components into its own artefacts. The 
“Medical_Devices_AED” assurance project includes the “Medical_Device_SignalAnalyser 
as a subproject. 
 
Both assurance projects are white boxes and the evidences from the Signal Analyser are 
part of the AED evidences. 
The AED argumentation is focused on product-based argumentation and compliance with 
the standards.  
7.4.5.4 Assurance Contract 
The assurance contract links the expected functionality and safety mechanism to be 
implemented by the other module. 
Some of the structured expressions used for the assumptions and guarantees definition 
can be seen in Table 21. 
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Table 21 Structured Expressions used for the assumptions and guarantees of the AED assurance contract 
Structured expression Instantiation on the case study 
{item|system|subsystem|element|compone
nt} performs {function} 
{signal analyser module} performs 
{patient’s heart rhythm evaluation}  
{item|system|subsystem|element|compone
nt} will perform {function} when 
{condition|stimulus} 
{signal analyser module} will perform 
{diagnostic ECG visualization} when {ECG 
analysis has been executed}  
{fault|failure} is diagnosed by 
{item|system|element|component|agent} 
and indicated by {action} 
{RAM section memory failure} is 
diagnosed by {signal analyser module} 
and indicated by {low level drivers test} 
{item|system|subsystem|element|compone
nt} will perform {action} to avoid {state} 
when {condition|stimulus} 
{signal analyser module} will perform {a 
CPU test} to avoid {a failure state} when 
{the period t expires} 
{fault|failure} is indicated by {condition} and 
detected by 
{item|system|element|component|agent} 
{CPU and RAM test failures} are indicated 
by {system failure alarm} and detected by 
{signal analyser module} 
{agent} will {action}{condition} {Stakeholders} will {ensure that the AED 
complies with intended local 
characteristics} 
In some cases the connection between the guarantees and the assumptions have not 
been one to one and need the rational part of the contract to ensure the validity as the 
excerpt shown in Fig. 114. 
 
Fig. 114 Excerpt of the AED assurance contract 
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8 Evaluation 
Various means of evaluation were employed during the different stages of the research. 
These include: 
• Peer review 
• Formalization and tool support 
• Case studies 
8.1 Scope of the evaluation  
In previous chapters the different challenges and proposal have been explained and 
analysed. In each of the chapters 4, 5 and 6 we have highlight the contributions made in 
order to fulfil the challenges identified. We can summarize the contributions as follow: 
• Common certification Language applied to compositional assurance 
o Extension of SACM metamodel  
• Compositional assurance methodology 
• Contract-based methodology 
• Tool support for the previous concepts 
8.2 Case studies 
In the previous chapter three different case studies were presented, each of them has 
been developed in a different domain. We have analysed the automotive, avionics and 
the medical devices environments with each particularities. We have applied the same 
approach presented on previous chapters in all the case studies. 
For the avionics use case, different interviews have been made with members of the 
Airworthiness directorate from Thales Avionics Group also different visits to their offices 
have been made in order to understand the business problem, the data provided and the 
approach presented.  
In the automotive case study, the link has been made across CRF (Centro di Researche the 
Fiat) as the main contributor for the definition, and with numerous interviews, 
teleconferences and discussions on the approach and appliance of the proposed 
methodology.  
The medical device use case has been done in collaboration with NUTES. NUTES is part of 
an initiative for promoting the technological development of Brazil, where the Brazilian 
Measuring Safety Performance 
by the number of injuries you 
have is like measuring 
parenting by the number of 
smacks you give” – Dr Robert 
Long 
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Health Ministry has started some technological transfer projects from well-consolidated 
manufacturers to institutes of science and technologies in order to retain the know-how 
of manufacturing medical devices inside the country. In this context, the NUTES project is 
in charge of receiving and improving methodologies for manufacturing AEDs from the 
Lifemed and providing new improvements. Lifemed is a Brazilian company that among 
other products is developing and distributing the AEDs subject of the case study. On this 
case study also the time difference has been a challenge. A visit to NUTES has been done 
describing the approach following with multiple teleconferences. 
8.2.1 Evaluation strategy  
When defining the evaluation strategy for the case studies two main objectives have been 
identified. The demonstration that the presented approach: 
• Goal 1: is the composition assurance challenges and  
• Goal 2: is efficient when handling the composition assurance 
In order to measure the two areas mentioned we proposed the creation of an evaluation 
framework to case studies, which is based on the Goal-Question-Metric (GQM) approach 
[Solingen Berghout 1999]. In Fig. 115 is shown the approach followed to define the 
metrics. 
 
Fig. 115 Goal-Chllenge-Question-Metric approach used 
For the goal 1 about the capability to handle the compositional assurance we have trance 
the challenges identified and managed along the chapters. The number included in the 
challenge column is the one used to identify the challenge in the previous chapters as 
used in tables: Table 9, Table 10 and Table 14. We specified the questions to in a form of 
true/false statements so only true statement will be considered as acceptable mean to 
support the approach. Goal 1 measures the capability to answer the research questions 
RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3.  
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For the goal 2 focused on the efficiency, again the GQM approach has been followed but 
this time; questions are not related to the challenges but to three areas: 
• Systematic 
• Transparency  
• Methodological 
In Table 22 the questions and metrics associated to goal 1 are specified following the 
Goal-Challenge-Question-Metric. 
Table 22 Metrics specification for goal 1. 
Goal Challenge Question Metric Id 
Capability 
for 
composition 
assurance 
Standard 
identification. 
(4.1) 
Can we indicate which 
standard a component 
should work to on the 
baseline?   
Number of standards 
required  
Number of standards 
referring on the baselines 
1 
Level of 
compliance 
(4.2) 
Is it feasible to indicate 
up to what level the 
component is complying 
with a standard? 
Number of artefact 
required to comply with 
the standard 
Compliance maps existing 
about those artefacts 
2a 
Number of standard 
requirements 
Compliance maps about 
those requirements 
2b 
Evidence 
detail level 
(4.3) 
Are we capable to 
define which claim a 
specific piece of 
evidence is supporting? 
Number of evidence not 
linked on the 
argumentation 
3 
Different 
formats, not 
recognizable 
information 
(4.4) 
Are the standards 
recognizable by all 
stakeholders? 
Is the reference 
framework shared by the 
assurance projects of the 
case study?   
4a 
Are we able to model 
activities in the same way 
along the case studies? 
4b 
Are we able to model 
artefacts in the same way 
along the case studies? 
4c 
Are we able to model 
requirements in the same 
way along the case 
studies? 
4d 
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Goal Challenge Question Metric Id 
Assumptions 
(4.5) 
Is it feasible to handle 
assumptions of the 
component? 
Number of assumptions 
defined for the 
component 
5 
Guarantees 
(4.6) 
Is it feasible to handle 
guarantees of a 
component? 
Number of guarantees 
defined for the 
component 
6 
Responsibility 
decompositio
n (5.1) 
Is it possible to assign 
complying 
responsibilities to the 
different teams? 
Is the subproject property 
used on the case study? 
7a 
Are the responsible for 
each subproject 
identified on the 
responsible property? 
7b 
Has each of the assurance 
projects its own baseline 
indicating the compliance 
requirements the project 
will work to? 
7c 
Need to 
reference to 
others’ 
activities (5.2) 
Is it feasible to 
reference other 
components or the 
system development 
activities? 
Are there activities from 
other projects referenced 
on the integration 
subproject? 
8 
Reference to 
others’ 
evidences 
(5.3) 
Is it feasible to 
reference other 
components or the 
system development 
evidences? 
Are there evidences from 
other projects referenced 
on the integration 
subproject? 
9 
Evidence 
refinement by 
composing 
artefacts from 
different 
components 
(5.4) 
Are we capable to trace 
evidence composition? 
Is any of the evidence 
from the component part 
of project evidence?  
10a 
Is the artefact part 
concept being used? 
110b 
Need to show 
integration 
from the 
assurance 
perspective 
(5.5) 
Are we capable to 
define a way to show 
the assurance 
requirements for the 
integration? 
Is there a baseline which 
includes the integration 
activities? 
11a 
Is there a baseline which 
includes the integration 
requirements? 
11b 
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Goal Challenge Question Metric Id 
Is there a baseline which 
includes the integration 
artefacts? 
11c 
Capability to 
trace what 
each team is 
doing 
regarding 
assurance 
(5.6) 
Are we able to trace 
each assurance project 
status? 
Does the online 
compliance report show 
the status of the 
assurance projects? 
12 
Human factor 
(6.1) 
Are we capable to guide 
the user on the different 
topics he/she should 
treat on the 
composition? 
Do the assumptions or 
guarantees specified not 
included in any of the 
categories? 
13 
Validation and 
checking (6.2) 
Do structure 
formalisation and 
structure expression 
support validation and 
checking? 
Are assumptions and 
guarantees clearly 
identified? 
14 
Interoperabilit
y between 
different 
suppliers (6.3) 
Are we able to express 
guarantees and 
assumptions on a 
uniform way? 
Are the assumptions on 
the integration project 
linked with the 
component guarantees? 
15 
Facilitate the 
integration of 
the 
components 
within the 
system (6.4) 
Does the contract 
include enough 
information to validate 
the assumptions and 
guarantees? 
Are the assumptions and 
the guarantees linked of 
the same category? 
16 
Learning curve 
(6.5) 
Are the set of 
structured expressions 
too complex to be 
used? 
Number of times a 
structured expression has 
been used 
17 
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Fig. 116 Excerpt of the argument justifying the capability of the assurance composition approach to fulfil 
the challenges identified 
The goal 1 is decomposed by the sub-goals which are the contributions proposed in this 
work.  
For the goal 2, the questions are not related to challenged but about the provided 
support. 
Goal Question Metric Id 
Efficiency on 
the 
composition 
assurance 
Is there support for detecting 
assumptions? 
Number of assumptions 
identified 
Total number of assumptions 
18 
Are the component evidences 
reusable? 
Number of evidences 
requested on the integration 
baseline before the 
component is integrated  
Number of evidences from the 
component that map those 
requirements 
19 
Is the scope of the approach 
sufficiently complex? 
Number of compliance activity 
covered 
20
a 
Number of compliance 
artefacts covered 
20
b 
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Fig. 117 Argument to support the efficiency metrics definition 
The goal 2 is decomposed into sub-goals that will cover parts of the tool support 
developed and used.  
Metric 1 
The objective of the metric is to evaluate if the standard modelling approach presented 
on chapter 4 let the user specify which standard the component is complying. The use of 
baselines was the mechanism proposed to reference at the component assurance project 
level which standards the component was aiming to comply with. 
 
Fig. 118 Argument justifying metric1 objective 
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Metrics 2a and 2b 
The aim of these metrics is to ensure that the compliance map mechanism defined on 
chapter 4 is valid. The mechanism is appropriate for indicating the level of compliance of 
a component has regarding a standard. With respect to metric 2a the focus is on the 
artefacts used as compliance evidence regarding documentation requested by the 
standard. If the artefacts required by the standard are covered by the compliance maps, 
then the objective is fulfilled. Metric 2b is similar but the focus is not on the required 
artefact but on the requirements to fulfil. Compliance maps also show the trace between 
the requirements and the claim related on the argumentation where it is being 
decomposed and supported. 
 
Fig. 119 Argument justifying metric 2a and 2b objectives 
Metric 3 
This metric tries to evaluate where we have been able to trace how the evidence is 
supporting a claim. The objective is to have a no answers or at least a minimum value, 
meaning that all evidence is supporting a claim and it is traceable. If there is evidence not 
linked with any argumentation, then we are not able to affirm that we are capable to 
make this trace in all scenarios.  
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Fig. 120 Argument justifying metric3 objective. 
Metric 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d 
All these metrics expect “yes or no” answer. The metric 4a aims to detect whether the 
different stakeholders are able to share the information about the standard. If they are 
able to share the same reference frameworks between the different assurance cases, 
means that the information is understandable.  
The metrics 4b, 4c and 4d focus on the capability to model the main elements we can 
identify on the standards. 
 
Fig. 121 Argument justifying metric 4a,4b,4c and 4d objectives 
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Metric 5 
In all component development we need to make assumptions. The nature of the 
component is to be reused and the context/objective for use… might change. The 
assumptions define the set of properties/activities/artefacts the component developer 
expect the integrator to take care about. The objective of this metric is to check the 
capability to define the assumptions. If the number is less than one, it means that no 
assumptions has been done and will indicate that we are not able to claim the approach 
let the user define assumptions. 
 
Fig. 122 Argument justifying metric5 objective 
Metric 6 
This metric similar to the previous one but the focus is on the guarantees that a 
component provides to the rest. If the number is less than one, it means that no 
guarantees has been done and will indicate that we are not able to claim the approach let 
the user define guarantees. 
 
Fig. 123 Argument justifying metric6 objective. 
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Metrics 7a, 7b and 7c 
All these metrics expect “yes or no” answer. The metric 7a focused on the hierarchy 
approach where an assurance project can be a subproject from another assurance 
project. Metric 7b highlights the responsible person in charge of the project assurance. 
Metric 7c indicates the responsibility in the way as the assurance requirements the 
assurance project has planned to comply with. 
 
Fig. 124 Argument justifying metric 7a, 7b and 7c objectives. 
 
Metric 8 
The aim of this metric is to ensure that it is feasible to references activities among the 
subprojects. It is a yes or no question and yes is the expected answer. 
 
Fig. 125 Argument justifying metric8 objective. 
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Metric 9 
The aim of this metric is to ensure that it is feasible to references evidences among the 
subprojects. It is a yes or no question and yes is the expected answer. 
 
Fig. 126 Argument justifying metric9 objective. 
Metrics 10a and 10b 
These two metrics has the objective to show that composition of evidences is feasible, 
they are related to the previous one. First metrics deals with referring a piece of evidence 
from another subproject (A) as part of the subproject’s (B) evidences. The second metric 
is about the use of artefact part concept defined on the evidence metamodel from 
chapter 4. This is the mechanism proposed to indicate that an artefact (a document, a 
section, a file, some code) is part of a bigger artefact. 
 
Fig. 127 Argument justifying metric 10a and 10b objectives 
CHAPTER 8 · EVALUATION 
227 
 
Metric 11a, 11b and 11c 
These metrics focus on the capability to show the integration requirements from the 
assurance perspective. Assurance request to execute integration activities mentioned on 
the standard and that is the target for the first metrics. The activities should be 
performed in order to fulfil certain requirements which are the objective of the next 
metric and finally as a result some artefacts should be the outputs which are question 
about on the last metric. 
 
Fig. 128 Argument justifying metric 11a, 11b and 11c objectives 
Metric 12 
This metric questions about the capability of the online compliance report to show the 
status of the assurance projects. This metric is not an objective metric because users 
might differ on the idea of what concepts should appear on a report. However, the 
objective here is to show a quick view of the status. 
 
Fig. 129 Argument justifying metric 12 objective. 
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Metric 13 
This metric questions the completeness of the categories list. The objective with the 
category classification is to classify all types of information that will be handled on the 
contracts. If there are too many assumptions or guarantees with no category associated, 
then the categories classification might not be complete. 
 
Fig. 130 Argument justifying metric13 objective 
Metric 14 
This metric focus on the support for contract checking and validation. In order to confirm 
that this is feasible we inquire about the possibility for tool support. We understand that 
if there is a tool support then there is possibility for validation development. 
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Fig. 131 Argument justifying metric14 objective 
Metric 15 
This metric focus on the level of understanding between different suppliers. On metrics 5 
and 6 we have focused on the capability to specify assumptions and guarantees. This 
metric focused whether on the case study it has been possible to link the functional 
behaviour requested on the integration to the guarantees offered by the component.  
 
Fig. 132Argument justifying metric15 objective 
Metric 16 
The objective of this metric is to inquire about the contracts. Categories have been design 
in order to support the user when validating the assumptions with the guarantee 
information. The idea is to link information of the same category. If there are assumptions 
linked with guarantees of a different category, the hypothesis of linking information on 
the same kind will no longer be true.  
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Fig. 133 Argument justifying metric16 objective 
Metric 17 
The objective of this metric is to ensure the reusability. The idea is not to have so many 
structured expressions that will end up with an encyclopaedia of expressions. The 
objective is to identify those expressions which are highly reusable. If an expression is 
often used, then it indicates that we have achieved on our goal. 
 
Fig. 134 Argument justifying metric17 objective 
Metric 18 
This metrics is focused on efficiency and efforts saving. Usually the task of identifying 
assumptions is time consuming. If we assume that we need a specific amount of time for 
each of the assumptions to be identified, this time will be reduced if the assumptions are 
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already detected. The metric calculates the number of assumptions detected against the 
total number of assumptions so as to calculate the percentage saved. 
Metric 19 
This metric is very similar to the previous one. Collecting evidences is also a time 
consuming task. The metric focused on calculating the percentage of evidences requested 
that are already included on the component assurance project. The percentage obtained 
will be translated into efficiency. 
Metrics 20a and 20b 
These metrics are focusing on the scope of the approach. It focused on the complexity of 
the case studies in order to provide confidence to the rest of metrics. If the number is too 
low it will be consider a too simplistic case study, while a high number will give us a view 
of the complexity of the work 
8.2.2 Avionics 
Similar to the previous one, this case study has gone through an evaluation phase after 
the approach has been followed in order to get all the measures.  
The objective of this case study was the composition of an IMA software module within 
an IMA platform. 
In Table 23 the values of the metrics extracted from the automotive case study are 
shown. 
Table 23 Metric values obtained in the avionics case study 
Id Metric Value Comments 
1 Number of standards required  2 Standards identified are DO-297 and 
DO 178c Number of standards referring 
on the baselines 
2 
2a Number of artefact required to 
comply with the standard 
24+16 For the IMA module development 
(artefacts requested from DO-178C 
and DO-297) Compliance maps existing about 
those artefacts 
24+16 
2b Number of standard 
requirements 
527 For the IMA module development 
(requirements requested from DO-
178C and DO-297) Compliance maps about those 
requirements 
527 
3 Number of evidence not linked 
on the argumentation 
0   
4a Is the reference framework 
shared by the assurance projects 
of the case study?   
YES   
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Id Metric Value Comments 
4b Are we able to model activities in 
the same way along the case 
studies? 
YES   
4c Are we able to model artefacts in 
the same way along the case 
studies? 
YES   
4d Are we able to model 
requirements in the same way 
along the case studies? 
YES   
5 Number of assumptions defined 
for the component 
7 The ARINC 653 already defines the 
reference architecture 
6 Number of guarantees defined 
for the component 
27   
7a Is the subproject property used 
on the case study? 
YES   
7b Are the responsible for each 
subproject identified on the 
responsible property? 
YES   
7c Has each of the assurance 
projects its own baseline 
indicating the compliance 
requirements the project will 
work to? 
YES AT component there are 2 baselines 
(per standard), at integration 2 
baselines (one to reference the 
module and another one for the 
integration) 
8 Are there activities from other 
projects referenced on the 
integration subproject? 
YES   
9 Are there evidences from other 
projects referenced on the 
integration subproject? 
YES   
10
a 
Is any of the evidence from the 
component part of project 
evidence?  
YES MAP is requested on the MAAS 
10
b 
Is the artefact part concept being 
used? 
YES   
11
a 
Is there a baseline which 
includes the integration 
activities? 
YES   
11
b 
Is there a baseline which 
includes the integration 
requirements? 
YES   
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Id Metric Value Comments 
11
c 
Is there a baseline which 
includes the integration 
artefacts? 
YES   
12 Does the online compliance 
report show the status of the 
assurance projects? 
YES   
13 Do the assumptions or 
guarantees specified not 
included in any of the 
categories? 
NO   
14 Are assumptions and guarantees 
clearly identified? 
YES   
15 Are the assumptions on the 
integration project linked with 
the component guarantees? 
YES   
16 Are the assumptions and the 
guarantees linked of the same 
category? 
YES   
17 Number of times a structured 
expression has been used 
Min:1 
Max:9 
Activity Adequacy Claims Type 4: 6
Activity-Artefact Claim Type 1: 6
Artefact Compliance Claims Type 2: 9
Element adequacy claims Type 1: 2
Element behaviour claims Type 1: 1
Element compliance claims Type 1: 7
Fault Accommodation Claims Type 5: 
1 
Hazard Mitigation Claims Type 3: 2 
18 Number of assumptions 
identified 
7   
Total number of assumptions 7 
19 Number of evidences requested 
on the integration baseline 
before the component is 
integrated  
16 Just the ones requested by DO-297 
Number of evidences from the 
component that map those 
requirements 
16 
20
a 
Number of compliance activity 
covered 
53+15 DO-178C+DO-297 
20
b 
Number of compliance artefacts 
covered 
24+24 DO-178C+DO-298 
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This case study has mainly been focused on compliance. The safety case for the IMA 
module includes arguments about: 
- Auto generated argumentation in relation with DO-178C and DO-297 standards 
conformity 
- Completeness of verification artefacts 
- Segregation insurance between partitions 
This has a direct effect on the assumptions and guarantees as the categories used are 
mainly about activities, artefacts and elements compliance.  
In this use case, artefacts are linked to constrained requirements in a sense that describe 
the information that should contain and the process followed to produce them. That is 
the rationale behind such a high number of requirements. 
In the avionics domain, the ARINC 653 Avionics Application Standard Software Interface 
already defines most of the assumptions that appear on software development, which 
explains the reason why the number of assumptions is so low.  
One of the big challenges of this use case has been that data has been sanitized before it 
was used for the case study. That has implied some iterations and meetings with people 
from Thales certification directorate in order to ensure the understanding of the data 
provide and request some more data to reduce the effects on the sanitization. On the 
other hand, usage domain rules that have been used to provide the guarantees and 
assumptions are already defined on a formal way. For that reason the effect of the 
structure language expressions used has not been too much noticed. 
8.2.3. Automotive 
Once the case study has followed the approach described on this thesis, the case study 
has gone through an evaluation phase where all the values of the metrics have been 
extracted.  
The objective of this case study was the composition of a system SEooC with an electric 
parking functionality within a full electric vehicle.  
In the following table the values of the metrics extracted from the automotive case study 
are shown. 
Table 24 Metric values obtained in the automotive case study 
Id Metric Value Comments 
1 Number of standards required  1 ISO 26262 
Number of standards referring on 
the baselines 
1 
2a Number of artefact required to 
comply with the standard 
25 For the SEooC development. Some 
of the documents are supporting 
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Id Metric Value Comments 
Compliance maps existing about 
those artefacts 
21 process and are optional, those are 
the ones that has missing 
compliance maps 
2b Number of standard requirements 34 For the SEooC development.  
Compliance maps about those 
requirements 
34 
3 Number of evidence not linked on 
the argumentation 
0   
4a Is the reference framework shared 
by the assurance projects of the 
case study?   
YES   
4b Are we able to model activities in 
the same way along the case 
studies? 
YES   
4c Are we able to model artefacts in 
the same way along the case 
studies? 
YES   
4d Are we able to model requirements 
in the same way along the case 
studies? 
YES   
5 Number of assumptions defined for 
the component 
13   
6 Number of guarantees defined for 
the component 
23   
7a Is the subproject property used on 
the case study? 
YES   
7b Are the responsible for each 
subproject identified on the 
responsible property? 
YES   
7c Has each of the assurance projects 
its own baseline indicating the 
compliance requirements the 
project will work to? 
YES   
8 Are there activities from other 
projects referenced on the 
integration subproject? 
YES   
9 Are there evidences from other 
projects referenced on the 
integration subproject? 
YES   
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Id Metric Value Comments 
10a Is any of the evidence from the 
component part of project 
evidence?  
YES On the standard they are 
mentioned as refinement  
10b Is the artefact part concept being 
used? 
YES  One example is the HARA 
11a Is there a baseline which includes 
the integration activities? 
YES   
11b Is there a baseline which includes 
the integration requirements? 
YES   
11c Is there a baseline which includes 
the integration artefacts? 
YES   
12 Does the online compliance report 
show the status of the assurance 
projects? 
YES As it is evaluated once the 
approach has already been done on 
the total scope, we only see the 
final status. 
13 Do the assumptions or guarantees 
specified not included in any of the 
categories? 
NO   
14 Is there tool support for contract 
creation? 
YES  
15 Are the assumptions on functional 
behaviour made at integration level 
linked with the component 
guarantees? 
YES Mainly about functional safety 
behaviour 
16 Are the assumptions and the 
guarantees linked of the same 
category? 
YES   
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Id Metric Value Comments 
17 Number of times a structured 
expression has been used 
Min:1 
Max: 
12 
Agent Action Claims type 1: 3  
Element adequacy claims Type 1: 
12 
Element adequacy claims type 4: 1 
Element behaviour claims type 1: 1  
Element behaviour claims type 3: 3 
Element behaviour claims type 4: 4 
Element behaviour claims type 5: 4 
Fault accommodation claims type 
1: 1 
Fault accommodation claims type 
2: 5 
Fault accommodation claims type 
3: 3 
Fault accommodation claims type 
4: 1 
18 Number of assumptions that were 
detected 
26 Assumptions are focused on 
technical safety requirements. 
Total number of assumptions  26 
19 Number of evidences requested on 
the integration baseline before the 
component is integrated  
22 
 
  
Number of evidences from the 
component that map those 
requirements 
22 
20a Number of compliance activity 
covered 
30 For the SEooC assurance project 
20b Number of compliance artefacts 
covered 
24 For the SEooC assurance project 
This case study has mainly been focused on hazards avoidance. The safety case for the 
SEooC includes two types of arguments: 
- Auto generated argumentation in relation with ISO 26262 conformity 
- Hazards identified, and safety requirements derived. 
This has a direct effect on the assumptions and guarantees as the categories used are 
mainly about the behaviour and fault accommodation.  
Regarding the evidence, on this use case the different refinements of evidence has been 
modelled as new evidence. This decision has been taken in accordance with the standard. 
On the standard each refinement is mentioned as a new document and so, on the 
modelled each refinement mentioned on the standard is identified as a new piece of 
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evidence. At the same time each of these refinements has also been modelled with a 
relationship with the previous one. As it is mentioned, artefacts included on the standard 
and which are not included on the use case are the ones considered optional.  
Audits and verification of critical artefacts such as HARA have also been part of the 
integration assurance project. 
When an activity shall be performed as a succession of tasks, according to the standard, 
this has been modelled as sub-activities. This is one of the reasons the number of 
requirements is not very high. 
One of the big challenges of this use case has been that there was no data from previous 
projects that comply with ISO 26262 as it is a quite new standard and only new 
developments shall follow it. Other important challenge has been the Intellectual 
Property for the documents used as evidence. They have followed a sanitized process and 
only information relevant for the case study was available. Fortunately this has been 
resolved by a fluent communication with CRF staff, mainly Alberto Melzi.  
8.2.4 Medical device 
This has been the last case study implemented. The objective of this case study was the 
composition of the signal analyser software into an AED. This is a critical component.  The 
development of the component has been done in parallel of recollecting the data for 
implementing the presented approach.  
In Table 25 the values of the metrics extracted from the automotive case study are 
shown. 
Table 25 Metric values obtained in the medical device case study 
Id Metric Value Comments 
1 Number of standards required  2 IEC 62304 only software 
development process scope 
and ISO 14971 
Number of standards referring on the 
baselines 
2 
2a Number of artefact required to comply 
with the standard 
15+16 For the IEC 62304 and for ISO 
14971 respectively for the 
signal Analyser component Compliance maps existing about those 
artefacts 
15+16 
2b Number of standard requirements 40   
Compliance maps about those 
requirements 
3 Number of evidence not linked on the 
argumentation 
0   
4a Is the reference framework shared by 
the assurance projects of the case 
study?   
YES   
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Id Metric Value Comments 
4b Are we able to model activities in the 
same way along the case studies? 
YES   
4c Are we able to model artefacts in the 
same way along the case studies? 
YES   
4d Are we able to model requirements in 
the same way along the case studies? 
YES   
5 Number of assumptions defined for the 
component 
6   
6 Number of guarantees defined for the 
component 
30   
7a Is the subproject property used on the 
case study? 
YES   
7b Are the responsible for each subproject 
identified on the responsible property? 
YES   
7c Has each of the assurance projects its 
own baseline indicating the compliance 
requirements the project will work to? 
YES   
8 Are there activities from other projects 
referenced on the integration 
subproject? 
YES   
9 Are there evidences from other projects 
referenced on the integration 
subproject? 
YES   
10
a 
Is any of the evidence from the 
component part of project evidence?  
YES   
10
b 
Is the artefact part concept being used? YES   
11
a 
Is there a baseline which includes the 
integration activities? 
YES   
11
b 
Is there a baseline which includes the 
integration requirements? 
YES   
11
c 
Is there a baseline which includes the 
integration artefacts? 
YES   
12 Does the online compliance report show 
the status of the assurance projects? 
YES   
13 Do the assumptions or guarantees 
specified not included in any of the 
categories? 
NO   
14 Are assumptions and guarantees clearly 
identified? 
YES   
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Id Metric Value Comments 
15 Are the assumptions on the integration 
project linked with the component 
guarantees? 
YES   
16 Are the assumptions and the guarantees 
linked of the same category? 
YES   
17 Number of times a structured 
expression has been used 
Min:1 
Max:7 
Agent Action Type 1: 5 
Agent Action Type 1: 6 
Component Development Type 
4: 1 
Element behaviour Type 1: 5 
Element behaviour Type 3: 7 
Element behaviour Type 4: 2 
Element behaviour Type 5: 7 
Fault accommodation Type 3: 5 
Fault accommodation Type 4: 1 
18 Number of assumptions identified 7   
Total number of assumptions 
19 Number of evidences requested on the 
integration baseline before the 
component is integrated  
12 This evidences from the 
component are part of the AED 
evidences 
Number of evidences from the 
component that map those 
requirements 
20
a 
Number of compliance activity covered 11+7 ISO 14971+IEC62304 
20
b 
Number of compliance artefacts covered 16+12
  
ISO 14971+IEC62304 
The product under analysis in this case study has been designed at the same type as the 
case study was developed. The product was not created before so the data was created 
when it was required by applying the approach. This has produced new evidences that 
were specifically created and also affected the way process of development. It has given 
us the chance to see the appliance of the approach from the beginning of the system 
planning. 
The Automated External Defibrillator system was designed as a component-based 
system; however, the components were developed by the same team.  
The medical devices safety standards are not prescriptive in terms of evidence to produce 
for compliance and following this approach has given to the user a mechanism to show 
exactly the way they were complying with the requirements. Assurance cases are not very 
extended in this domain; however, they have been much appreciated. 
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8.2.5 Case studies conclusions 
Two goals were tested in the case studies, the capability to handle the assurance 
challenges and the efficiency when handling composition assurance. The metric and goals 
are related to the research questions presented in chapter 1.  
In Fig. 135 the metrics associated with RQ1 (How can we express standards compliance 
needs in relation to component development and component integration?) are shown.  
 
Fig. 135 Metrics associated with RQ1 
The all the cases we have been able to model the different standards, in total 5 standards 
have been modelled. In the case studies not all the requirements for the standards were 
applied. 
In this case we can affirm that the assurance modelling contribution proposed is a valid 
method for expressing standards compliance needs in relation to component 
development and component integration 
In Fig. 136 the metrics associated with RQ2 (How can we express the distribution of 
responsibility across the system stakeholders in relation to safety standards compliance?) 
are shown.  
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Fig. 136 Metrics associated with RQ2 
The compositional assurance approach validated has not only made an impact in the 
assurance process but also indirectly in the development processes, making component 
responsible aware of their responsibilities and the needs from the system perspective. 
The metrics referring to RQ3 (How can we best support stakeholders while ensuring 
compliance across the system development lifecycle?) are shown in Fig. 137. 
 
Fig. 137 Metrics associated with RQ3 
RQ3 is the one with more metrics associated and it is also associated with goal 2, being 
efficient when handling the composition assurance. The tool has been able to support the 
process and the structured expressions have support not only the specification but also at 
design time, it has been beneficial to detect assumptions that have not been initially 
identified. However the results for this question might be the most subjective. 
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8.3. Evaluation through peer review  
The research outcomes of this thesis were presented to, and reviewed by, various 
members of the academia and systems and functional safety engineers in industry. The 
thesis contributions have taken advantage of peer review in order to assure the adequacy 
of the other, more formal, mean of evaluation (outlined in the previous two sections) as 
well as to mitigate against any limitations of case studies. 
The following projects in which the author of the thesis has collaborated and in some of 
them she continues collaborating have served to enhance the conceptual work of the 
thesis.  
8.3.1 Recomp Project 
"RECOMP" stands for Reduced Certification Costs Using Trusted Multi-core Platforms and 
is a European funded project from ARTEMIS JOINT UNDERTAKING (JU). The project 
started April 1th of 2010 and has duration of 36 months. 
RECOMP research project pretended to form a joint European task force contributing to 
the European Standard Reference Technology Platform for enabling cost-efficient 
certification and re-certification of safety-critical systems and mixed-criticality systems, 
i.e. systems containing safety-critical and non-safety-critical components. The aim was to 
establish methods, tools and platforms for enabling cost-efficient (re-)certification of 
safety-critical and mixed-criticality systems. Applications addressed were automotive, 
aerospace, industrial control systems, and lifts and transportation systems. 
This project has been the first step of the thesis and where the analysis of the standards 
from the composition point of view started.  
In this project the author of the thesis worked on: 
• Analysis of the DO 178 and IEC 61508 standards regarding reuse requirements 
• Modular safety cases approach to be used for safety assessment 
• Support to the tool chain identification to reduce certification costs on multicores 
• Appliance of modular safety cases on an avionics demonstrator.  
8.3.2 OPENCOSS 
The work presented here was framed under collaboration within the European project 
called OPENCOSS (Open Platform for EvolutioNary Certification Of Safety-critical Systems) 
which is a large-scale collaborative project of the EU’s Seventh Framework Program. 
[OPENCOSS] 
OPENCOSS is a European large scale integrating FP7 project dedicated to produce the first 
European-wide open safety certification platform: an Open Platform for EvolutioNary 
Certification Of Safety-critical Systems for the railway, avionics and automotive markets. 
Most of the work presented on this thesis has been framed under the collaboration 
within this project.  
In this project the author of the thesis worked on: 
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• Developing the platform architecture 
• Support on creation of the common certification language, specially the 
argumentation metamodel as an extension of the SAM model and identification 
the links between the different meta-model. 
• Research on the compositional certification area 
• Support on the case studies from the avionics and the automotive domains 
8.3.3 SafeAdapt 
The promising advent of fully electric vehicles also means a shift towards fully electrical 
control of the existing and new vehicle functions. In particular, critical X-by-wire functions 
require sophisticated redundancy solutions. As a result, the overall Electric/Electronic 
(E/E) architecture of a vehicle is becoming even more complex and costly. 
The main idea of SafeAdapt is to develop novel architecture concepts based on 
adaptation to address the needs of a new E/E architecture for FEVs regarding safety, 
reliability and cost-efficiency. This will reduce the complexity of the system and the 
interactions by generic, system-wide fault and adaptation handling. It also enables 
extended reliability despite failures, improvements of active safety, and optimized 
resources. This is especially important for increasing reliability and efficiency regarding 
energy consumption, costs and design simplicity. 
SafeAdapt follows a holistic approach for building adaptable systems in safety-critical 
environments that comprises methods, tools, and building blocks for safe adaptation. This 
also includes certification support of safety-critical systems in the e-vehicle domain. The 
technical approach builds on a SafeAdapt Platform Core, encapsulating the basic 
adaptation mechanisms for re-allocating and updating functionalities in the networked, 
automotive control systems. This will be the basis for an interoperable and standardized 
solution for adaptation and fault handling in AUTOSAR. The SafeAdapt approach also 
considers functional safety with respect to the ISO 26262 standard. 
SafeAdapt provides an integrated approach for engineering such adaptive, complex and 
safe systems, ranging from tool chain support, reference architectures, modelling of 
system design and networking, up to early validation and verification. For realistic 
validation of the adaptation and redundancy concepts, an actual vehicle prototype with 
different and partly redundant applications is developed. 
In this project the author of the thesis worked on: 
• Defining the use cases for demonstration the safe adaptation behaviour of the 
architecture 
• Identifying the challenges of applying ISO 26262 to the adaptive systems 
• Support to define the safety concept for the new architecture 
• Appliance of the contracts proposal to contracts to integrate the software 
adaptation mechanism within different hardware platforms. 
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This project has helped to improve the idea of composition within different context. The 
use of contracts has been applied to assess the verification of the safety requirements. 
One piece of software implemented as a SEooC is released into two different hardware 
platforms and contracts has helped assessing safety composition.  
8.3.4 OMG Structured Assurance Case Metamodel Standardization Committee 
One of the contributions presented on this thesis is the extension of the SACM standard. 
The contribution has been presented on chapter 4 and the extension has been used while 
developing the three case studies.  
The extension of the metamodel in order to support patterns and modular argumentation 
along with the GSN mapping has been presented to the SACM standardization committee 
from the OMG group as an input for future versions.  
At the moment of writing this thesis, the author is under discussions for the next version 
of the standard in order to include some of the proposals presented here.  
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9 Conclusions 
The present work has introduced a compositional approach to face the challenges arising 
when dealing with assurance in a component-based environment. The work is based in a 
model-based approach for assurance specification, a methodology for assurance 
responsibility decomposition and a contract-based approach to be used while integrating 
the components. 
9.1 Thesis contributions 
At the introduction of this thesis when describing the main problems safety-critical 
systems face when assuring safety standards compliance on component-based systems. 
In chapter 1 we defined the scope of this thesis on three perspectives: 
• Perspective 1: Guidance. It consists of providing guides, formalisation, and 
methodology. It is a way to structure the knowledge base and expose that 
knowledge to be used by different stakeholders. 
• Perspective 2: Reuse parts/components. This perspective is focused on managing 
the decomposition of responsibilities of the work at component level and 
integration at system level.  
• Perspective 3: Automation. The aim here is the automation where possible. 
Provide a methodology and tools to support integration of components into a 
system from the assurance perspective 
In the previous chapters the different challenges for each of the perspectives are 
presented and potential solutions are proposed. In order to address the compositional 
assurance problem, we can summarise the solution into these contributions: 
• Assurance modelling 
• Assurance decomposition 
• Contract-based approach for assurance integration 
• Tool support for the above 
This thesis provides the next technological bridge towards safe and secure safety critical 
systems. It provides the means to ensure safety as well as the mechanisms required by 
industry to ensure a safe society while reducing system production costs. The three 
perspectives ensure an increase both in the safety assurance in industry, while providing 
"Out of clutter find simplicity; 
from discord find harmony; In 
the middle of difficulty lies 
opportunity" – Albert Einstein 
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the means for the regulatory bodies to validate safety in industry in an normalized 
environment, while reducing certification overheads to industry. 
9.1.1 Assurance modelling 
Chapter 4 has focused on the assurance modelling approach, defining the Common 
Certification Language metamodels and its use. This is directly linked with the provision of 
guidance and structuring of knowledge the first perspective of contributions defined on 
the scope.  
Assurance modelling provides us the mechanism to understand the common basis of 
standards. This is the first step in generating guidelines and formalising compliance with 
the standards within a company and a project.  
The extension of the SACM metamodel is used here in order to specify the assurance 
cases for the components and the system. They are the central piece of model that serves 
us to link the different elements. Requirements from the standards are transformed into 
claims on the argumentation model. These claims are supported by evidence, and the 
evidences are seen in a form of artefacts that are linked with the evidence model. Those 
two concepts (claims and evidences) are used by the compliance maps to trace what was 
requested to what has been done for compliance on a specific project. 
9.1.2 Compositional assurance decomposition 
The compositional assurance decomposition contribution can addresses as perspectives 1 
and 2. It provides us a guideline and the mechanism to decompose the responsibilities 
associated with a component. We are able to ensure a hierarchy of assurance projects 
where the responsibilities and tasks can be specified and there is a mechanism to indicate 
compliance with those tasks. 
Assurance decomposition supports the reuse of components as it guides us not just for 
standards compliance but specifically on the understanding and tailoring of those 
standards for component assurance.  
When dealing with compositional assurance, we have proposed the need to create 
different assurance projects each of them focused in a component the system has been 
decomposed into. Also an integration assurance project is required to be responsible for 
referring to others projects activities and/or artefacts in order to ensure themselves that 
compliance is not broken. Assurance modelling and the compositional assurance 
decomposition method support us on this task.  
9.1.3 Contract-based approach for assurance integration 
This contribution addresses perspectives 2 and 3. On the one hand the contract-based 
approach supports the integration of reused components and, on the other hand, the 
proposal supports the identification of assumptions, a very laborious and time consuming 
task. 
Assurance Contracts are defined to ensure incremental compliance once the components 
are integrated. The objective of this assurance contracts is to ensure the overall 
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compliance of the system with the selected standards and reference documents such as 
guidelines or advisory circulars.  
The defined approach for assurance contracts specification attempts to balance the need 
for unambiguity on the composition while maintaining the heterogeneity of the 
information managed. The claims classification offers an easy method to support the 
assessment of contract completeness and the structured expressions provide a semi-
formal language to specify the assumptions and guarantees of a component 
9.1.4 Tool support 
In order to fulfil perspective 3 of the scope and support the previous contributions tool 
support has been developed and applied on the different case studies.  
The tool implements the metamodels shown in the assurance modelling chapter and 
provides editors for each of them. The tool support is not explained on a specific chapter 
but has been shown in the different chapters and been used on the case studies.  
9.2 Relevant Publications 
Most of the previous section’s contributions have been presented to, and discussed with 
the scientific community in international workshops, conferences and journals. In this 
section, we present the articles in which this research has been published. 
Table 26 Outline of the contributions and the publications achieved 
Contribution Publication 
Assurance modelling Model-Based Specification of Safety Compliance Needs 
for Critical Systems: A Holistic Generic Approach  
Submitted to Information and Software Technology 
Journal 
Assurance modelling Making Software Safety Assessable and Transparent. 
EuroSPI2 2013 
Assurance modelling Safety Case Driven Development for Medical Devices  
SAFECOMP 2015 
Compositional approach A Preliminary Study towards a Quantitative Approach 
for Compositional Safety Assurance  
SSS 2013 
Contract-based assurance Towards a multi-view point safety contract  
SASSUR 2013 
Contract-based assurance Adequacy of contract grammars for component 
certification  
SAFECOMP fast abstract 2013 
Compositional approach Systematic application of ISO 26262 on a SEooC: 
Support by applying a systematic reuse approach  
DATE 2015 
Tooling A Tool suite for Assurance Cases and Evidences: 
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Avionics experiences  
EuroAsiaSPI2 
Tooling An industrial experience in cross domain assurance 
projects  
EuroAsiaSPI2 
International Workshop Papers  
Alejandra Ruiz, Tim Kelly, Huáscar Espinoza: “Towards a multi-view point safety contract.” 
SASSUR Workshop 2013 
International Conference Papers.  
Risto Nevalainen, Alejandra Ruiz, Timo Varkoi: “Making Software Safety Assessable and 
Transparent.” EuroSPI2 2013 
Alejandra Ruiz, Huáscar Espinoza, Fulvio Tagliablò, Sandra Torchiaro and Alberto Melzi: “A 
Preliminary Study towards a Quantitative Approach for Compositional Safety Assurance” 
21st Safety-Critical Systems Symposium (SSS), 2013 
Alejandra Ruiz Huascar Espinoza, Tim Kelly. “Adequacy of contract grammars for 
component certification.” Safecomp FastAbstract, 2013 
Alejandra Ruiz, Alberto Melzi, Tim Kelly: “Systematic application of ISO 26262 on a SEooC: 
Support by applying a systematic reuse approach.” DATE 2015 
Alejandra Ruiz, Paulo Barbosa, Yang Medeiros and Huascar Espinoza: “Safety Case Driven 
Development for Medical Devices.” SAFECOMP 2015 
Alejandra Ruiz, Xabier Larrucea, Huascar Espinoza: “A Tool suite for Assurance Cases and 
Evidences: Avionics experiences” EuroAsiaSPI2 2015 
Alejandra Ruiz, Xabier Larrucea, Huascar Espinoza, Franck Aime, Cyril Marchand: “An 
industrial experience in cross domain assurance projects” EuroAsiaSPI2 2015 
International Journals Indexed in the JCR.  
Jose Luis de la Vara; Alejandra Ruiz; Katrina Attwood; Huascar Espinoza; Rajwinder K 
Panesar-Walawege; Angel Lopez; Idoya del Rio; Tim Kelly: “Model-Based Specification of 
Safety Compliance Needs for Critical Systems: A Holistic Generic Approach”. This 
publication has been submitted to Information and Software Technology Journal and it is 
pending for approval. 
SASSUR: International Workshop on Next Generation of System Assurance Approaches 
for Safety-Critical Systems 
The SASSUR workshop provides a forum for thematic presentations and in-depth 
discussions about reuse and composition of safety arguments, safety evidence, and 
contextual information about system components, in a way that makes assurance and 
certification more cost-effective, precise, and scalable. 
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SASSUR aims at bringing together experts, researchers, and practitioners, from diverse 
communities, such as safety and security engineering, certification processes, model-
based technologies, software and hardware design, safety-critical systems, and 
applications communities (railway, aerospace, automotive, health, industrial 
manufacturing, etc.). 
In this workshop the paper “Towards a multi-view point safety contract”, presents some 
of the challenges for component-based in relation with safety, and safety assurance, 
properties and the issues faced by a contract-based approach. Safety is a system property 
and because of that, it can be hard to define the contribution of components that have an 
impact on safety. Contract-based approaches addressing safety have been proposed in 
the past regarding modular safety case development. In this paper we suggested a “multi 
viewpoint” contract approach where these many aspects are organized to address 
different stakeholder concerns.  
EuroSPI: European System, Software & Service Process Improvement & Innovation 
The EuroSPI² conference presents and discusses results from systems, software and 
services process improvement and innovation (SPI) projects in industry and research, 
focusing on the gained benefits and the criteria for success. 
EuroSPI2 is a partnership of large Scandinavian research companies and experience 
networks (SINTEF, DELTA, STTF, FiSMA), the ASQF as a large German quality association, 
the American Society for Quality and ISCN as the co-coordinating partner. EuroSPI2 
collaborates with a large number of SPINs (Software Process Improvement Network) in 
Europe. In 2015 it becomes European & Asian Systems, Software & Service Process 
Improvement & Innovation. 
According to Computer Science Conference Rank (CORE), this conference is classified as B. 
The paper, “Making Software Safety Assessable and Transparent”, highlights the difficulty 
to software safety assessment in a component. We propose a balanced use of process 
assessment and product evaluation methods. We should compensate the lack of 
transparency in software with a more formal development process. Safety cases are an 
effective approach to demonstrate safety, and then both process and product evidences 
are necessary  
The paper “A Tool suite for Assurance Cases and Evidences: Avionics experiences” 
describes a specification and an implementation of a flexible tool platform for assurance 
and certification of safety-critical systems. This tool platform is built upon a 
comprehensive conceptual assurance and certification framework. This conceptual 
framework is composed of a common information model called CCL (Common 
Certification Language) and a compositional assurance approach. The ultimate goal of our 
platform is to provide an integrated approach for managing assurance cases and 
evidences resulting from a safety project.  
The paper, “An industrial experience in cross domain assurance projects” presents the 
experience of component reuse in the avionics domain and the use of the tool suite used 
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on this thesis for the use on a specific case involving a reuse of a software component 
developed for the railway domain, reuse in the avionics domain. 
SSS: Safety-critical Systems Symposium 
Safety-critical Systems Symposium is an annual event organized by Safety-Critical Systems 
Club, an organization that has operated in support of colleagues in the safety community 
since 1991 
The Symposium is for engineers, managers and academics working in the field of system 
safety, in a variety of roles, and across all industry sectors. It offers wide-ranging coverage 
of current safety topics, and a blend of academic research and industrial experience, 
including both recent developments in the field and discussion of open issues that will 
shape future progress. 
The paper, “A Preliminary Study towards a Quantitative Approach for Compositional 
Safety Assurance” presents preliminary research towards applying a compositional safety 
assurance approach based on the ISO 26262 concept of SEooC (Safety Element out of 
Context). In this approach a component must be evaluated against ‘assumed’ operational 
context conditions in a quantitative manner (based on compatibility/gap analysis), 
instead of using inspections. Once the component becomes part of a specific system in an 
actual operational context, the evaluation is optimized by comparing assumed context 
conditions against actual context conditions. We propose a classification scheme to 
organize information about assumptions and guarantees and outline a procedure to 
systematically manage their specification, validation and gap analysis. 
SAFECOMP: international conference on computer safety, reliability & security 
SAFECOMP was established in 1979 by the European Workshop on Industrial Computer 
Systems, Technical Committee 7 on Reliability, Safety and Security (EWICS TC7), 
SAFECOMP has contributed to the progress of the state-of-the-art in dependable 
application of computers in safety-related and safety-critical systems. 
SAFECOMP is an annual event covering the experience and new trends in the areas of 
safety, security and reliability of critical computer applications. It provides ample 
opportunity to exchange insights and experience on emerging methods, approaches and 
practical solutions. It is a one-stream conference without parallel sessions, allowing easy 
networking. 
According to Computer Science Conference Rank (CORE), this conference is classified as B. 
The paper, “Adequacy of contract grammars for component certification” moves one step 
further forward with the creation of a methodology and grammar that incorporates 
encompasses and helps structure current models of ‘safety contracts’ and propose an 
assurance contract structure. 
The paper, “Safety Case Driven Development for Medical Devices” proposes a 
methodology to enhance Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) practice from the 
safety perspective, encouraging the use of safety cases and providing guidance on how to 
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show the correspondent traceability to development artifacts. We illustrate our 
methodology and its usage in the context of an industrial Automated External 
Defibrillator (AED). The benefits are a clearer mapping of IEC 62304 recommendations 
and ISO 14971 standardization to the system and safety engineering activities. 
DATE: Design, Automation and Test in Europe 
DATE is the major international event for design and engineering of Systems-on-Chip, 
Systems-on-Board and Embedded Systems Software and brings together designers and 
design automation users, researchers and vendors, as well as specialists in hardware and 
software design, test and manufacturing of electronic circuits and systems 
According to Computer Science Conference Rank (CORE), this conference is classified as B. 
The paper , “Systematic Application of ISO 26262 on a SEooC. Support by applying a 
systematic reuse approach”, presents our experience of the application of the SEooC 
concept from ISO 26262 to an electric parking system, the automotive case study 
presented on this thesis. We describe a systematic approach that takes into account the 
needs for safe reuse of system elements integration into the whole vehicle context 
Information and Software Technology Journal 
Information and Software Technology is an international technical journal covering 
software development. It bridges the gap between the theories of software engineering 
and the application of information technology within organizations. The journal covers 
the entire area of information processing, from state-of-the-art research, through 
software development and implementation, to information systems management. The 
impact factor on 2014 was 1.33 
The paper, “Model-Based Specification of Safety Compliance Needs for Critical Systems: A 
Holistic Generic Approach” paper has been submitted to this journal and its acceptance is 
still pending. The paper focused on the assurance modelling contribution. It provides a 
model-based approach for the specification of safety compliance needs for critical 
systems. The approach is based on a holistic and generic metamodel that abstracts 
common concepts for demonstrating safety compliance from different standards and 
application domains. Its application results in the specification of "reference assurance 
frameworks" for safety-critical systems, which correspond to a model of the structure of a 
given standard. The resulting models also provide an effective means of structuring and 
managing safety compliance information. 
9.3 Further Work 
During the course of writing and undertaking research for this thesis, a number of areas 
for further research have been identified. This section provides a brief overview of these 
areas.  
The following list includes topics and areas that have been identified for further research 
in order to widen the scope of the actual work: 
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- Connection with engineering process and tools  
- Applicability to adaptive systems.  
- Appliance of Formal Methods  
- Run-time assurance 
Connection with engineering process and tools 
When working on the case studies and specifically on the medical device case study 
where the development of the system was performed alongside the assurance activities 
we notice the need for connection the engineering and the assurance ecosystems.  
Engineering development is usually done by a team separately from the assurance team; 
however, the information source is the same, information about the system. In the 
presented approach, documents, models, designs used to justify the compliance where 
taken from the system development. There is a need to connect these two worlds on a 
transparent way. 
Applicability on adaptive systems  
Adaptive systems are becoming more popular and reliable and could be the new 
evolution in critical systems when used as fail operational purpose. For example, a failure 
of an ECU (Electronic Control Unit) in a traditional car can be handled by turning of this 
unit without losing control of the driving behavior. In contrast, an ECU hosting a break-by-
wire application cannot be shut down without losing the ability to break, as long as there 
is no costly mechanical backup installed. This shift from fail-silent to fail-operational 
systems poses a great challenge for future automotive systems and to ensure these 
systems assurance. 
Components might end up in a new context due to adaptation. This change t can also be 
seen as a component reuse, where the possible environments in which they can be 
adapted are new context of reuse.  
A contract-based approach such as the one presented here might be a possible method 
used to define the possible accepted environments in which a component can end up 
working. Either if the component ends up being integrated into multiple different systems 
or if the component is integrated into one system that supports adaptation for use in 
multiple environments, the components needs to indicate constraints on the working 
environment in form of assumptions.  
Formal Methods 
Contracts specification could be improved by a more formal language to express the 
assumptions and guarantees. This formal language could further reduce the ambiguity in 
these contracts and enable some formal validation to be performed to ensure satisfaction 
on the specification.  
Applying a formal language in this way could affect the learning curve on the use and 
became a barrier for adoption. It is necessary that along with this language tool support 
should be developed.  
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After developing a formal language for contract specification, a second step would be to 
define a method for formal validation of the contract. Language formalization and formal 
validation can be a very complex topic due to the heterogeneous information treated on 
assurance contract. This diversity is directly connected to the different typology of the 
analysis that can be applied. Also some of the information treated needs the judgment of 
domain experts based on their previous backgrounds to provide a valid response. 
Run-time assurance 
Another important area that can widen the scope of the research is run-time assurance. 
Fist we should start by identifing those aspects in the systems that are highly dependent 
with the target environment where the component will end up operating. Once they are 
identified we are able to delegate some of the verification tasks to an integration phase 
instead of component design time.  
It can also be used to define a monitoring system to ensure that assurance related 
properties remain in the desired value range during operational time.  
Further tool support 
During the presentation of the approach presented in this work tooling has also being 
shown and is a part of this thesis. Tooling has been used on the case studies 
implementation in order to store the data and for metrics evaluation. However, the 
tooling has not been the focus on this thesis and during the case studies development, 
potential new features have been identified in order to improve existing functionality and 
also to new gaps for laborious tasks have been identified such as transparent assumptions 
and guarantees import from the component argumentation models into the integration 
argumentation model,  
9.4 Final remarks 
Just because a product complies with the standards and follows a well-defined process 
does not mean that the product is safe.  
Standards are made to ensure that best practices of the industry are followed; however, 
it is still important to ensure deeper safety analysis is undertaken and prepare to the 
unexpected. Standards will evolve along with the new technologies and improvement in 
safety analysis. 
Standards compliance should not be a barrier for new upgrades, technologies and 
innovations to be included in safety-critical systems. Certification processes should not 
impose a delay to put the product in the market or required a big investment from the 
industry. At the same time certification should ensure the best practices to ensure the 
safety of a system. 
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ANNEX – 
A: Standard analysis tables 
All this data is based on the information included on the advisory circular AC 20-148, 
which presents the software component for reuse as a COTS component and the DO-
297when talking about module or application reuse for IMA platforms. The standard ISO 
26262 includes information regarding the SEooC, although the guidelines provided are 
very high level considerations and it is when dealing with the hardware and software 
qualified component concepts when we can go deeper in the knowledge of the actual 
requirements for compliance. The IEC 61508 as the standard in which the others are 
based, also have another relevant concept, the safety manual for the qualified item. All 
these have provided input to the following tables.  
Artefact 
Avionics.  
Software 
Responsible Artefact Content 
Developer Plan for Software 
Aspects of Certification 
(PSAC) for the RSC 
System overview: description of its functions and 
their allocation to the hardware and software, the 
architecture, processor(s) used, hardware/software 
interfaces, and safety features. 
Software overview: emphasis on the proposed safety 
and partitioning concepts, for example, resource 
sharing, redundancy, multiple-version dissimilar 
software, fault tolerance, and timing and scheduling 
strategies. 
Certification considerations: including the means of 
compliance, the proposed software level(s) and 
potential software contributions to failure conditions. 
Software life cycle: The summary explains how the 
objectives of each software life cycle process will be 
satisfied. 
Software life cycle data: the software life cycle data 
that will be produced and controlled by the software 
life cycle processes, and the means by which software 
life cycle data will be made available to the 
certification authority. 
Schedule: means to provide the certification 
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Responsible Artefact Content 
authority with visibility of the activities  
Additional considerations: specific features that may 
affect the certification process. 
Define safety concerns: the failure conditions, safety 
features, protection mechanisms, architecture, 
limitations, software levels, interface specifications, 
and intended use of the RSC. 
Certification liaison process: definition of the process 
including communication and coordination focal 
points to all involved stakeholders. 
For each objective RTCA/DO-178B objective reference;  
RTCA/DO-178B objective description;  
Amount of credit being sought (full, partial, or no 
credit);  
Assumptions;  
Means of compliance; and  
Remaining activities the integrator or applicant must 
complete.  
RSC software 
Accomplishment 
Summary (SAS) 
System overview:  This section also describes any 
differences from the system overview in the Plan for 
Software Aspects of Certification. 
Software overview: as section before is highlights 
differences from the software overview proposed in 
the Plan for Software Aspects of Certification. 
Certification considerations: restates the 
considerations mentioned on the PSAC and describes 
any differences. 
Software characteristics: states the Executable Object 
Code size, timing and memory margins, resource 
limitations, and the means of measuring each 
characteristic. 
Software life cycle: explains differences from the 
software life cycle and software life cycle processes 
proposed in the PSAC. 
Software life cycle data: describes the relationship of 
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Responsible Artefact Content 
the data to each other and to other data defining the 
system. 
Additional considerations: summarizes certification 
issues that may warrant the attention of the 
certification authority and references data items 
applicable to these issues, such as issue papers or 
special conditions. 
Software identification: identifies the software 
configuration by part number and version. 
Change history: is a summary of software changes 
with attention to changes made due to failures 
affecting safety. 
Software status: problem reports unresolved at the 
time of certification, including a statement of 
functional limitations. 
Compliance statement: summary of the methods 
used to demonstrate compliance with criteria 
specified in the software plans. 
Analysis of the RSC 
behaviour report 
Vulnerabilities, partitioning requirements, , hardware 
failure effects, requirements for redundancy, data 
latency, design’s constrains 
Agreement from 
stakeholders for the 
first application 
 
Software Development 
plan (SDP) 
Standards: Identification of the Software 
Requirements Standards, Software Design Standards 
and Software Code Standards for the project.  
Software life cycle: This description is distinct from 
the summary provided in the Plan for Software 
Aspects of Certification, in that it provides the detail 
necessary to ensure proper implementation of the 
software life cycle processes. 
Software development environment : software 
development environment in terms of hardware and 
software, including: 
(1) Requirements development method(s) and tools 
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Responsible Artefact Content 
to be used. 
(2) Design method(s) and tools to be used. 
(3) Programming language(s), coding tools, compilers, 
linkage editors and loaders to be used. 
(4) Hardware platforms for the tools to be used. 
Software Verification 
Plan (SVP) 
It includes the procedures to satisfy the software 
verification process objectives.  This plan should 
include: 
Organization: Organizational responsibilities within 
the software verification process and interfaces with 
the other software life cycle processes. 
Independence: A description of the methods for 
establishing verification independence, when 
required. 
Verification methods: the verification methods to be 
used for each activity of the software verification 
process. 
(1) Review methods. 
(2) Analysis methods 
(3) Testing methods 
Verification environment : the equipment for testing, 
the testing and analysis tools, and the guidelines for 
applying these tools and hardware test equipment 
Transition criteria: The criteria for entering the 
software verification process. 
Partitioning considerations: methods used to verify 
the integrity of the partitioning. 
Compiler assumptions: assumptions about the 
correctness of the compiler, linkage editor or loader. 
Reverification guidelines: For software modification, 
methods for identifying the affected areas of the 
software and the changed parts of the Executable 
Object Code. 
Previously developed software: For previously 
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Responsible Artefact Content 
developed software, if the initial compliance baseline 
for the verification process does not comply with this 
document, a description of the methods to satisfy the 
objectives of this document. 
Multiple-version dissimilar software : If multiple-
version dissimilar software is used, a description of 
the software verification process activities  
Software Quality 
Assurance Plan (SQAP) 
Environment: A description of the SQA environment, 
including scope, organizational responsibilities and 
interfaces, standards, procedures, tools and methods. 
Authority: A statement of the SQA authority, 
responsibility, and independence, including the 
approval authority for software products. 
Activities: The SQA activities performed for each 
software life cycle process  
Transition criteria : The criteria for entering the SQA 
process. 
Timing : The timing of the SQA process activities. 
SQA Records: A definition of the records to be 
produced by the SQA process. 
Supplier control: the means of ensuring that sub-tier 
suppliers' processes and outputs will comply with the 
SQA Plan. 
Software Configuration 
Management Plan 
(SCMP) 
Environment: description of the SCM environment 
used 
Activities: A description of the SCM process activities 
that will satisfy the objectives for: Configuration 
identification, Baselines and traceability, Problem 
reporting, Change control , Change review, 
Configuration status accounting, Archive, retrieval, 
and release, Software load control, Software life cycle 
environment controls , Software life cycle data 
controls 
Transition criteria : The criteria for entering the SCM 
process. 
SCM data: software life cycle data produced by the 
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Responsible Artefact Content 
SCM process. 
Supplier control : The means of applying SCM 
process requirements to sub-tier suppliers. 
SW Requirements 
Standards 
Methods used for developing software requirements 
Notations used to express requirements,  
Constraints on the use of the requirement 
development tools. 
Method to provide derived requirements to the 
system process. 
SW Design Standards Description method(s) used. 
Naming conventions used. 
Conditions imposed on permitted design methods,  
Constraints on the use of the design tools. 
Constraints on design,  
Complexity restrictions 
SW Code Standards Programming language(s) t used and/or defined 
subset(s).  
Source Code presentation standards 
Naming conventions for components, subprograms, 
variables, and constants. 
Conditions and constraints imposed on permitted 
coding conventions 
Constraints on the use of the coding tools. 
SQA Records SQA review or audit reports, meeting minutes, records 
of authorized process deviations, or 
software conformity review records. 
Software Verification 
Results 
For each review, analysis and test, indicate each 
procedure that passed or failed during the activities 
and the final pass/fail results. 
Identify the configuration item or software version 
reviewed, analysed or tested. 
Include the results of tests, reviews and analyses, 
including coverage analyses and traceability analyses. 
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Responsible Artefact Content 
Software Requirements 
Data 
Allocation of system requirements to software, with 
attention to safety-related requirements and potential 
failure conditions. 
Functional and operational requirements under each 
mode of operation. 
Performance criteria,  
Timing requirements and constraints. 
Memory size constraints. 
Hardware and software interfaces,  
Failure detection and safety monitoring requirements. 
Partitioning requirements allocated to software, and 
the software level(s) of each partition. 
Design Description  
Source Code Software identification, including the name and date 
of revision and/or version 
Code written in source language(s)  
Compiler instructions 
Executable Object Code  
Software Verification 
Cases and Procedures 
 
SCM Records Configuration identification lists, baseline or software 
library records, change history reports, archive 
records, and release records. 
Software Configuration 
Index 
Software product. 
Executable Object Code. 
Each Source Code component. 
Previously developed software included. 
Software life cycle data. 
Archive and release media. 
Instructions for building the Executable Object Code 
Reference to the Software Life Cycle Environment 
Configuration Index, if it is packaged separately. 
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Responsible Artefact Content 
Data integrity checks for the Executable Object Code. 
Problem Reports Identification of the configuration item and/or the 
software life cycle process activity 
Identification of the configuration item(s) modified. 
A problem description 
A description of the corrective action taken 
Software Life Cycle 
Environment 
Configuration Index 
Identify the software life cycle environment hardware 
and its operating system software. 
Identify the software development tools 
Identify the test environment used to verify the 
software product 
Identify qualified tools and their associated tool 
qualification data. 
Interface descriptor 
data 
 
Equipment specification  
List of any RSC 
subcomponents 
 
Instructions for 
maintenance & 
calibration 
 
Verification Data List of test cases and procedures affected by any 
settable parameter 
RSC data sheet RSC functions 
Limitations 
Analysis of potential interface safety concerns 
Assumptions 
Configuration 
Supporting Data 
Open problem reports 
Software characteristics 
Other relevant information that supports the 
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Responsible Artefact Content 
integrator’s or applicant’s use of the RSC 
Integrator Software Verification 
Results, verification 
cases and verification 
Procedures repeated 
after integration 
 
System level PSAC for 
the target system 
The content includes the same sections as the 
Component PSAC but this time the information is a 
system level 
System level SDP The content includes the same sections as the 
Component SDP but this time the information is a 
system level 
System level System 
level Software 
Verification Plan (SVP) 
The content includes the same sections as the 
Component SVP but this time the information is a 
system level 
System level Software 
Quality Assurance Plan 
(SQAP) 
The content includes the same sections as the 
Component SQAP but this time the information is a 
system level 
System level Software 
Configuration 
Management Plan 
(SCMP) 
The content includes the same sections as the 
Component SCMP but this time the information is a 
system level 
System level Software 
Configuration Index 
The content includes the same sections as the 
Component SCI but this time the information is a 
system level 
System level SAS The content includes the same sections as the 
Component SAS but this time the information is a 
system level 
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Automotive.  
SEooC: 
Responsible Artefact Content 
Developer Item integration and testing 
plan(s) 
Safety activities for product 
development, testing 
hardware/software, element integration 
and item integration 
Methods and measures during design 
and integration 
Interface and interaction between HW 
and SW 
Level of robustness 
Effectiveness of a safety mechanism’s 
diagnosis or failure coverage 
Performance, accuracy and timing of 
safety mechanism 
Consist and correct implementation of 
interfaces 
Validation plan Criteria for safety validation 
Configuration of the item 
The specification of the validation 
processes, test cases, driving 
manoeuvres and acceptance criteria 
The equipment and the required 
environmental conditions 
Project plan (refined) Reference the safety plan 
Safety plan (refined) Implementation of project-independent 
safety activities, 
Definition of the tailored activities 
Planning: HARA, development activities, 
supporting processes, verification 
activities, confirmation reviews and 
analysis of depended failures 
F.S. assessment plan (refined) Work products required by the safety 
plan, the processes required for 
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Responsible Artefact Content 
functional safety and reviewing the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of the 
implemented safety measures 
Technical safety requirements 
specification 
External interfaces 
The constrains 
The system configuration requirements 
Ensure consistency with architectural 
assumptions 
Dependencies between system, item 
elements and other systems 
Response of the systems or elements  to 
stimuli that affect the achievement of 
safety goals 
Safety mechanism 
The transition to the safe state, the fault 
tolerant time interval 
System verification plan  
Technical safety concept  
System design specification  
HW/SW Interface Specification 
(HSI) 
 
System verification report 
(refined) 
 
Safety analysis report  
Integration testing 
specification(s) 
 
Integration testing report(s)  
Validation report  
Functional safety assessment 
report 
 
Release for production report  
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Responsible Artefact Content 
Hardware safety requirements 
specification (including test 
and qualification criteria) 
 
Hardware safety requirements 
verification report 
 
Hardware design specification  
Hardware safety analysis 
report 
 
Hardware design verification 
report 
 
Specification of requirements 
related to production, 
operation, service and 
decommissioning 
 
Analysis of the effectiveness of 
the architecture of the item to 
cope with the random 
hardware failures 
 
Review report of evaluation of 
the effectiveness of the 
architecture of the item to 
cope with the random 
hardware failures 
 
Analysis of safety goal 
violations due to random 
hardware failures 
 
Specification of dedicated 
measures for hardware 
 
Review report of evaluation of 
safety goal violations due to 
random hardware failures 
 
Hardware integration and 
testing report 
 
Software verification plan  
REFERENCES 
279 
 
Responsible Artefact Content 
Design and coding guidelines 
for modelling and 
programming languages 
 
Tool application guidelines  
Software safety requirements 
specification 
 
Software verification plan 
(refined) 
 
Software verification report  
Software architectural design 
specification 
 
Software safety requirements 
specification (refined) 
 
Safety analysis report  
Dependent failures analysis 
report 
 
Software unit design 
specification 
 
Software unit implementation  
Software verification 
specification 
 
Embedded software  
Assumed requirements related 
to design external to SEooC 
 
Report of probability of 
violation of safety goal due to 
random HW failure 
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SW component: 
Responsible Artefact Content 
Developer Evidence that the SW 
component complies with its 
requirements  
Show requirement coverage (Software 
verification Plan, Software verification 
specification and Software verification 
report)  
Cover both normal operating conditions and 
behaviour in case of failure 
Results from known errors to show that they 
do not lead to the violation of safety 
requirements 
Evidence that the SW 
component is suitable for its 
intended  
Verification of the validity of the intended 
use 
Specification of the software component 
comply with the requirements of the 
intended use 
Evidence that the software 
development process for the 
component is based on an 
appropriate standard 
 
Software component 
documentation 
Requirements of the software component 
Configuration description 
Interfaces description 
Application manual 
Software integration description 
Reaction of the functions under anomalous 
operating conditions 
Dependencies with other software 
components 
Know anomalies description with 
correspondent work-around measures 
Software component 
qualification report 
Unique identification of the SW component 
The unique configuration of the SW 
component 
The person or the organization who carried 
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Responsible Artefact Content 
out with the qualification 
The environment used for qualification 
The results of the verification measures 
applied to qualify the software component 
The maximum target ASIL of any safety 
requirement that might be violated of the 
SW component performs incorrectly 
Safety plan refinement Unique identification of the SW component 
The maximum target ASIL of any safety 
requirement that might be violated of the 
SW component performs incorrectly 
The activities that shall be carried out to 
qualify the software component 
 
Hardware component 
Responsible Artefact Content 
Developer Qualification plan Identification and version of the hardware 
component or part 
Specification of the environment in which the 
hardware component or part is intended to be used 
Qualification strategy and rationale 
Tools and equipment used for implementing the 
strategy 
Party responsible for qualification 
Criteria used to assess the hardware qualification 
Hardware component 
test plan 
Description of the functions 
Number and sequence of test 
Requirements for assembly and connections 
Procedure for accelerated ageing 
Operating and environmental conditions to be 
simulated 
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Pass/fail criteria established 
Environmental parameters 
Qualification report The analytical methods and assumptions 
Data from operational experience or testing result 
A rationale for each assumption 
The results of the verification measures applied to 
qualify the component 
 
Properties 
Avionics.  
Category Property 
Installation Configuration Interface specification 
Settable parameters specification 
Intended use description 
Environment Hardware 
Software 
Safety Possible safety problems 
Safety features 
Safety related requirements 
Failure categories 
Failure conditions 
Protection mechanism 
Risk mitigation 
Assumptions 
Operational Software levels 
Operational specifications 
Operation possible effects (problems) 
Limitations 
Functional Architecture & design features 
Safety architectural function 
Performance Performance specifications 
Performance possible effects (problems) 
Reuse issues  Timing 
Memory Usage 
Resource usage 
Resource items 
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Data coupling 
Partitioning 
Protection 
Deactivated code 
Traceability 
Robustness 
Reuse -compliance Analysis of all interfaces  
Analysis of all settable parameters  
Analysis of all assumptions of intended use 
Safety Analysis 
Applicable credit for reusable test 
Automotive.  
Category Property 
Installation Description on configuration 
Interfaces 
Application manual 
Software component integrations 
Environment  
 environmental endurance  
 tools and equipment 
Environmental conditions  
 limits of these conditions 
Environmental parameters 
Requirements for assembly 
Safety RequirementsMaximum ASIL of any safety requirement  
Known anomalies  work around measures 
Requirements coverage 
Functions  functional performance 
Failure modes  failure mode distributions  failure models 
Diagnostic capability 
Limits of use 
Operational Operational effects (problems) 
Operational conditions  limitations 
Behaviour 
Dependencies 
Functional Requirements for testing equipment 
Pass/fail criteria for test 
Analytical method use 
Rationale for each assumption 
Performance Procedure for accelerated ageing 
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Robustness 
Conditions/ test cases 
Reuse -compliance Criteria to assess qualification 
Industry 
Category Property 
Installation Input/output interfaces  interface constrains 
Hardware /Software configurations  hardware run-time 
environment  compilation – link system 
Maintenance requirements 
Installation instructions 
Compatibility with other systems 
Configurable elements  methods for configuration 
Safety Safe state Design  
Instructions or constrains observable to prevent systematic 
failures 
Anomalies 
Information for external diagnosis of failure mode 
Failure mode  failure rates failure mode of the diagnostic 
internal  diagnostic test interval  outputs initiated by the 
diagnosis 
Operational Evidence for systematic capability to provide functionality 
Constrains on the use  Assumptions on the use 
Functional Functions specification 
 
Performance Behaviour analysis 
Periodic proof test 
Hardware fault tolerance 
Reuse/compliance Competence  minimum degree of knowledge expected of the 
integration (example tools) 
Degree of reliance 
 
Process 
Avionics.  
Responsible Process/Activity 
Developer Plan development 
Verification procedures 
Certification liaison process 
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Inform any deviation from plans 
Make reviews and adjustments 
Prescribe activities to gain full credit for the installation 
Identify verification activities that integrator must repeat 
Analysis of any potential functional, operational, performance and safety 
effects 
Analysis of all interfaces  
Analysis of all settable parameters 
Define Installation or integration procedures 
Define periodic maintenance and/or calibration 
Process for making some data available to the applicant, without 
supplying the data to the applicant 
Identify and maintain data to support changes to the RSC 
Retain and maintain a list of all integrators and applicants buying or using 
their components 
Integrator Activities prescribe by developer to gain full credit for the installation 
Repeat verification activities define by developer 
Retest where new setting or parameters may affect the requirements, 
code, function, performance, or protection features 
Analysis of data coupling and control coupling of the RSC 
Development of new test cases and procedures to complete all test and 
test coverage objectives 
Open problem reports on the RSC and analysis of any potential 
functional, operational, performance and safety effects 
Integrate plans into own software lifecycle 
Produce a system level plans 
Evaluate safety, operational, performance and functional impacts 
Follow the approved plans and standards 
Validate the assumptions made by RSC’s developer 
Validate and verify the throughput, timing, memory usage, resource 
usage, and other resource items 
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Report in-service problems with the RSC 
Investigate the in-service experience related to the RSC  
Establish a legal agreement with the RSC developer  
Submit all SCIs, SAS and other required software lifecycle data to the 
certification authority 
Automotive.  
Responsible Process/Activity 
Developer Planning the activities that shall be carried out to qualify the 
software component 
Specify the software/hardware component or SEooC 
Provide evidence that software component complies with its 
requirements 
 Show requirement coverage I  part 6 clause 9 
 Verify both normal operating conditions and 
behaviour in the case of failure 
 Verify results that no known error lead to violation of 
safety requirements 
Integrator Measure structural coverage to evaluate completeness of test cases 
If necessary specify additional test cases or provide rational to 
ensure completeness to test cases 
Verification of qualification of a software component 
 
 
 
